September 27, 1950

Pyongyang Matveyev Shtykov

The grave situation that has developed in recent days on the front of the Korean People's Army, both in the Seoul area and in the southeast, is in large measure a consequence of serious errors committed by the front command, the command of army groups, and troop formations, both in matters of troop command and control and especially in matters of the tactics of their combat employment.

Our military advisers bear even greater responsibility for these errors. Our military advisers did not ensure the precise and timely execution of the Supreme Commander's order to withdraw four divisions from the main front to the Seoul area, even though full opportunity to do so existed at the time the decision was made. As a result, seven days were lost, which gave the Americans a great tactical advantage near Seoul. A timely withdrawal of these divisions could have fundamentally changed the situation around Seoul.

The battalions and individual regiments arriving in the Seoul area piecemeal and not yet ready for combat could not produce any effect due to their scattered nature and the absence of communication with headquarters. The division arriving from the southeast was immediately and in a disorganized fashion committed to battle in parts, making it easy for the enemy to tear it apart. It would have been necessary, as we had earlier indicated, to deploy this division for battle on a line northeast and east of Seoul, bring it into order there, give it at least twenty-four hours of rest, prepare it for combat, and only then commit it to battle in an organized manner.

Serious attention must be drawn to the incorrect and utterly inadmissible tactics of employing tanks in combat. Lately, tanks have been committed to battle without preliminary artillery strikes to clear the field for them, as a result of which your tanks are very easily set ablaze by the enemy. Our military advisers, who have behind them the experience of the Great Patriotic War, should know that such illiterate use of tanks only leads to losses.

Attention must also be drawn to the strategic illiteracy of our advisers, as well as their blindness in matters of reconnaissance. They did not grasp the strategic significance of the enemy's landing at Inchon, they denied the serious significance of the landing, and Shtykov even proposed bringing to trial the author of the note in Pravda about the American amphibious assault. This blindness and lack of strategic experience led to the necessity of transferring troops from the south to the Seoul area being called into question, the transfer itself being drawn out and delayed, and thus seven days being lost -- to the delight of the enemy.

The assistance provided by our military advisers to the Korean command is also exceptionally weak in such critically important matters as communications, troop command and control, organization of reconnaissance, and conduct of battle. As a result, the troops of the Korean Army are in essence almost unmanageable, fight blindly, and are unable to organize combined-arms coordination in battle. This may be tolerable during a successful offensive, but it is completely intolerable when complications arise at the front.

It is necessary for you to explain all of this to our military advisers, and above all to Vasilyev. In the conditions of the current situation, and in order to assist the Korean command -- especially in matters of the organized withdrawal of Korean People's Army troops from the southeast and the most rapid organization of a new line of defense to the east, south, and north of Seoul -- our advisers must work to achieve the following:

1. The withdrawal of main forces must be conducted under the cover of strong rear guards detached from divisions, capable of offering serious resistance to the enemy. Experienced combat commanders must be placed at the head of rear guards; rear guards must be reinforced with field and above all antitank artillery, engineer troops, and, where possible, tanks.

2. Rear guards are obligated to fight from one line to the next, making wide use of obstacles, employing mines and improvised means for this purpose.

The actions of rear guards must be resolute and active, so as to gain the time necessary for the withdrawal of the main forces.

3. The main forces of divisions must, wherever possible, be moved not in scattered groups but compactly, in readiness to fight their way through. Strong advance guards with artillery -- and where possible tanks -- must be detached from the main forces.

4. Tanks must be used only in conjunction with infantry and only after preliminary artillery strikes.

5. Defiles, bridges, crossings, passes over mountain ridges, and important road junctions along the route of the main forces must be seized and held until the main forces pass through, using detachments sent forward in advance.

6. Special attention must be given during the withdrawal of troops to the organization of field reconnaissance, to the security of flanks, and to the maintenance of communications between troop columns.

7. When organizing a defensive line, the stretching of all forces along the front must be avoided; instead, the main axes must be firmly covered and strong reserves created for active operations.

8. When organizing communications with troops through the Korean command structure, radio equipment with encryption must be used.

In organizing the work of our military advisers going forward, in accordance with this directive, you must take all measures to ensure that not a single military adviser, as was previously indicated, falls into enemy hands.

Report on the measures taken.

Fyn Si

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Vestnik, 1996, No. 1, pp. 124-125.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 827. L. 90-93.