To Comrade Malenkov.

The other day I received a letter signed by engineer-Communists of the Stalin Factory — Maretsky, Sokolova, and Klimenko — about shortcomings in the work of the secretary of the Moscow Committee, Comrade Popov.

I do not know the comrades who signed this letter. It is possible that these names are fictitious (this needs to be verified). But that is not the point. The point is that the facts mentioned in the letter are well known to me; I have received several letters about them from individual comrades in the Moscow organization. It is possible that I am at fault for not having paid proper attention to these signals. I did not pay proper attention because I trusted Comrade Popov. But now, after the improper actions of Comrade Popov in connection with the electric combine harvester, which revealed anti-party and anti-state aspects in Comrade Popov's work, the Politburo of the CC cannot pass by the above-mentioned letter.

Even now, before the investigation of Comrade Popov's activities has been carried out, I consider it my duty to note two facts in the life of the Moscow organization that are completely clear to me and that reveal deeply negative aspects of Comrade Popov's work.

It is clear to me, first, that in the practice of the Moscow party leadership, self-criticism is not only stifled but directly and openly persecuted. And what does it mean to persecute self-criticism? It means to kill all self-initiative of the party organization, to undermine the authority of the leadership among the party masses, to corrupt the party, and to entrench in the life of the party organization the anti-party mores of bureaucrats, the sworn enemies of the party.

It is clear to me, second, that the party leadership of the Moscow organization in its work constantly and everywhere supplants ministers, the government, and the CC of the VKP(b), giving direct instructions to enterprises and ministers, while those ministers who disagree with such usurpation are slandered and beaten down by Comrade Popov at meetings. And what does this mean? It means destroying party and state discipline.

What additional shortcomings will come to light in the course of the investigation, I do not know, but the above-mentioned fundamental shortcomings are already evident to me now.

My proposal:
a) To appoint a Politburo commission to investigate the activities of Comrade Popov in light of the facts noted in the letter of the three engineers;
b) To establish that not only the secretaries of district committees of the Moscow (and Leningrad) regional and city organizations, but also the chairmen of district executive committees, be confirmed by the CC of the VKP(b);
c) The letter of the three comrades, as well as this letter of mine, to be circulated to members of the Politburo and secretaries of the CC.

I. Stalin.

The Politburo of the CC of the VKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945-1953. Pp. 321-322.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 762. L. 30-31.