Some comrades, in their speeches on the sovkhozes, have returned to yesterday’s disputes on the grain-procurement question. Well then, let us return to yesterday’s disputes.

What were we arguing about yesterday? First of all, about the “scissors” between town and country. The point was that the peasant is still overpaying for manufactured goods and under-receiving for agricultural products. The point was that these overpayments and under-receipts constitute a super-tax on the peasantry, something in the nature of a “tribute,” an additional tax for the benefit of industrialization, which we must definitely abolish but which we cannot abolish right now, unless we intend to undermine our industry, to undermine the definite tempo of development of our industry, which works for the whole country and impels our national economy toward socialism.

Some people did not like this. These comrades, apparently, are afraid to admit the truth. Well, that is a matter of taste. Some think that one should not tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee. But I think that we are duty bound to tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee of our Party. It should not be forgotten that a plenum of the Central Committee cannot be regarded as a mass meeting. Of course, the words “super-tax,” “additional tax” are unpleasant words, because they hit one right in the nose. But, firstly, it is not a matter of words. Secondly, the words fully correspond to reality. Thirdly, these unpleasant words are precisely meant to hit one in the nose and to compel the Bolsheviks to address in the most serious way the task of eliminating this “super-tax,” of eliminating the “scissors.”

And how can these unpleasant things be eliminated? By systematically rationalizing our industry and reducing prices on manufactured goods. By systematically raising the technology and yield of agriculture and gradually cheapening agricultural products. By systematically rationalizing our trade and procurement apparatuses. And so on, and so forth.

All this, of course, cannot be done in a year or two. But we must necessarily do it over a number of years if we want to rid ourselves of all kinds of unpleasant things and glaring phenomena.

A section of the comrades yesterday bent the line toward the immediate elimination of the "scissors" and in essence demanded the introduction of restoration prices for agricultural products. I, together with other comrades, objected to this, saying that this demand runs counter to the interests of the country's industrialization at the present moment, and therefore runs counter to the interests of our state.

That is what our dispute yesterday was about, comrades.

Today these comrades admit that they are renouncing the policy of restoration prices. Well, that is very good. It turns out that yesterday's criticism did not go in vain for these comrades.

The second question concerns collective farms and state farms. I noted in my speech the unnaturalness and strangeness of the fact that a section of the comrades, in their statements on measures to raise agriculture in connection with grain procurements, did not touch upon in a single word such serious measures as the development of collective farms and state farms. How can one "forget" such serious things as the task of developing collective farms and state farms in agriculture? Is it really unknown that the task of developing individual peasant farming, for all its importance at the present moment, has already become insufficient, that if we do not supplement this task in practice with new tasks of developing collective farms and state farms, we will not solve the grain problem and will not emerge from difficulties either in terms of the socialist transformation of our entire national economy (and therefore of peasant farming as well), or in terms of providing the country with known reserves of marketable grain?

How can one, after all this, "forget", bypass and hush up the question of developing collective farms and state farms?

Let us now pass to the question of large state farms. Those comrades are wrong who assert that large grain farms do not exist in North America. In reality, such farms exist both in North and in South America. I could refer to such a witness as Professor Tulaykov, who published the results of his survey of American agriculture in the journal *Nizhneye Povolzhye*[56] (No. 9).

Allow me to quote from Tulaykov’s article.

“The wheat enterprise in Montana belongs to the Campbell Farming Corporation. Its area is 95,000 acres, or about 32,000 desyatins. The farm lies in one contiguous tract and is divided for operational purposes into 4 sections, or farms in our sense, each under the charge of a separate manager, while the entire enterprise is directed by one person—the director of this corporation, Thomas Campbell.

This year, according to newspaper information—which, of course, originates from this same enterprise—about half of the total area is under cultivation, and the anticipated harvest is around 410,000 bushels of wheat (about 800,000 poods), 20,000 bushels of oats, and 70,000 bushels of flaxseed. The total income from the enterprise is expected to be 500,000 dollars.”

Horses and mules on this farm have been almost entirely replaced by tractors, trucks and automobiles. Ploughing, sowing and, in general, all field work, and especially the harvesting of grain, are carried out day and night, the machines working in the fields at night under the light of searchlights. The enormous sown areas allow implements to work over very long distances without turning. Thus, combined harvester-threshers, if the condition of the crop permits their use, with a width of 24 feet, cover a distance of 20 miles, i.e. a little over 30 versts. Previously, this work required 40 horses and men. Binders behind the tractor move four abreast, covering a strip 40 feet wide and 28 miles long at a time, i.e. a distance of roughly 42 versts. Binding is used when the grain is not sufficiently dry to be threshed at the same time as reaping. In that case, the binding apparatus is removed from the binder, and the cut grain is laid in rows by means of a special conveyor. The grain thus laid out lies for 24 and 48 hours; during this time it dries out, and the seeds of the weeds cut at the same time fall onto the ground. Then the harvester-thresher is set to work, equipped with a self-feeder instead of a knife, which feeds the dried grain from the ground directly into the threshing drum. In this operation, only the tractor driver and one man on the thresher work on the machine. There is no one else on it. The grain from the thresher is poured directly into wagon-carts with a capacity of 6 tons, and tractors haul trains of 10 such wagons to the grain collection points. The note indicates that between 16 and 20 thousand bushels of grain are threshed daily when working in this way.” (See “Nizhneye Povolzhye” No. 9, September 1927, pp. 38–39.)

Here you have a description of one of the giant wheat farms of the capitalist type. Such giant farms exist in both North and South America.

Some comrades have said here that conditions for the development of such gigantic farms in capitalist countries are not always favorable, or not entirely favorable, as a result of which such farms sometimes break up into smaller units of 1,000 to 5,000 dessiatins each. This is absolutely correct.

On this basis these comrades think that large grain farms have no future under Soviet conditions as well. That is utterly incorrect.

These comrades evidently do not understand, or do not see the difference in conditions between the capitalist order and the Soviet order. Under capitalism there exists private ownership of land, and hence absolute land rent, which raises the cost of agricultural production and places insurmountable obstacles to its serious progress. Under the Soviet order, however, there exists neither private ownership of land nor absolute land rent, which cannot but cheapen the production of agricultural products and, consequently, cannot but facilitate the forward movement of enlarged agriculture along the path of technical and all other progress.

Furthermore, under capitalism large grain farms have as their aim the obtaining of maximum profit, or at least such a profit on capital as can correspond to the so-called average rate of profit, without which they, generally speaking, are unable to maintain themselves and exist. This circumstance cannot but raise the cost of production, thereby creating the most serious obstacles to the development of large grain farms. Under the Soviet order, however, large grain farms, which are at the same time state farms, do not at all need for their development either maximum profit or average profit, but can limit themselves merely to a minimum of profit (and sometimes temporarily can dispense with any profit at all), which, along with the absence of absolute land rent, creates exceptionally favorable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Finally, under capitalism, large grain farms do not enjoy any preferential credits or preferential taxes, whereas under the Soviet system, designed to give every possible support to socialist farming, such preferences exist and will continue to exist.

All these and similar conditions create, under the Soviet system (as distinct from the capitalist system), a highly favourable environment necessary for further advancing the development of state farms as large grain farms.

Finally, the question of state farms and collective farms as strongpoints for strengthening the bond, as strongpoints for ensuring the leading role of the working class. We need collective farms and state farms not only to secure our long-term goals of the socialist transformation of the countryside. We also need collective farms and state farms in order to have in the countryside, even now, socialist economic strongpoints necessary for strengthening the bond, necessary for ensuring the leading role of the working class within the bond. Can we already count on the creation and development of such strongpoints? I have no doubt that we can and must count on this. Khlebotsentr[57] reports that it has contracts with collective farms, artels and partnerships, under which it is to receive 40–50 million poods of grain from them. As for state farms, the data show that our old and new state farms are to produce, this year too, 25–30 million poods of marketable grain.

If we add to this the 30–35 million poods that are to be obtained by agricultural cooperation from individual peasant farms linked to it through the contract system, we will have over 100 million poods of fully secured grain, which can serve as a certain reserve, at least on the home market. That is something, after all.

Here you have the first results of our socialist economic strongpoints in the countryside.

And what follows from this? What follows from this is that those comrades who think that the working class is helpless in the countryside in the matter of defending its socialist positions, that it supposedly has only one alternative left: to yield endlessly and continuously surrender its positions to the capitalist elements, are wrong. No, comrades, that is incorrect. The working class is not as weak in the countryside as might appear to a superficial observer. This cheerless philosophy has nothing in common with Bolshevism. The working class possesses a whole series of economic strongpoints in the countryside in the form of sovkhozes, kolkhozes, supply-and-marketing cooperatives, by relying on which it can strengthen the bond with the countryside, isolate the kulak and ensure its leadership. The working class, finally, possesses a series of political strongpoints in the countryside in the form of the Soviets, in the form of the organized poor peasants, etc., by relying on which it can strengthen its positions in the countryside.

Relying on these economic and political bases in the countryside and employing all the means and forces at the disposal of the proletarian dictatorship (commanding heights, etc.), the Party and the Soviet government can confidently carry forward the cause of the socialist transformation of the countryside, strengthening step by step the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, strengthening step by step the leadership of the working class in this alliance.

Particular attention must be devoted here to work among the rural poor. It must be taken as a rule that the better and more successfully our work among the poor proceeds, the higher the authority of Soviet power in the countryside, and conversely, the worse our affairs with the poor stand, the lower the authority of Soviet power.

We speak often of an alliance with the middle peasant. But in order to strengthen this alliance under our conditions, we must wage a resolute struggle against the kulaks, against the capitalist elements in the countryside. That is why the Fifteenth Congress of our Party was absolutely right when it issued the slogan of intensifying the offensive against the kulaks. But is it possible to wage a successful struggle against the kulaks without carrying on intensified work among the poor peasants, without rousing the poor peasants against the kulaks, without rendering systematic assistance to the poor peasants? It is clear that it is not! The middle peasant is a vacillating class. If our work among the poor peasants is poor, if the poor peasants do not yet constitute an organised support of Soviet power – the kulak feels himself strong, the middle peasant vacillates towards the kulak. And conversely: if our work among the poor peasants is good, if the poor peasants constitute an organised support of Soviet power – the kulak feels himself in a state of siege, the middle peasant vacillates towards the working class.

That is why I think that intensifying work among the poor peasants, organising systematic assistance to the poor peasants, and, finally, transforming the poor peasants themselves into an organised support of the working class in the countryside – is one of the most essential immediate tasks of our Party.

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