Leningrad: At the apparatus, Zhdanov, Khozin.

Moscow: At the apparatus, Stalin.

We are very troubled by your slowness in carrying out the operation known to you. You have been given a deadline of several days. If you do not break through to the east within several days, you will doom the Leningrad Front and the population of Leningrad. We are told that after the artillery preparation, the infantry does not venture forward. But you should know that without tanks the infantry will not advance. After the artillery preparation, tanks must be sent in, and only after the tanks and behind them can the infantry be committed, giving the artillery the task of hitting the enemy 3-4 kilometers to the east of the front line, ahead of our tanks. So that the tanks and infantry can advance more freely, and the enemy cannot bring up fresh forces, and in general, as our tanks and infantry advance, the fire must be shifted further to the east. Without such organization of the offensive, nothing will come of it. It goes without saying that aviation and rocket launchers must do their part. That is all.

Zhdanov: The advance of the infantry ran into fairly solid fortifications. The artillery preparation was given each time in adequate measure, but the infantry, as a rule, did not exploit the artillery fire and air preparation. The infantry, having risen from its positions and advanced a bit, usually went to ground, suffering heavy losses. In connection with this, the divisions operating on the left bank of the Neva now have a very great shortage of infantry. As for tanks, despite the measures we have taken, we have managed to ferry across to the left bank of the Neva only 7 infantry-support tanks, which quickly broke down. As for KV tanks, we have so far been unable to ferry across a single one. Suffice it to say that three-quarters of the crossing equipment has been knocked out. Therefore the transfer of reinforcements proceeds slowly and mainly at night. As for the artillery, the artillery does a good job on the forward edge, but in depth it cannot see targets. To deliver concentrated fire by area it cannot, and the enemy is dug in, has bunkers and pillboxes. In view of our losses and the crossing not yet having been organized, it was necessary to temporarily halt the offensive for two days in order to bring the units into order, replenish them, organize the crossing properly, organize the battle so that there is full coordination between the infantry and artillery. As for the sector of the 55th Army on the axis of the supporting attack, progress is being made here; blocking groups of sappers supported by tanks have been created. Here tanks are being used to full capacity. We have 29 tanks knocked out and burned. Right now, during the night, a battle is under way for the capture of strongpoints at Ust-Tosno and the railroad bridge. The 55th Army command has been given the task of clearing the western bank of Ust-Tosno today during the day, so as to begin forcing the Ust-Tosno River tomorrow. The mood of the troops is combative. On the right bank, the problem comes down to the fact that we cannot use tanks. We are also hampered by the small size of our divisions. We are taking measures: we are reducing rear-area personnel -- artillerists by 8,000, signalmen by 5,000, air defense troops by 8,000 -- and sending them to serve as riflemen. We are reducing some divisions to a two-regiment structure. That is all.

Stalin: You must choose between captivity on the one hand, and sacrificing several divisions on the other. I repeat: sacrifice them and break a road to the east, to save your front and Leningrad. As soon as you break a road, the railroad will follow. Without tanks, the infantry will not advance. Take measures to ferry KV tanks to the left bank. If these tanks are too heavy, let them shed 10-20 tons of armor. If there are other, lighter tanks, ferry them across. If the 55th Army can strike from the south northward into the rear of the enemy standing on the Neva, let it strike. I repeat, very little time remains; to sit and wait for fair weather is unwise. Make the artillery work at night on area targets. Select an area of one to two kilometers and concentrate the full fire of the artillery and rocket launchers on it. I repeat, you have very little time remaining; soon you will be without bread. Try selecting groups of volunteers from various divisions -- the most daring men -- and form one or two composite regiments. Explain to them the great significance of the feat that is demanded of them, to break a road through. It is possible that even composite regiments of daring men will pull the rest of the infantry along after them. That is all.

Zhdanov: The Military Council of the front not only has no doubts, but is entirely in agreement with you, and we will not hesitate before any forces for a single minute. So that you have no doubts about our actions, I report that we have transferred five of our best divisions to the left bank. In the 168th and 20th Rifle Divisions, after 3-4 days of battle, only 200-300 men remain, but so far we have had neither desertions nor evasions of battle. Everything we have at hand, we immediately throw into the fight. Ferrying light tanks -- perhaps a dozen and a half across the entire front -- to the left bank is impossible. They are all engaged in the 55th Army at Ust-Tosno.

Stalin: If you do not agree, or if you have any doubts, say so directly. You are spending your forces badly. If you have such good divisions fighting at the front, then it is all the more lamentable that you have used them incorrectly. An infantry division with its rifles and machine guns cannot cope with the enemy's fortified areas. First the fortified areas must be destroyed by artillery and mortars, then tanks must be committed, and only after the tanks can an infantry division show itself to be a real force. Without tanks, the infantry is helpless in the face of the enemy's fortified areas.

Zhdanov: We will restructure the work of the artillery as you direct. We will begin forming composite regiments of volunteers immediately. Volunteer teams are already operating in the 55th Army to capture enemy bunkers and pillboxes. That is all.

Stalin: I ask you and Comrade Khozin to report on the situation via this line by around midnight. That is all.

Zhdanov: We have nothing further.

Stalin: All the best. I wish you success. I await the first report via direct line tonight at midnight. Call me to the line. 8 November 1941, 06:00. Stalin.

Zhdanov: Goodbye, Comrade Stalin. We are proceeding to carry out your instructions and at midnight will report to you.

The Blockade of Leningrad in Documents of Declassified Archives. Pp. 61-63.

TsAMO RF. F. 96a. Op. 2011. D. 5. L. 151-155.