July 28, 1927

I. ON THE THREAT OF WAR

There can hardly be any doubt that the fundamental question of the present time is the question of the threat of a new imperialist war. We are not speaking of some vague and incorporeal "danger" of a new war. We are speaking of a real and actual threat of a new war in general, and of a war against the USSR in particular.

The redivision of the world and of spheres of influence carried out as a result of the last imperialist war has already managed to become "outdated." Certain new countries have come to the fore (America, Japan). Certain old countries are falling behind (England). Capitalist Germany, which had been buried at Versailles, is reviving and growing, gathering ever more strength. Bourgeois Italy is pushing upward, casting envious glances at France.

A furious struggle is underway for markets for the sale of goods, for markets for the export of capital, for sea and land routes to these markets, for a new redivision of the world. The contradictions between America and England, between Japan and America, between England and France, between Italy and France are growing.

The contradictions within the capitalist countries are growing, bursting through from time to time in the form of open revolutionary actions by the proletariat (England, Austria).

The contradictions between the imperialist world and the dependent countries are growing, constantly bursting through in the form of open conflicts and revolutionary explosions (China, Indonesia, North Africa, South America).

But the growth of all these contradictions means the growth of the crisis of world capitalism, despite the fact of stabilization — a crisis incomparably deeper than the crisis before the last imperialist war. The existence and prosperity of the USSR, a country of the proletarian dictatorship, only deepens and sharpens this crisis.

It is not surprising that imperialism is preparing for a new war, seeing it as the only path to resolving this crisis. The unprecedented growth of armaments, the general course of bourgeois governments toward fascist methods of "governance," the crusade against communists, the furious campaign of incitement against the USSR, direct intervention in China — all these are various sides of one and the same phenomenon: preparation for a new war for a new redivision of the world.

They, the imperialists, would long ago have fought among themselves had it not been for the communist parties, which are waging a determined struggle against imperialist wars; had it not been for the USSR, whose peaceful policy is a heavy weight on the legs of the instigators of a new war; had it not been for the fear of weakening each other and thereby facilitating a new breach in the imperialist front.

I think that the last circumstance — that is, the fear of weakening each other and thereby facilitating a new breach in the imperialist front — is one of the important factors restraining for now the impulse toward mutual fighting.

Hence the "natural" striving of certain imperialist circles to push aside the contradictions within their own camp, to paper them over temporarily, to create a united front of imperialists and march against the USSR, in order to resolve the deepening crisis of capitalism at least partially, at least temporarily, at the expense of the USSR.

The fact that the initiative in this matter, in the matter of creating a united front of imperialists against the USSR, has been taken up by the English bourgeoisie and its fighting staff, the Conservative Party — this fact should not represent anything unexpected for us. English capitalism always has been, is, and will be the most vicious strangler of popular revolutions. From the great French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century to the Chinese revolution now taking place, the English bourgeoisie has always stood and continues to stand in the front ranks of those who crush the liberation movement of humanity. Soviet people will never forget the violence, plunder, and military invasions to which our country was subjected a few years ago at the behest of English capitalists. What is so surprising, then, if English capital and its Conservative Party undertake once more to lead the war against the world center of proletarian revolution, against the USSR?

But the English bourgeoisie does not like to fight with its own hands. It has always preferred to wage war with the hands of others. And it has sometimes actually succeeded in finding fools ready to pull chestnuts out of the fire for it.

Thus it was during the great French bourgeois revolution, when the English bourgeoisie managed to create a union of European states against revolutionary France.

Thus it was after the October Revolution in the USSR, when the English bourgeoisie, having attacked the USSR, attempted to create a "union of fourteen states" and when, despite this, it was kicked out of the borders of the USSR.

Thus it is now in China, where the English bourgeoisie is attempting to create a united front against the Chinese revolution.

It is entirely understandable that the Conservative Party, preparing for war with the USSR, has for several years now been conducting preparatory work to create a "holy alliance" of large and small states against the USSR.

If previously, until recent times, this preparatory work of the Conservatives was conducted more or less covertly, then lately, in the most recent period, they have moved to "direct action," striking open blows against the USSR and attempting to cobble together in plain view the notorious "holy alliance."

The first open blow was struck by the Conservative government of England in Peking with the attack on the Soviet plenipotentiary mission. This attack pursued at least two aims. It was supposed to uncover "terrible" documents of the "subversive" work of the USSR, intended to create an atmosphere of general indignation and a basis for a united front against the USSR. It was supposed to create a military conflict with the Peking government and draw the USSR into a war with China.

This blow failed, as is well known.

The second open blow was struck in London with the attack on ARCOS and the break with the USSR. This blow had as its aim the creation of a united front against the USSR, the opening of a diplomatic blockade of the USSR throughout Europe, and the provocation of a series of breaks in treaty relations with the Soviet Union.

This blow also failed, as is well known.

The third open blow was struck in Warsaw through the organization of the murder of Voikov. The murder of Voikov, organized by agents of the Conservative Party, was meant, according to the design of its authors, to play the role of the assassination in Sarajevo, drawing the USSR into a military conflict with Poland.

This blow also, it would seem, failed.

How can one explain that these blows have not so far produced the effect the Conservatives expected from them?

By the conflicting interests of the various bourgeois states, many of which are interested in preserving economic ties with the USSR.

By the peace-loving policy of the USSR, firmly and unswervingly pursued by the Soviet government.

By the unwillingness of states dependent on England — whether we are speaking of the state of Zhang Zuolin or the state of Pilsudski — to serve as a voiceless instrument of the Conservatives to the detriment of their own interests.

The respectable lords, evidently, do not wish to understand that every state, be it ever so insignificant, tends to consider itself a certain entity striving to live its own life and unwilling to stake its existence for the sake of the Conservatives' beautiful eyes. The English Conservatives forgot to take all these circumstances into account.

Does this mean that there will be no more such blows? No, it does not. On the contrary, it means only that the blows will be repeated with renewed force.

These blows cannot be considered accidental. They grew naturally out of the entire international situation, out of the position of the English bourgeoisie both in the "metropolis" and in the colonies, out of the position of the Conservative Party as the ruling party.

The entire present international situation, all the facts from the sphere of "operations" by the English government against the USSR — both that it is organizing a financial blockade of the USSR, and that it is conducting secret talks with the powers about policy against the USSR, and that it is subsidizing emigre "governments" of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc. for the purpose of organizing uprisings in these countries of the USSR, and that it is financing espionage and terrorist groups that blow up bridges, set fire to factories, and terrorize the plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR — all this tells us with absolute certainty that the English Conservative government has firmly and resolutely set out on the path of organizing war against the USSR. And under no circumstances can it be considered excluded that the Conservatives may succeed, under certain conditions, in cobbling together one or another military bloc against the USSR.

What are our tasks?

The task is to sound the alarm in all countries of Europe about the threat of a new war, to raise the vigilance of the workers and soldiers of the capitalist countries, and to prepare the masses, tirelessly prepare them for meeting in full readiness of revolutionary struggle any and all attempts by bourgeois governments to organize a new war.

The task is to pillory all those figures of the labor movement who "consider" the threat of a new war an "invention," who lull the workers with pacifist lies, who close their eyes to how the bourgeoisie is preparing a new war — for these people want the war to catch the workers by surprise.

The task is for the Soviet government to continue to pursue, firmly and unswervingly, a policy of peace, a policy of peaceful relations, despite the provocative antics of our enemies, despite the stings to our prestige.

We are taunted, and will continue to be taunted, by provocateurs from the hostile camp, claiming that our peaceful policy is explained by our weakness, the weakness of our army. This sometimes agitates some of our comrades, who are inclined to succumb to the provocation and demand the adoption of "decisive" measures. This is weakness of nerves. This is a lack of restraint. We cannot and must not dance to our opponents' tune. We must go our own way, upholding the cause of peace, demonstrating our will for peace, exposing the predatory intentions of our enemies, and presenting them as the instigators of war.

For only such a policy can give us the possibility of uniting the toiling masses of the USSR into a single fighting camp, should the enemy impose — or rather, when the enemy imposes — war upon us.

As for our "weakness," or the "weakness" of our army, our enemies are not making this mistake for the first time. Some eight years ago, when the English bourgeoisie undertook its intervention against the USSR and Churchill threatened a march of "fourteen states," the bourgeois press also screamed about the "weakness" of our army; however, the whole world knows that both the English interventionists and their allies were thrown out in disgrace from the borders of our country by our victorious army.

The gentlemen warmongers would do well to remember this.

The task is to raise the defense capability of our country, to develop our national economy, to improve our industry — both military and non-military — to raise the vigilance of the workers, peasants, and Red Army soldiers of our country, tempering in them the will to defend the socialist fatherland and eliminating the slackness that, unfortunately, has by no means yet been eliminated.

The task is to strengthen our rear and purge it of filth, not stopping short of reprisals against the "most illustrious" terrorists and arsonists of our factories and plants, for the defense of our country is impossible without a strong revolutionary rear.

Recently a protest was received from well-known figures of the English labor movement — Lansbury, Maxton, and Brockway — regarding the execution of twenty terrorists and arsonists from the ranks of Russian princes and noblemen. I cannot consider these figures of the English labor movement enemies of the USSR. But they are worse than enemies.

They are worse than enemies because, calling themselves friends of the USSR, they nevertheless facilitate by their protest the Russian landlords and English detectives in organizing further murders of representatives of the USSR.

They are worse than enemies because by their protest they are working toward leaving the workers of the USSR unarmed in the face of their sworn enemies.

They are worse than enemies because they do not want to understand that the execution of twenty "most illustrious" persons is a necessary measure of self-defense of the revolution.

It was said with good reason: "God save us from such friends; with enemies we shall deal ourselves."

As for the execution of twenty "most illustrious" persons, let the enemies of the USSR — internal enemies as well as external — know that the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR lives and its hand is firm.

What can one say, after all this, about our hapless opposition, in connection with its new attacks on the Party in the face of the threat of a new war? What can one say about the fact that this same opposition found it appropriate, on the occasion of the threat of war, to intensify its attacks on the Party? What good can there be in the fact that, instead of rallying around the Party against the external threat, it finds it appropriate to exploit the difficulties of the USSR's position for new attacks on the Party? Can it be that the opposition is against the victory of the USSR in the coming battles with imperialism, against raising the defense capability of the Soviet Union, against strengthening our rear? Or is this perhaps cowardice in the face of new difficulties, desertion, a desire to escape responsibility, covered up by the clatter of left phrases?...

II. ON CHINA

Now that the revolution in China has entered a new phase of development, we can draw up a certain balance sheet of the path traversed and examine the question of verifying the Comintern's line in China.

There exist certain tactical principles of Leninism, without taking into account which neither correct leadership of the revolution nor verification of the Comintern's line in China is possible. Our oppositionists have long since forgotten these principles. But precisely because the opposition suffers from forgetfulness, it is necessary to remind of them again and again.

I have in mind such tactical principles of Leninism as:
a) the principle of the mandatory taking into account of the nationally particular and nationally specific in each individual country when developing guiding directives of the Comintern for the labor movement of these countries;
b) the principle of the mandatory utilization by the Communist Party of each country of the slightest possibility to secure for the proletariat a mass ally, even if temporary, vacillating, unstable, and unreliable;
c) the principle of the mandatory recognition of the truth that for the political education of the millions of masses, propaganda and agitation alone are insufficient — for this, the masses' own political experience is necessary.

I think that the taking into account of these tactical principles of Leninism is that necessary condition without which a Marxist verification of the Comintern's line in the Chinese revolution is impossible.

Let us examine the questions of the Chinese revolution in the light of these tactical principles.

Despite the ideological growth of our Party, there still exists in our Party, unfortunately, a certain type of "leaders" who sincerely believe that it is possible to lead the revolution in China, so to speak, by telegraph, on the basis of well-known, universally recognized general theses of the Comintern, without taking into account the national peculiarities of the Chinese economy, the Chinese political system, Chinese culture, Chinese mores and traditions. These "leaders" are distinguished from real leaders precisely by the fact that they always have in their pockets two or three ready-made formulas "suitable" for all countries and "obligatory" under all conditions. For them, the question of taking into account the nationally particular and nationally specific in each country does not exist. For them, the question of connecting the general theses of the Comintern with the national peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in each country, of adapting the general theses of the Comintern to the national-state peculiarities of individual countries, does not exist.

They do not understand that the main task of leadership now, when the Communist Parties have grown and become mass parties, is to find, seize, and skillfully combine the nationally particular features of the movement in each country with the general theses of the Comintern, in order to facilitate and make practically achievable the fundamental aims of the communist movement.

Hence the attempts to standardize leadership for all countries. Hence the attempts to mechanically impose certain general formulas without regard for the concrete conditions of the movement in individual countries. Hence the eternal conflicts between formulas and the revolutionary movement in individual countries, as the basic result of the leadership of these sorry leaders.

Our oppositionists belong precisely to the category of such sorry leaders.

The opposition has heard that a bourgeois revolution is taking place in China. It knows, moreover, that the bourgeois revolution in Russia was directed against the bourgeoisie. Hence the ready-made formula for China: down with any joint actions with the bourgeoisie, long live the immediate exit of the communists from the Guomindang (April 1926).

But the opposition forgot that China, unlike Russia in 1905, is a semi-colonial country oppressed by imperialism, that the revolution in China is therefore not simply a bourgeois revolution, but a bourgeois revolution of the anti-imperialist type, that imperialism in China holds in its hands the basic threads of industry, trade, and transport, that the oppression of imperialism affects not only the toiling masses of China but also certain strata of the Chinese bourgeoisie, and that the Chinese bourgeoisie can therefore, under certain conditions and for a certain period, support the Chinese revolution.

In reality, that is precisely what happened, as is well known. If we take the Canton period of the Chinese revolution, the period of the advance of the national armies to the Yangtze, the period before the split in the Guomindang, one cannot but acknowledge that the Chinese bourgeoisie supported the revolution in China, that the Comintern's line on the permissibility of joint actions with this bourgeoisie for a certain period and under certain conditions proved to be entirely correct.

The result was the opposition's retreat from its old formula and the proclamation of a "new" formula: joint actions with the Chinese bourgeoisie are necessary, the communists must not leave the Guomindang (April 1927).

This was the first punishment of the opposition, suffered for its refusal to take into account the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolution.

The opposition has heard that the Peking government is quarreling with the representatives of the imperialist powers on the question of China's customs autonomy. The opposition knows that customs autonomy is needed, first and foremost, by the Chinese capitalists. Hence the ready-made formula: the Chinese revolution is national and anti-imperialist because its main aim is the conquest of China's customs autonomy.

But the opposition forgot that the strength of imperialism in China consists chiefly not in the customs restrictions on China, but in the fact that it owns factories, plants, mines, railways, steamships, banks, and trading houses there, sucking the blood of the workers and peasants of multi-million China.

The opposition forgot that the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism is explained, first and foremost and chiefly, by the fact that imperialism in China is that force which supports and inspires the direct exploiters of the Chinese people — the feudal lords, the militarists, the capitalists, the bureaucrats, etc. — and that the Chinese workers and peasants cannot overcome their exploiters without at the same time waging a revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

The opposition forgets that it is precisely this circumstance that is one of the most important factors making possible the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution.

The opposition forgets that whoever declares the Chinese anti-imperialist revolution to be a revolution for customs autonomy denies the possibility of the bourgeois revolution in China growing over into a socialist revolution, for he thereby places the Chinese revolution under the leadership of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

And indeed, the facts subsequently showed that customs autonomy is essentially the platform of the Chinese bourgeoisie, for even such hardened reactionaries as Zhang Zuolin and Chiang Kai-shek now speak in favor of abolishing the unequal treaties and establishing customs autonomy in China.

Hence the vacillation of the opposition, its attempts to wriggle away from its own formula about customs autonomy, its attempts to quietly abandon it and sidle up to the Comintern's position on the possibility of the bourgeois revolution in China growing over into a socialist revolution.

This was the second punishment of the opposition, suffered for its refusal to seriously study the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolution.

The opposition has heard that the merchant bourgeoisie has penetrated the Chinese countryside, leasing land to destitute peasants. The opposition knows that a merchant is not a feudal lord. Hence the ready-made formula: the remnants of feudalism, and consequently the struggle of the peasantry against the survivals of feudalism, do not have serious significance in the Chinese revolution; the main thing now in China is not the agrarian revolution, but the question of China's state-customs dependence on the imperialist countries.

But the opposition does not see that the peculiarity of the Chinese economy consists not in the penetration of merchant capital into the countryside, but in the combination of the dominance of feudal survivals with the existence of merchant capital in the Chinese countryside, with the preservation of feudal-medieval methods of exploitation and oppression of the peasantry.

The opposition does not understand that the entire present military-bureaucratic machine in China, which inhumanly plunders and oppresses the Chinese peasantry, is essentially the political superstructure over this combination of the dominance of feudal survivals and feudal methods of exploitation with the existence of merchant capital in the countryside.

And indeed, the facts subsequently showed that a grandiose agrarian revolution unfolded in China, directed first and foremost and chiefly against the small and large feudal lords of China.

The facts showed that this revolution encompassed tens of millions of peasants and has a tendency to spread throughout all of China.

The facts showed that the feudal lords, real and living feudal lords, not only exist in China but hold power in their hands in a whole series of provinces, subordinate the commanding personnel of the army to their will, subordinate the leadership of the Guomindang to their influence, and deal blow after blow to the Chinese revolution.

To deny after this the existence of feudal survivals and of the feudal system of exploitation as the basic form of oppression in the Chinese countryside, to fail to recognize after this the agrarian revolution as the basic fact of the Chinese revolutionary movement at the present moment — would mean going against obvious facts.

Hence the opposition's retreat from its old formula on the question of feudal survivals and the agrarian revolution. Hence the opposition's attempts to slink away from its old formula and silently acknowledge the correctness of the Comintern's position.

This is the third punishment of the opposition for its unwillingness to reckon with the national peculiarities of the Chinese economy.

And so on and so forth.

The discord between formulas and reality — such is the lot of the sorry leaders of the opposition.

And this discord is a direct result of the opposition's break with the well-known tactical principle of Leninism on the mandatory taking into account of the nationally particular and nationally specific in the revolutionary movement of each individual country.

Here is how Lenin formulates this principle:

"The whole point now is that the communists of each country should quite consciously take into account both the fundamental tasks of the struggle against opportunism and 'left' doctrinairism, and the concrete peculiarities which this struggle assumes and inevitably must assume in each individual country, in accordance with the original features of its economics, politics, culture, its national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, its religious divisions, and so on and so forth. Everywhere there is felt, spreading and growing, dissatisfaction with the Second International both for its opportunism and for its inability or incapacity to create a truly centralized, truly leading center capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet republic. It must be clearly understood that such a leading center can in no case be built on standardization, on the mechanical equalization and identification of tactical rules of struggle. So long as national and state differences exist between peoples and countries — and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time even after the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world scale — the unity of the international tactics of the communist labor movement of all countries demands not the elimination of diversity, not the abolition of national differences (that is an absurd dream at the present moment), but such an application of the basic principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as will correctly modify these principles in particulars, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences. To investigate, study, discover, divine, grasp what is nationally particular and nationally specific in the concrete approach of each country to the solution of the single international task, to victory over opportunism and left doctrinairism within the labor movement, to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, to the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship — this is the main task of the historical moment being experienced by all the advanced (and not only the advanced) countries" (see "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," Vol. XXV, pp. 227–228).

The Comintern's line is the line of mandatory observance of this tactical principle of Leninism.

The opposition's line, on the contrary, is the line of a break with this tactical principle.

In this break lies the root of the opposition's misadventures in the questions of the character and perspectives of the Chinese revolution.

* * *

Let us proceed to the second tactical principle of Leninism.

From the character and perspectives of the Chinese revolution arises the question of the allies of the proletariat in its struggle for the victory of the revolution.

The question of the proletariat's allies is one of the fundamental questions of the Chinese revolution. Before the Chinese proletariat stand powerful adversaries: the small and large feudal lords, the military-bureaucratic machine of old and new militarists, the counter-revolutionary national bourgeoisie, the imperialists of East and West, who have seized in their hands the basic threads of China's economic life and who back up their right to exploit the Chinese people with troops and a navy.

To defeat these powerful adversaries, there is needed, in addition to everything else, a flexible and well-thought-out policy of the proletariat, the ability to exploit every crack in the camp of the adversaries, the ability to find allies for itself, even if these allies are vacillating and unstable, provided that these allies are mass allies, that they do not restrict the revolutionary propaganda and agitation of the party of the proletariat, do not restrict the work of this party in organizing the working class and the toiling masses.

Such a policy is the fundamental requirement of the second tactical principle of Leninism. Without such a policy, the victory of the proletariat is impossible.

The opposition considers such a policy incorrect, un-Leninist. But this only shows that it has lost the last remnants of Leninism, that it is as far from Leninism as the sky is from the earth.

Were there such allies for the Chinese proletariat in the recent past?

Yes, there were.

In the period of the first stage of the revolution, when the revolution was a revolution of a general-national united front (the Canton period), the allies of the proletariat were the peasantry, the urban poor, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, and the national bourgeoisie.

One of the peculiarities of the Chinese revolutionary movement is that representatives of these classes conducted joint work together with the communists within a single bourgeois-revolutionary organization called the Guomindang.

These allies were not and could not be equally reliable. Some of them were more or less reliable allies (the peasantry, the urban poor), others were less reliable and wavering (the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia), and still others were altogether unreliable (the national bourgeoisie).

The Guomindang at that time was unquestionably a more or less mass organization. The policy of the communists within the Guomindang consisted in isolating the representatives of the national bourgeoisie (the right wing), utilizing them in the interests of the revolution, pushing the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the left wing) to the left, and rallying the peasantry and urban poor around the proletariat.

Was Canton then the center of the revolutionary movement in China? Unquestionably, yes. This can now be denied only by the insane.

What were the achievements of the communists during this period? The expansion of the territory of the revolution, inasmuch as the Canton armies reached the Yangtze; the possibility of the open organization of the proletariat (trade unions, strike committees); the formation of communist organizations into a party; the creation of the first cells of peasant organizations (peasant unions); the penetration of communists into the army.

It follows that the Comintern's leadership during this period was entirely correct.

In the period of the second stage of the revolution, when Chiang Kai-shek and the national bourgeoisie went over to the camp of counter-revolution and the center of the revolutionary movement shifted from Canton to Wuhan, the allies of the proletariat were the peasantry, the urban poor, and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

How can the defection of the national bourgeoisie to the camp of counter-revolution be explained? By the national bourgeoisie's fear of the scope of the revolutionary movement of the workers — in the first place; by the pressure of the imperialists in Shanghai on the national bourgeoisie — in the second place.

The revolution thus lost the national bourgeoisie. This was a partial loss for the revolution. But it entered instead a higher phase of its development, the phase of the agrarian revolution, drawing the broad masses of the peasantry closer to itself. This was a plus for the revolution.

Was the Guomindang at that time, in the period of the second stage of the revolution, a mass organization? Unquestionably, yes. It was unquestionably a more mass organization than the Guomindang of the Canton period.

Was Wuhan then the center of the revolutionary movement? Unquestionably, yes. This can now be denied only by the blind. Otherwise, the territory of Wuhan (Hubei, Hunan) would not then have been the base for the maximum development of the agrarian revolution, led by the Communist Party.

The policy of the communists in relation to the Guomindang at that time consisted in pushing it to the left and transforming it into the nucleus of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Was the possibility of such a transformation present then? Yes, it was. In any case, there were no grounds for considering such a possibility excluded. We directly stated then that for the transformation of the Wuhan Guomindang into the nucleus of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, at least two conditions were necessary: the radical democratization of the Guomindang and the direct assistance of the Guomindang to the agrarian revolution. It would have been foolish on the part of the communists to refuse to attempt such a transformation.

What were the achievements of the communists during this period?

The Communist Party grew during this period from a small party of 5–6 thousand people into a large mass party of 50–60 thousand members.

The workers' trade unions grew into an enormous all-Chinese association numbering about 3 million members.

The initial peasant organizations grew into enormous associations encompassing several tens of millions of people. The agrarian movement of the peasantry expanded to grandiose proportions, occupying a central place in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The Communist Party won for itself the possibility of the open organization of revolution. The Communist Party was becoming the leader of the agrarian revolution. The hegemony of the proletariat was beginning to turn from a wish into a fact.

True, the Chinese Communist Party did not manage to exploit all the possibilities of this period. True, the CC of the Chinese Communist Party committed a series of major errors during this period. But it would be ridiculous to think that the Chinese Communist Party can become a real Bolshevik party, so to speak, in one sitting, on the basis of Comintern directives. One need only recall the history of our Party, which passed through a series of splits, secessions, betrayals, and treacheries, etc., to understand that real Bolshevik parties are not born in one sitting.

It follows, therefore, that the Comintern's leadership during this period, too, was entirely correct.

Are there allies for the Chinese proletariat now?

Yes, there are.

These allies are the peasantry and the urban poor.

The present period is characterized by the defection of the Wuhan Guomindang leadership to the camp of counter-revolution, by the defection of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia from the revolution.

This defection is explained, first, by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia's fear of the expanding agrarian revolution and the pressure of the feudal lords on the Wuhan leadership, and second, by the pressure of the imperialists in the Tianjin region, who demand from the Guomindang a break with the communists as the price for passage to the north.

The opposition doubts the existence of feudal survivals in China. But now it is clear to everyone that feudal survivals not only exist in China, but they have even turned out to be stronger than the thrust of the revolution at the present moment. And precisely because the imperialists and feudal lords in China have turned out to be for now stronger, the revolution has suffered a temporary defeat.

The revolution has this time lost the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

This is precisely what constitutes a sign of the temporary defeat of the revolution.

But in return it has more closely rallied around the proletariat the broad masses of the peasantry and the urban poor, thereby creating the basis for proletarian hegemony.

Herein lies the plus for the revolution.

The opposition explains the temporary defeat of the revolution by the policy of the Comintern. But only people who have broken with Marxism can speak in this way. Only people who have broken with Marxism can demand that a correct policy always and necessarily lead to immediate victory over the adversary.

Was the Bolsheviks' policy correct in the revolution of 1905? Yes, it was. Then why did the revolution of 1905 suffer defeat, despite the existence of Soviets, despite the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because the feudal survivals and the autocracy turned out to be stronger then than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

Was the Bolsheviks' policy correct in July 1917? Yes, it was. Then why did the Bolsheviks suffer defeat then, despite once again the existence of Soviets, which at the time betrayed the Bolsheviks, despite the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because Russian imperialism turned out to be stronger then than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

A correct policy by no means has to lead always and necessarily to immediate victory over the adversary. Immediate victory over the adversary is determined not only by a correct policy but, first and foremost and chiefly, by the correlation of class forces, a clear preponderance of forces on the side of the revolution, disintegration in the adversary's camp, and a favorable international situation.

Only under these conditions can the correct policy of the proletariat lead to immediate victory.

But there is one mandatory requirement that a correct policy must always satisfy under all conditions. This requirement consists in the policy of the party raising the combat capacity of the proletariat, multiplying its connections with the toiling masses, raising the authority of the proletariat among these masses, and transforming the proletariat into the hegemon of the revolution.

Can one assert that the past period represented the maximum of favorable conditions for the immediate victory of the revolution in China? Clearly, one cannot.

Can one assert that communist policy in China did not raise the combat capacity of the proletariat, did not multiply its connections with the broad masses, and did not raise the authority of the proletariat among these masses? Clearly, one cannot.

Only the blind can fail to see that during this time the Chinese proletariat managed to tear the broad masses of the peasantry away from both the national bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia for the purpose of rallying them around its banner.

The Communist Party passed through a bloc with the national bourgeoisie in Canton, in the first stage of the revolution, in order to expand the territory of the revolution, to take shape as a mass party, to create for itself the possibility of openly organizing the proletariat, and to pave the way to the peasantry.

The Communist Party passed through a bloc with the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the Guomindang in Wuhan, in the second stage of the revolution, in order to multiply its forces, expand the organization of the proletariat, tear the broad masses of the peasantry away from the Guomindang leadership, and create the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat.

The national bourgeoisie departed to the camp of counter-revolution, having lost its connections with the broad popular masses.

The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the Guomindang in Wuhan trailed after the national bourgeoisie, frightened by the agrarian revolution and having definitively discredited itself in the eyes of the millions of peasant masses.

But in return, the millions of peasant masses rallied more closely around the proletariat, seeing in it their sole reliable leader and guide.

Is it not clear that only a correct policy could have led to such results?

Is it not clear that only such a policy could have raised the combat capacity of the proletariat?

Who, besides the sorry leaders of our opposition, can deny the correctness and revolutionary character of such a policy?

The opposition asserts that the turn of the Wuhan Guomindang leadership toward counter-revolution demonstrates the incorrectness of the policy of the bloc with the Wuhan Guomindang in the second stage of the revolution.

But only people who have forgotten the history of Bolshevism and have lost the last remnants of Leninism can speak in this way.

Was the Bolshevik policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in October and after October, up to the spring of 1918, correct? I think no one has yet ventured to deny the correctness of this bloc. How did this bloc end? With the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries against Soviet power. Can one assert on this basis that the policy of the bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries was incorrect? Clearly, one cannot.

Was the policy of the revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Guomindang in the second stage of the Chinese revolution correct? I think no one has yet ventured to deny the correctness of such a bloc during the second stage of the revolution. The opposition itself asserted then (April 1927) that such a bloc was correct. How can one now, after the defection of the Wuhan Guomindang leadership from the revolution, assert on the basis of this defection that the revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Guomindang was incorrect?

Is it not clear that only spineless people can operate with such "arguments"?

Did anyone assert that the bloc with the Wuhan Guomindang was an eternal and never-ending bloc? Do eternal and never-ending blocs exist in nature? Is it not clear that the opposition has understood nothing, absolutely nothing, in the second tactical principle of Leninism on the revolutionary bloc of the proletariat with non-proletarian classes and groups?

Here is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

"To defeat a more powerful adversary is possible only by exerting the greatest effort and by necessarily making the most thorough, careful, attentive, and skillful use of every, even the smallest, 'crack' between enemies, every antagonism of interest between the bourgeoisie of the various countries, between various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries — as well as every, even the smallest, opportunity to gain a mass ally, even if temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. Those who do not understand this do not understand even a grain of Marxism and of modern, scientific socialism in general. Those who have not proved by their practice, over a fairly long period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice, have not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its struggle for the liberation of all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And what has been said applies equally to the period before and after the conquest of political power by the proletariat" (see "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," Vol. XXV, pp. 210–211).

Is it not clear that the line of the opposition is the line of a break with this tactical principle of Leninism?

Is it not clear that the Comintern's line, on the contrary, is the line of mandatory observance of this tactical principle?

* * *

Let us proceed to the third tactical principle of Leninism.

This tactical principle concerns the question of the changing of slogans, of the order and methods of this change. It concerns the question of how to transform slogans for the party into slogans for the masses, the question of how and by what means to lead the masses to revolutionary positions so that the masses themselves become convinced through their own political experience of the correctness of the party's slogans.

And one cannot convince the masses by propaganda and agitation alone. For this, the masses' own political experience is necessary. For this, it is necessary for the broad masses themselves to experience, on their own backs, the inevitability of, say, the overthrow of a given system, the inevitability of the establishment of new political and social orders.

It is good if the advanced group, the party, has already become convinced of the inevitability of overthrowing, say, the Provisional Government of Milyukov-Kerensky in April 1917. But this is still not enough for taking action to overthrow this government, for putting forward the slogan of the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power as the slogan of the day. In order to transform the formula "all power to the Soviets" from a perspective for the immediate period into the slogan of the day, the slogan of immediate action, one more decisive circumstance was necessary — namely, that the masses themselves become convinced of the correctness of this slogan and extend to the party some degree of support in carrying it out.

One must strictly distinguish between a formula as a perspective for the near future and a formula as a slogan of the day. It was precisely on this point that the group of Bolsheviks in Petrograd headed by Bagdatyev stumbled in April 1917, when it prematurely put forward the slogan "down with the Provisional Government, all power to the Soviets." Lenin then characterized this attempt by the Bagdatyev group as dangerous adventurism, publicly branding it.

Why?

Because the broad masses of toilers in the rear and at the front were not yet ready to accept this slogan. Because this group confused the formula "all power to the Soviets" as a perspective with the slogan "all power to the Soviets" as a slogan of the day. Because it ran ahead, placing the party before the threat of complete isolation from the broad masses, from the Soviets, which at the time still believed in the revolutionary character of the Provisional Government.

Should the Chinese communists have put forward, say, half a year ago, the slogan "down with the Guomindang leadership in Wuhan"? No, they should not have.

They should not have, because this would have been a dangerous running ahead, this would have made it difficult for the communists to reach the broad masses of toilers who still believed in the Guomindang leadership, this would have isolated the Communist Party from the broad peasant masses.

They should not have, because the Wuhan Guomindang leadership, the Wuhan CC of the Guomindang, had not yet exhausted itself as a bourgeois-revolutionary government, had not yet disgraced and discredited itself in the eyes of the broad masses of toilers by its struggle against the agrarian revolution, its struggle against the working class, its turn toward counter-revolution.

We always said that one cannot set a course for the discrediting and replacement of the Wuhan Guomindang leadership until it had exhausted itself as a bourgeois-revolutionary government, that one must first let it exhaust itself in order then to raise the practical question of its replacement.

Should the Chinese communists now put forward the slogan "down with the Guomindang leadership in Wuhan"? Yes, they must, they absolutely must.

Now, when the Guomindang leadership has already disgraced itself by its struggle against the revolution, having placed itself in hostile relations with the broad worker-peasant masses, this slogan will find a mighty response among the popular masses.

Now every worker and every peasant will understand that the communists acted correctly in leaving the Wuhan government and the Wuhan CC of the Guomindang and putting forward the slogan "down with the Guomindang leadership in Wuhan."

For the question now stands before the peasant and worker masses as a choice: either the present Guomindang leadership, and then — a refusal to satisfy the vital needs of these masses, a refusal of the agrarian revolution; or the agrarian revolution and a radical improvement in the position of the working class, and then — the replacement of the Guomindang leadership in Wuhan becomes the slogan of the day for the masses.

Such are the requirements of the third tactical principle of Leninism on the question of the changing of slogans, on the question of the ways and means of leading the broad masses to new revolutionary positions, on the question of helping the broad masses of toilers, through one's policy, one's actions, the timely replacement of some slogans by other slogans, to recognize through their own experience the correctness of the party's line.

Here is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

"It is impossible to win with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, while the whole class, while the broad masses have not yet taken up a position either of direct support for the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality toward it and complete inability to support its adversary, would be not merely folly but a crime. And for the whole class, for the broad masses of toilers and those oppressed by capital actually to take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not sufficient. For this, the masses' own political experience is needed. This is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, confirmed now with striking force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate masses of Russia, but also the highly cultured, universally literate masses of Germany required their own experience — experience on their own skins — to realize the total impotence, the total spinelessness, the total helplessness, the total servility before the bourgeoisie, the total baseness of the government of the knights of the Second International, the total inevitability of the dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn decisively toward communism. The immediate task of the class-conscious vanguard in the international labor movement, i.e., the communist parties, groups, and trends, is to be able to lead the broad (now still, in most cases, sleeping, apathetic, routine-ridden, inert, not yet awakened) masses to this new position of theirs, or, more precisely, to be able to lead not only one's own party but also these masses in their approach, their transition to the new position" (see "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," Vol. XXV, p. 228).

The fundamental error of the opposition is that it does not understand the meaning and significance of this tactical principle of Leninism; it does not recognize it; it systematically violates it.

It (the Trotskyists) violated this tactical principle at the beginning of 1917, when it tried to "leap over" the agrarian movement that had not yet been completed (see Lenin).

It (Trotsky-Zinoviev) violated it when it tried to "leap over" the reactionary character of the trade unions, refusing to recognize the expediency of communist work in reactionary trade unions and denying the necessity of temporary blocs with them.

It (Trotsky-Zinoviev-Radek) violated it when it tried to "leap over" the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolutionary movement (the Guomindang), the backwardness of the Chinese popular masses, demanding in April 1926 the immediate exit of communists from the Guomindang and putting forward in April 1927 the slogan of the immediate formation of Soviets in the conditions of the Guomindang phase of development that had not yet been completed or outlived.

The opposition thinks that if it understood, discerned the half-heartedness, the vacillation, the unreliability of the Guomindang leadership, if it discerned the temporary and conditional character of the bloc with the Guomindang (and to discern this is not difficult for any qualified political worker), then this is quite sufficient for launching "decisive actions" against the Guomindang, against the power of the Guomindang — quite sufficient for the masses, the broad masses of workers and peasants, to "immediately" support "us" and "our" "decisive actions."

The opposition forgets that "our" understanding is far from sufficient for the Chinese communists to lead the masses behind them. The opposition forgets that for this it is further necessary that the masses themselves recognize through their own experience the unreliability, the reactionary character, the counter-revolutionary character of the Guomindang leadership.

The opposition forgets that revolutions are "made" not only by the advanced group, not only by the party, not only by individual, even "exalted" "personalities," but, first and foremost and chiefly, by the millions of masses of the people.

It is strange that the opposition forgets about the state of mind, the understanding, the readiness for decisive action of the millions of popular masses.

Did we know — the Party, Lenin — in April 1917 that the Provisional Government of Milyukov-Kerensky would have to be overthrown, that the existence of the Provisional Government was incompatible with the activity of the Soviets, that power must pass into the hands of the Soviets? Yes, we knew.

Then why did Lenin brand as adventurists the well-known group of Bolsheviks in Petrograd headed by Bagdatyev in April 1917, when this group put forward the slogan "down with the Provisional Government, all power to the Soviets" and attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government?

Because the broad masses of toilers, a certain section of the workers, millions of peasants, the broad masses of the army, and finally, the Soviets themselves were not yet ready to accept this slogan as the slogan of the day.

Because the Provisional Government and the petty-bourgeois parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had not yet exhausted themselves, had not yet sufficiently discredited themselves in the eyes of the millions of toiling masses.

Because Lenin knew that for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power, the understanding and consciousness of the advanced group of the proletariat, the party of the proletariat, alone was not sufficient — for this it was further necessary that the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of such a line.

Because it was necessary to pass through the entire coalition bacchanalia, through the betrayals and treacheries of the petty-bourgeois parties in June, July, and August of 1917; it was necessary to pass through the shameful offensive at the front in June 1917, through the "honest" coalition of the petty-bourgeois parties with the Kornilovs and Milyukovs, through the Kornilov uprising, and so on, in order for the millions of toiling masses to become convinced of the inevitability of the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power.

Because only under these conditions could the slogan of Soviet power as a perspective be transformed into the slogan of Soviet power as the slogan of the day.

The trouble with the opposition is that it constantly commits the same error that the Bagdatyev group once committed, that, leaving the path of Lenin, it prefers to "march" along the path of Bagdatyev.

Did we know — the Party, Lenin — that the Constituent Assembly was incompatible with the system of Soviet power, when we took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly and when we convened it in Petrograd? Yes, we knew.

Then why did we convene it? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, enemies of bourgeois parliamentarism, having built Soviet power, not only took part in the elections but themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? Was this not "tailism," lagging behind events, "holding back the masses," a violation of the tactics of "long-range aim"? Of course not.

The Bolsheviks took this step in order to make it easier for the backward popular masses to see for themselves the unsuitability of the Constituent Assembly, its reactionary character, its counter-revolutionary character. Only in this way was it possible to draw the millions of peasant masses closer and to facilitate the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly.

Here is what Lenin writes about this:

"We participated in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September–November 1917. Was our tactic correct or not?... Did we, the Russian Bolsheviks, not have in September–November 1917 more right than any Western communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long or short time, but the extent to which the broad masses of the toilers are prepared (ideologically, politically, practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse (or permit the dispersal of) the bourgeois-democratic parliament. That in Russia in September–November 1917 the urban working class, the soldiers, and the peasants were, by virtue of a number of special conditions, exceptionally well prepared for the acceptance of the Soviet system and the dispersal of the most democratic bourgeois parliament, is an absolutely established and fully authenticated historical fact. And nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did not boycott the Constituent Assembly but participated in the elections both before and after the conquest of political power by the proletariat... The conclusion to be drawn from this is absolutely indisputable: it has been proved that even a few weeks before the victory of the Soviet republic, even after such a victory, participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament far from injuring the revolutionary proletariat, but actually makes it easier for it to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed, makes their dispersal easier, makes the 'political obsolescence' of bourgeois parliamentarism easier to accomplish" (see "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," Vol. XXV, pp. 201–202).

This is how the Bolsheviks applied in practice the third tactical principle of Leninism.

This is how the tactics of Bolshevism must be applied in China, whether we are speaking of the agrarian revolution, of the Guomindang, or of the slogan of Soviets.

The opposition, it seems, is inclined to the view that the revolution in China has already suffered a complete collapse. This is, of course, untrue. That the revolution in China has suffered a temporary defeat — of this there can be no doubt. But what kind of defeat it is and how deep it is — that is the question now.

It is possible that this is approximately the same kind of prolonged defeat as took place in Russia in 1905, when the revolution was interrupted for a full twelve years in order then, in February 1917, to break out with renewed force, sweep away the autocracy, and clear the way for a new, Soviet revolution.

This perspective cannot be considered excluded. This is not yet a complete defeat of the revolution, just as the defeat of 1905 could not be considered the final defeat. It is not a complete defeat, because the fundamental tasks of the Chinese revolution at the present phase of development — the agrarian revolution, the revolutionary unification of China, liberation from the yoke of imperialism — are still awaiting their resolution. And if this perspective becomes a reality, then naturally there can be no talk of the immediate creation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China, since Soviets are created and flourish only in conditions of revolutionary upsurge.

But one can hardly consider this perspective probable. At any rate, there are for now no grounds for considering it probable. There are no grounds, because the counter-revolution is not yet united and will not soon be united, if indeed it is ever destined to unite at all.

For the war of old and new militarists among themselves is flaring up with renewed force, and it cannot but weaken the force of the counter-revolution, while at the same time ruining and embittering the peasantry.

For there is not yet in China any group or any government that would be capable of undertaking something like the Stolypin reform, which could serve as a lightning rod for the ruling groups.

For the millions of peasants who have already gotten their hands on the landlords' land will not be easily bridled and beaten down.

For the authority of the proletariat in the eyes of the toiling masses is growing day by day, and its forces are far from destroyed.

It is possible that the defeat of the Chinese revolution is analogous in its degree to the defeat suffered by the Bolsheviks in July 1917, when the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary Soviets betrayed them, when they were forced to go underground, and when, a few months later, the revolution again came out into the streets to sweep away the imperialist government of Russia.

The analogy here, of course, is conditional. I allow it only with all the reservations necessary if one has in mind the difference between the situation of present-day China and Russia of 1917. I resort to such an analogy only in order to outline approximately the degree of the defeat of the Chinese revolution.

I think that this perspective is more probable. And if it, this perspective, becomes a reality, if in the near future — not necessarily in two months, but in half a year, in a year — a new revolutionary upsurge becomes a fact, then the question of forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies may become the order of the day as the slogan of the day and as a counterweight to the bourgeois government.

Why?

Because in the conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge at the present phase of its development, the formation of Soviets will be a fully ripe question.

Yesterday, several months ago, the communists of China should not have put forward the slogan of forming Soviets, for that would have been adventurism characteristic of our opposition, since the Guomindang leadership had not yet discredited itself as an opponent of the revolution.

Now, on the contrary, the slogan of forming Soviets can become a genuinely revolutionary slogan, if (if!) a new and powerful revolutionary upsurge breaks out in the near future.

Therefore, already now, even before the onset of the upsurge, alongside the struggle to replace the present Guomindang leadership with a revolutionary leadership, it is necessary to conduct the broadest propaganda among the broad masses of toilers for the idea of Soviets, without running ahead and without forming Soviets right now, remembering that Soviets can flourish only in conditions of a powerful revolutionary upsurge.

The opposition may say that it said this "first," that this is precisely what they call the tactic of "long-range aim."

Not true, dear friends. Completely untrue! This is not the tactic of "long-range aim" but the tactic of wandering, the tactic of eternal overshooting and undershooting.

When the opposition demanded the immediate exit of communists from the Guomindang in April 1926, this was a tactic of overshooting, for the opposition itself was later forced to recognize that the communists must stay in the Guomindang.

When the opposition declared the Chinese revolution a revolution for customs autonomy, this was a tactic of undershooting, for the opposition itself was later forced to slink away from its own formula.

When the opposition in April 1927 declared feudal survivals in China an exaggeration, having forgotten about the existence of a mass agrarian movement, this was a tactic of undershooting, for the opposition itself was later forced to silently acknowledge its error.

When the opposition in April 1927 put forward the slogan of the immediate formation of Soviets, this was a tactic of overshooting, for the oppositionists themselves were forced to acknowledge contradictions within their camp, of which one (Trotsky) demanded taking a course toward the overthrow of the Wuhan government, while the other (Zinoviev), on the contrary, demanded "all possible help" to that same Wuhan government.

But since when have we in our country begun to declare the tactic of wandering, the tactic of eternal overshooting and undershooting, the tactic of "long-range aim"?

Regarding Soviets, it must be said that the Comintern spoke about Soviets in China, as a perspective, in its documents long before the opposition did. As for Soviets as the slogan of the day, put forward by the opposition in the spring of this year as a counterweight to the revolutionary Guomindang (the Guomindang was then revolutionary; otherwise there would have been no reason for Zinoviev to shout about "all possible help" to the Guomindang), this was an adventure, a loud-mouthed running ahead, the same kind of adventure and the same kind of running ahead as that committed by Bagdatyev in April 1917.

From the fact that the slogan of Soviets may become in China in the near future the slogan of the day, it by no means follows that the opposition's putting forward of the slogan of Soviets in the spring of this year was not a dangerous and harmful adventure.

Just as from the fact that the slogan "all power to the Soviets" was recognized by Lenin as necessary and timely in September 1917 (the well-known CC resolution on the uprising), it by no means follows that the putting forward of this slogan by Bagdatyev in April 1917 was not a harmful and dangerous adventure...

Bagdatyev, too, could have said in September 1917 that he was the "first" to speak of Soviet power back in April 1917. Does this mean that Bagdatyev was right and Lenin was wrong in characterizing his action in April 1917 as adventurism?

Evidently, the "laurels" of Bagdatyev do not let our opposition sleep.

The opposition does not understand that the point is not at all in being the "first" to say something, running ahead and disrupting the cause of the revolution, but in saying it at the right time, and saying it so that what is said is taken up by the masses and transformed into action.

Such are the facts.

The opposition's departure from Leninist tactics, the "ultra-left" adventurism of its policy — such is the balance sheet.

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Source: Pravda No. 169, July 28, 1927.

Signature: J. Stalin