The Lessons of the Uprising in Georgia

A living example of such a turn of affairs is the recent Georgian uprising [68]. In our newspapers they write about sham actions in Georgia. This is true, for on the whole the uprising in Georgia was artificial, not a popular one. However, in some places the Mensheviks succeeded, owing to the poor connection of the Communist Party with the masses, in drawing a part of the peasant masses into the uprising. It is characteristic that these localities are the most saturated with Communist forces. In these localities there are relatively far more Communists than in the rest. And it is precisely here that people overlooked, missed, failed to notice that there was ferment among the peasants, that the peasants were preparing for something, that they had discontent, that it had been accumulating from day to day, and the Party knew nothing about it. The localities most saturated with Communists proved to be the most detached from the moods, from the thoughts and aspirations of the non-Party peasantry. That is the crux of the matter.

How could this incongruity have occurred? It happened because the Communists were unable to approach the peasants in a Leninist manner, created an atmosphere of mutual distrust instead of an atmosphere of trust, and thus severed the Party from the non-Party peasants. It is interesting that one of the most active workers of Georgia explains this incongruity by the weakness of the local Soviets and the Party’s isolation from the non-Party masses. “Undoubtedly,” he says, “the primary reason why we could overlook the growing unrest must be sought in the weakness of the local Soviets.” Lenin says that the Soviets are the most reliable barometer, the most reliable indicator of the mood of the peasantry. And it was precisely this barometer that was missing from the hands of the Communist Party in certain districts of Georgia.

Comrades, the events in Georgia must be considered indicative. What happened in Georgia can be repeated throughout all of Russia, if we do not fundamentally change the very approach to the peasantry, if we do not create an atmosphere of complete trust between the party and the non-party people, if we do not listen to the voice of the non-party people, and finally, if we do not revive the Soviets in order to give an outlet to the political activity of the laboring masses of the peasantry.

One of two things: either we will be able to establish a correct Leninist approach toward the non-Party peasants in order to channel the growing political activity of the peasantry into the mainstream of Soviet construction and thus ensure the leadership of the peasants by the workers; or we will not be able to do so, and then the political activity of the masses will bypass the Soviets, go over the heads of the Soviets, erupting in bandit actions, like the uprising in Georgia.

That is how the question stands, comrades.