Greetings, Comrade Kaganovich!

1) I received the letter of the 7th. We must not grant de jure recognition to the Manchurian state. By insisting on recognition from our side, the Japanese are calculating on setting us at odds with either China or Manchuria: if we recognize Manchuria, we quarrel with China; if we refuse to recognize it, we quarrel with the Manchurian government. This is how the Japanese reason with their shallow, if cunning, minds. But this game does not display great intelligence. If recognition is so necessary and reasonable, why are the Japanese themselves in no hurry to recognize their own creation?

We should tell the Japanese that we are studying the question of formal recognition, as well as the question of why the Japanese themselves are in no hurry to recognize the Manchurian state. Upon completing our study of these questions -- which, unfortunately, is somewhat delayed by the departure on leave of members of the CEC session, without whom the recognition question cannot be decided -- we will communicate the results to the Japanese. This should be communicated not only to Hayashi (commander of the Japanese Korean Army -- Ed.) but also -- simultaneously and obligatorily -- to the Manchurians themselves. In order to reassure the Japanese and the Manchurians, it should be stated to them simultaneously that we have never in principle rejected, and do not reject, de jure recognition, but that in practice such questions are not decided at a single stroke and require study. That this is so is evident from the fact that we agreed to receive consuls from the Manchurian government, did not allow Lytton (Lord Lytton, chairman of the League of Nations commission created to study the disagreements between China and Japan -- Ed.) to travel to Manchoukuo, and are pursuing a line of strict neutrality. And so on in this vein.

2) The Politburo apparently does not take into account the major changes that have occurred in the international world recently. The most important of these changes is that the influence of the USA has begun to decline both in China -- in favor of Japan -- and in Europe (especially after von Papen's coming to power) -- in favor of France. This is a very important circumstance. In connection with this, the USA will be seeking ties with the USSR. And they are already seeking them. One proof is the arrival of Lancaster, a representative of one of the most powerful banks in America. Take this new circumstance into account.

Greetings.

I. Stalin.

Source: Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936], pp. 158-159.

RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 100, ll. 142-145.

NOTE

On June 16, 1932, the Politburo instructed M.M. Slavutsky, the USSR consul general in Harbin, to give Ohashi (the minister of foreign affairs of Manchukuo) the following answer: "The Soviet Government is now studying the question of formal recognition of Manchukuo, as well as, in connection with this, the fact of non-recognition of Manchukuo on Japan's part.

After studying the question, which study, unfortunately, is being hindered by the departure on summer leave of members of the Central Executive Committee, without whom a decision on this question cannot be adopted, we shall communicate the results. The Soviet Government in principle has never rejected and does not reject recognition of Manchukuo de jure, but in practice such questions are not decided immediately.

That this is so is clear from the Soviet Government's attitude toward Manchukuo. Manchukuo can judge this from the Soviet Government's policy on the Chinese Eastern Railway, from the fact of our agreement to the appointment of Manchurian consuls in the USSR, and from our line of strict neutrality, which found expression, in particular, in the Soviet Government's attitude toward the Lytton Commission, which wished to travel to Manchukuo through Soviet territory."

Slavutsky was instructed simultaneously to communicate this answer directly to the Manchurians, and A.A. Troyanovsky (the Soviet plenipotentiary in Japan. - Ed.) to the Japanese government.