June 24, 1932

To Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze.

1) You have given too much money to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry for capital construction in the third quarter, and by doing so you have created the threat of ruining the whole enterprise, the threat of corrupting the workers of the Commissariat. Why did you overturn your own decision to remain within the limits of the second-quarter amounts? Do you not understand that by overfeeding the Commissariat on capital investment and thereby creating a cult of new construction, you are killing not only the cult but even the simple, elementary desire of economic managers to rationally utilize already completed enterprises? Take the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor factories, AMO, and the Automobile Factory. They were built with great enthusiasm. And that, of course, is very good. But when it came to putting these factories into motion and using them rationally, people's enthusiasm vanished; they preferred to hide in the bushes and -- naturally -- let down the country in the most unforgivable manner. And why do such things happen in our country? Because we have a cult of new construction (which is very good), but no cult of rational utilization of completed factories (which is very bad and extremely dangerous). And by overfeeding the Commissariat of Heavy Industry on capital investment, you are consolidating this abnormal and dangerous situation in industry. I need not even mention that you are thereby creating the threat of new food supply difficulties...

2) I am categorically against giving the Putilov Factory 2,900,000 rubles in foreign currency for the conversion of the tractor shop into an automobile shop. We already have too many debts abroad, and we must learn at some point to economize on foreign currency. If we cannot currently provide domestically manufactured machine tools for this purpose, we will wait a year until we can -- what is the rush? I need not even mention that it is unknown whether we will have steel for 20,000 Buicks. We lack steel for the tractor and automobile factories -- what guarantee is there that in a year's time we will have enough for both the existing factories and the Putilov automobile plant? No such guarantees have been provided in Comrade Ordzhonikidze's memorandum.

3) The Politburo has a decision requiring the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry to present a plan of concrete measures for creating a secure metallurgical base for AMO, the Automobile Factory, and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory. Where are these measures, and when will they be presented?

Well, that is all for now.

Greetings to all of you!

I. Stalin.

June 24, 1932

Source: Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936], pp. 190-191.

RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, ll. 71-76; f. 558, op. 11, d. 740, ll. 82-83.