I have received your message of October 1 informing me of your intention to send four convoys to the Soviet Union by the northern route in November, December, January and February. However, the information is depreciated by your further statement that the intention to send northern convoys to the U.S.S.R. is "not a contract or bargain," but merely a declaration which, I take it, may be renounced by the British side at any moment regardless of the effect on the Soviet armies at the front. I must say I cannot agree to this approach to the matter. The British Government's deliveries of munitions and other war cargoes to the U.S.S.R. cannot be treated other than as an obligation assumed by the British Government, in accordance with the terms of a special agreement between our two countries, in relation to the U.S.S.R., which for more than two years has borne the tremendous burden of the struggle against Hitler Germany, the common enemy of the Allies.

Nor can the fact be ignored that the northern route is the shortest, ensuring quickest delivery to the Soviet-German front of the munitions supplied by the Allies, and that unless that route is properly used the U.S.S.R. cannot get supplies on the required scale. As I have told you before, and as borne out by experience, shipment of munitions and other war materials to the U.S.S.R. through Persian ports simply cannot make up for the shortage, arising from non-shipment via the northern route, of munitions and materials which, it will be readily understood, are needed to fully meet the requirements of the Soviet armies. This year, however, the shipment of war cargoes by the northern route has, for some reason or other, decreased considerably compared with last year, thus making it impossible to fulfil the plan for military deliveries and running counter to the appropriate Anglo-Soviet protocol on war supplies. And so at the present time, when the Soviet Union is straining its forces to the limit in order to meet the needs of the front and ensure the success of the struggle against the main forces of our common enemy it would be impermissible to make supplies to the Soviet armies conditional on the arbitrary judgment of the British side. Such an approach cannot but be regarded as renunciation by the British Government of its obligations, as something in the nature of a threat to the U.S.S.R.

2. Concerning what you describe as controversial points in V. M. Molotov's communication, I must say that I see no grounds whatever for this comment. In my view the principle of reciprocity and equality, advanced by the Soviet side for settling all visa matters affecting the personnel of the Military Missions,
is sound and really
just. I am not convinced by the point that the difference in the functions of the British and Soviet Military Missions precludes the application of the above principle and that the numerical strength of the British Military Mission should be determined solely by the British Government. This matter has already been dealt with in sufficient detail in the appropriate aide-memoires of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

3. I see no need for increasing the numbers of the British military personnel in the Soviet North, for the overwhelming majority of the British military personnel there now are not being used properly and have for months been doomed to idleness, something repeatedly pointed out by the Soviet side. As an example Base No. 126 at Archangel can be given, the abolition of which in view of its uselessness had been suggested more than once and to which abolition the British Government has only now agreed. I regret to say there are also instances of impermissible behaviour on the part of individual British servicemen, who in a number of cases resorted to corruption in their efforts to recruit certain Soviet citizens for intelligence purposes. Facts such as these, which offend Soviet citizens, naturally, give rise to incidents with undesirable complications.

4. With regard to the formalities and certain restrictions imposed in our northern ports, mentioned by you, it should be borne in mind that in a zone adjoining the front these formalities and restrictions are inevitable in view of the military situation in which the U.S.S.R. now finds itself. Besides, they apply in equal measure to British and other foreign citizens as well as to Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, in this respect too, the Soviet authorities have granted British servicemen and seamen a number of privileges, of which the British Embassy was informed in March. It follows that your reference to numerous formalities and restrictions is based on inaccurate information. As regards censorship and penalties in relation to British Service personnel, I have no objection to the censorship of private mail for the British personnel in our northern ports being handled, on a reciprocal basis, by the British authorities, nor to British personnel who have committed minor offences that do not involve judicial investigation being dealt with by the appropriate military authorities.

October 13, 1943