Greetings, Comrade Kaganovich!

(Read the letter to Molotov)

1) Voroshilov visited me. We agreed on the following points (with the decisive word remaining, of course, with the Politburo):
a) The military budget for 1933 (including everything, including the increase in pay for Red Army soldiers and commanding personnel in 1933) must be drawn up within the range of 5-6 billion rubles and only in case of extreme necessity may be brought up to 6 (six) billion. Klim reminded me that I had spoken about two months ago of the possibility of raising this figure to 7 (seven) billion. But I rejected this reference, saying that the situation is now different.

b) The army deployment plan for 1933 in the event of war, submitted by the General Staff, is excessively inflated -- outrageously inflated -- and very burdensome for the state. It must be reworked and reduced to the maximum extent.

c) The peacetime strength of the army for 1932 (given according to the General Staff plan) is excessively inflated (reaching 1 million 100 thousand men). The General Staff forgets that the mechanization of the army in all countries leads to a reduction in its size. According to the General Staff plan, it turns out that mechanization of our army should lead to an increase in its size. This is absurd, demonstrating the helplessness of our people in restructuring the army on the basis of mechanization. I understand that restructuring takes time, that a certain transitional period is needed. But then it is necessary, first, to determine the length of this transitional period, reducing it to a minimum. Second, alongside the decision on troop strength, another decision must be adopted on calendar deadlines for reducing the army's size as mechanization proceeds. Without such a parallel decision, the General Staff's draft on strength for 1932 cannot be accepted.

d) The resolutions on combat training (staff leadership, artillery, navy) are non-specific and require reworking. The resolutions must be drafted so that their implementation can be verified by the Revolutionary Military Council point by point, by concrete points (how many training ranges and when they will be set up, etc.).

e) The question of the Kremlin School should be resolved in the spirit of maintaining the current arrangement, i.e., the Revolutionary Military Council order should be rescinded.

2) The situation with Ukraine, as it appears, is not good. Kosior could be replaced only by Kaganovich. No other candidates are in view. Mikoyan is not suitable -- not only for Ukraine; he is not even suitable for the People's Commissariat of Supply (a helpless and disorganized "agitator"). But sending Kaganovich to Ukraine now is impossible (inexpedient!): it would weaken the CC Secretariat. We shall have to wait some time. As for Chubar, he can be left in place for now, and we shall see how he works.

3) I am sending you a most vile lampoon by the foreign correspondent Bassehes on Soviet economic policy. Bassehes is a correspondent of the "Neue Freie Presse." He once wrote vilely about forced labor in the timber industry. We wanted to expel him from the USSR, but owing to his repentance he was allowed to stay. He then wrote abominations about the cost-accounting policy. But we, in our stupidity, let these abominations pass. Now he is exercising his wit on the subject of the loan and collective farm trade. And we are silent like idiots, tolerating the slander of this lapdog of capitalist shopkeepers. Bol-she-viks, ha-ha...

I propose:
a) to heap mud on this capitalist scum in the pages of Pravda and Izvestia;
b) some time after that, to expel him from the USSR.

That is all. Greetings!

I. Stalin

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Source: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936, pp. 224-225.

RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 167-174.