On the Discussion

The discussion on the intra-party situation that opened several weeks ago is apparently drawing to a close, if one has in mind Moscow and Petrograd. Petrograd, as is known, has spoken out in favor of the Party line. The main districts of Moscow have also spoken out in favor of the Central Committee line. The city-wide meeting of active workers of the Moscow organization on December 11 issued full approval of the organizational and political line of the Party Central Committee. There are no grounds to doubt that the forthcoming all-Party conference of the Moscow organization will follow in the footsteps of its districts. The opposition, representing a bloc of part of the “Left” Communists (Preobrazhensky, Stukov, Pyatakov, etc.) with the so-called Democratic Centralists (Rafail, Sapronov, etc.), has found itself crushed.

The course of the discussion and the transformations which the opposition underwent during the period of the discussion are interesting.

The opposition began by speaking out for nothing more nor less than a revision of the Party's basic line in inner-Party construction and inner-Party policy over the past two years, for the entire period of the NEP. Demanding the full implementation of the resolution of the 10th Congress on inner-Party democracy, the opposition at the same time insisted on the abolition of those restrictions (the prohibition of factions, Party seniority, etc.) that had been adopted by the 10th, 11th, and 12th Party Congresses. But the opposition did not stop there. Asserting that the Party had essentially turned into an army-type organization, and Party discipline into military discipline, the opposition demanded a shake-up of the entire Party apparatus from top to bottom, the removal of key officials from their posts, and so forth. There was, of course, no shortage of strong words and abuse directed at the Central Committee. Pravda was overflowing with articles and squibs accusing the Central Committee of all the deadly sins. The only thing missing was to blame it for the Japanese earthquake as well.

The Central Committee as a whole did not intervene in the discussion on the pages of "Pravda" during this period, granting party members complete freedom of criticism. It did not even find it necessary to refute the absurd accusations frequently put forward by the critics, considering that party members were sufficiently conscious to independently resolve the issues under discussion.

This was, so to speak, the first period of the discussion. Subsequently, when the strong words had become stale, the abuse ceased to have effect, and Party members demanded a businesslike discussion of the question – the second period of the discussion set in. It opened with the publication of the resolution of the CC and CCC on Party affairs [89]. Proceeding from the decision of the October plenum of the CC [90], which approved the course towards inner-Party democracy, the Political Bureau of the CC and the Presidium of the CCC worked out the well-known resolution outlining the conditions for implementing inner-Party democracy. This act created a turning point in the course of the discussion. Now it was no longer possible to confine oneself to criticism in general. The concrete plan presented by the CC and CCC required the opposition either to accept this plan or to put forward another, parallel, equally concrete plan for implementing inner-Party democracy. And here it turned out that the opposition was unable to counterpose to the plan of the CC its own plan capable of satisfying the demands of the Party organizations. The retreat of the opposition began. From the arsenal of the opposition disappeared the demand for the repeal of the basic line of the Party in inner-Party construction over the past two years. The opposition’s demand for the abolition of the restrictions on democracy adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Party congresses faded and lost its colour. The demand for a shake-up of the apparatus from top to bottom was pushed into the background and softened. The opposition deemed it necessary to replace all these demands with proposals on the need to “formulate precisely the question of factions,” “hold re-elections of all those Party bodies which had previously been appointed,” “abolish the practice of appointment as a system,” and so on. Characteristically, even these proposals of the opposition, softened several times over, were rejected by the organizations of Krasnaya Presnya and Zamoskvorechye, which welcomed the resolution of the CC and CCC by an overwhelming majority of votes.

This was, so to speak, the second period of the discussion. Now we have entered the third period. The characteristic feature of this period is the further retreat – I would say: the disorderly retreat of the opposition. Even the faded and several times softened demands of the opposition have this time fallen out of its resolution. The latest resolution by Preobrazhensky (it seems, the third in number), proposed to the meeting of active workers of the Moscow organization (over 1,000 people), reads:

"Only the swift, united, and sincere implementation of the Politburo resolutions, in particular the renewal of the inner-party apparatus through re-elections, can guarantee our party a transition to the new course without upheavals and internal struggle and strengthen the genuine cohesion and unity of its ranks."

It cannot be considered accidental that the assembly rejected even this completely harmless proposal of the opposition. Nor is it accidental that the assembly adopted, by an overwhelming majority of votes, a resolution on "approval of the political and organizational line of the Central Committee."

About Rafael

I think that Rafail is the most consistent and thoroughgoing representative of the present opposition, or, to put it more precisely, of the present opposition bloc. At one of the discussion meetings, Rafail declared that our party has essentially turned into an army organization, that its discipline is army discipline, and that in view of this the entire party apparatus must be shaken up from top to bottom, as unfit and alien to the spirit of genuine party spirit. It seems to me that these thoughts, or thoughts similar to them, are wandering in the minds of the present oppositionists, but they do not dare to express them for various considerations. It must be admitted that in this respect Rafail has proved bolder than his colleagues in the opposition.

And yet Rafail is fundamentally wrong. He is wrong not only formally, but, above all, in substance. For if our party had indeed turned, or even begun to turn, into an army organization, then is it not clear that we would then have had neither a party, in the proper sense of the word, nor a dictatorship of the proletariat, nor a revolution.

What is the army?

The army is a closed organization, built from the top down. The essence of the army presupposes that at its head stands a staff, appointed from above and forming the army on the basis of compulsion. The staff not only forms the army – it also supplies it, clothes it, provides it with footwear, etc. The material dependence of the entire army personnel on the staff is complete. On this, among other things, rests that army discipline, the violation of which entails a specific form of the supreme penalty – execution by shooting. This also explains the fact that the staff can move the army anywhere and at any time, guided solely by its own strategic plans.

What is a party?

The Party is the vanguard detachment of the proletariat, built from below on the basis of voluntariness. The Party also has its own staff, but it is not appointed from above, but elected from below by the entire Party. It is not the staff that forms the Party, but, on the contrary, the Party forms its staff. The Party forms itself on the basis of voluntariness. Here, too, there is none of that material dependence between the Party staff and the Party as a whole that was discussed above in relation to the army. The Party staff does not supply the Party, does not feed or clothe it. This, incidentally, explains the fact that the Party staff cannot move the ranks of the Party arbitrarily, wherever and whenever it pleases, that the Party staff can lead the Party as a whole only along the lines of the economic and political interests of the class of which the Party itself is a particle. Hence the special character of Party discipline, built mainly along the lines of the method of persuasion, in contrast to army discipline, built mainly along the lines of the method of coercion. Hence the fundamental difference between the supreme measure of punishment in the Party (expulsion from the Party) and the supreme measure of punishment in the army (execution by shooting).

It is enough to compare these two definitions to understand the full monstrosity of Rafail’s error.

The party has turned, he says, into an army organization. But how can the party be turned into an army organization if it is not materially dependent on its staff, if it is built from below on the principles of voluntariness, if it forms its own staff itself? How then to explain the influx of workers into the party, the growth of its influence among the non-party masses, its popularity among the working strata of the whole world? One of two things:

Either the Party is passive and voiceless to the utmost degree – but then how to explain the fact that such a passive and voiceless Party leads the most revolutionary proletariat in the world and has been governing the most revolutionary country in the world for several years now?

Either the party is active and self-motivated – but then it is unclear why such an active and self-motivated party has not overthrown the military regime within the party during this time, if it truly exists in the very depths of the party itself?

Is it not clear that our party, which has carried out three revolutions, smashed Kolchak and Denikin, and is now shaking the foundations of world imperialism – that this party would not have tolerated for even a single week the military regime and command system that Raphael speaks of so lightly and recklessly, that it would have instantly smashed them and established a new regime, without waiting for Raphael’s call?

But the dream is terrible, yet God is merciful. The point is, firstly, that Rafail has confused the Party with the army and the army with the Party, for he obviously knows neither the Party nor the army properly. The point is, secondly, that Rafail evidently does not believe his own discovery himself—he needs the “terrible” words about a command system in the Party in order to substantiate the main slogans of the current opposition: a) on the freedom of factional groupings, and b) on the removal of the leading elements of the Party from top to bottom.

Rafail, evidently, feels that without “frightening” words these slogans cannot be pushed through.

That is the whole point.

On Comrade Preobrazhensky's Article

Preobrazhensky sees the main cause of the shortcomings in internal party life in the incorrectness of the party's basic line in party construction. Preobrazhensky asserts that "the party has been pursuing a fundamentally incorrect line in its internal party policy for two years now," that "the basic line of the party in internal party construction and internal party policy during the NEP period" has proved to be incorrect.

What is the main line of the Party during the NEP period? The Party at its 10th Congress adopted a resolution on workers' democracy. Did the Party act correctly in adopting such a resolution? Preobrazhensky thinks it acted correctly. The Party at that same 10th Congress adopted a most serious restriction of democracy, in the form of banning factions. Did the Party act correctly in adopting such a restriction? Preobrazhensky thinks the Party acted incorrectly, for such a restriction, in his opinion, constrains independent Party thought. The Party at the 11th Congress adopted new restrictions on democracy, in the form of a defined Party standing, etc. The 12th Party Congress merely confirmed these restrictions. Did the Party act correctly in adopting these restrictions as a guarantee against petty-bourgeois tendencies under NEP conditions? Preobrazhensky thinks the Party acted incorrectly, for these restrictions, in his opinion, constrained the independent activity of Party organizations. The conclusion is clear: Preobrazhensky proposes to abolish the main line of the Party in this area, adopted by the 10th and 11th Party Congresses in the context of NEP.

But the 10th and 11th Party Congresses were held under the direct leadership of Comrade Lenin. The resolution banning factions (the resolution on unity) was introduced and carried at the 10th Congress by Comrade Lenin. Further restrictions on democracy, in the form of a specified Party service record, etc., were adopted by the 11th Congress with the closest participation of Comrade Lenin. Does Preobrazhensky not suspect that he is essentially proposing the abolition of the Party's line under the conditions of the NEP, a line organically linked with Leninism? Is Preobrazhensky not beginning to understand that his proposal to abolish the Party's basic line on Party construction under the conditions of the NEP is essentially a repetition of certain proposals of the well-known "anonymous platform,"[91] which demanded a revision of Leninism?

It is worth posing these questions in order to understand that the party will not follow in Preobrazhensky's footsteps.

What does Preobrazhensky propose? He proposes nothing more nor less than the restoration of party life "along the lines of 1917-1918." In what way are the years 1917-1918 distinctive in this respect? In that at that time groupings and factions existed in our party, in that an open struggle of groupings existed at that time, in that the party was then going through a critical moment connected with the question of its life and death. Preobrazhensky demands that such an order in the party, abolished by the Tenth Congress, be restored, at least "in part." Can the party take this path? No, it cannot. Firstly, because the restoration of party life on the principles of 1917-1918, when there was no NEP, does not and cannot meet the needs of the party under the conditions of 1923, when there is NEP. Secondly, because the restoration of the past order of factional struggle would inevitably lead to the undermining of the unity of the party, especially now, in the absence of Comrade Lenin.

Preobrazhensky has a tendency to depict the conditions of inner-Party life in 1917-1918 as something desirable and ideal. But we know a mass of dark sides of this period of inner-Party life, which cost the Party the deepest upheavals. Never, it seems, did the inner-Party struggle among the Bolsheviks reach such bitterness as in this period, the period of the Brest Peace. It is known, for example, that the "Left" Communists, who then constituted a separate faction, reached such bitterness that they seriously talked about replacing the then existing Council of People's Commissars with a new Council of People's Commissars made up of new people who were part of the "Left" Communist faction. A part of the present-day oppositionists – Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, Stukov and others – were then part of the "Left" Communist faction.

Does Preobrazhensky think of “restoring” these old “ideal” ways in our Party?

Clearly, in any case, the Party will not agree with this "restoration."

On Comrade Sapronov's Article

Sapronov sees the main reason for the shortcomings of inner-party life in the presence in the party apparatuses of “party pedants,” “classroom ladies” engaged in “educating party members” by the “school method” and thus hindering the actual education of party members in the course of struggle. Having thus turned the workers of our party apparatus into “classroom ladies,” Sapronov does not even think to ask: where did these people come from and how could it happen that the “party pedants” came to predominate in the work of our party. Putting forward this more than risky and demagogic proposition as proven, Sapronov forgot that a Marxist cannot be satisfied with mere sayings, that he must first of all understand the phenomenon, if it indeed exists in nature, and explain it, in order then to outline real measures for improvement. But Sapronov, evidently, has no concern for Marxism. He needs at all costs to curse the party apparatus – everything else will follow. The evil will of the “party pedants” – such, in Sapronov’s opinion, is the reason for the shortcomings of our inner-party life. A correct explanation – needless to say.

It is only unclear:

1) How could these “class ladies” and “party pedants” manage to retain leadership over the most revolutionary proletariat in the world?

2) How could our "party schoolchildren," handed over to the upbringing of "class ladies," retain for themselves the leadership of the most revolutionary country in the world?

It is clear, in any case, that it is easier to chatter about "party pedants" than to understand and appreciate the greatest merits of our party apparatus.

How does Sapronov think to treat the shortcomings of our inner-party life? His remedy is as simple as his diagnosis. “Review our officer corps,” remove the current workers from their posts—such is Sapronov’s means. In this he sees the basic guarantee for implementing inner-party democracy. I am far from denying the significance of re-elections from the standpoint of democratism in the matter of improving our inner-party life. But to see in this the basic guarantee means understanding neither inner-party life nor its shortcomings. In the ranks of the opposition there are such as Beloborodov, whose “democratism” the Rostov workers still remember to this day; Rosengolts, from whose “democratism” our water transport and railway workers fared ill; Pyatakov, from whose “democratism” the entire Donbass did not cry out but howled; Alsky, whose “democratism” is known to all; Byk, from whose “democratism” Khorezm still howls to this day. Does Sapronov think that if the current “party pedants” are replaced by the above-named “respected comrades,” democracy within the party will triumph? May I be permitted to entertain some doubt about this.

Apparently, there exist two kinds of democratism: the democratism of the Party masses, striving for independent activity and for active participation in the work of Party leadership, and the “democratism” of disgruntled Party grandees, who see the essence of democratism in the replacement of some persons by others. The Party will stand for the democratism of the first kind, and it will implement it with an iron hand. But the Party will cast aside the “democratism” of disgruntled Party grandees, which has nothing in common with genuine intra-Party workers’ democracy.

To ensure inner-Party democracy, it is necessary, first of all, to overcome those survivals and habits of the wartime period in the minds of some of our functionaries, by virtue of which the Party is assessed not as an independent organism, but as a system of institutions. But it is impossible to overcome these survivals in the shortest possible time.

To ensure inner-Party democracy, it is necessary, secondly, to overcome the pressure exerted by our bureaucratic state apparatus, numbering about a million employees, on the Party apparatus, which comprises no more than 20–30 thousand workers. But it is unthinkable to overcome the pressure of this cumbersome machine and to subordinate it to oneself in the shortest possible time.

To ensure inner-Party democracy, it is necessary, thirdly, to achieve a rise in the cultural level of a whole number of our backward cells and the correct distribution of active workers throughout the entire territory of the Union, which, again, cannot be achieved in the shortest possible time.

As you can see, ensuring full democracy is not as simple as Sapronov imagines it to be, if, of course, by democracy we mean not Sapronov’s empty, formal democracy, but genuine, working, authentic democracy.

Obviously, the exertion of will of the entire party from top to bottom is necessary in order to ensure and implement genuine inner-party democracy.

Regarding Trotsky’s Letter

Resolution of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission on intra-Party democracy, published on December 7, was adopted unanimously. Trotsky voted for this resolution. It could therefore be assumed that the members of the Central Committee, including Trotsky, would present a united front with an appeal to Party members for comradely support of the Central Committee and its resolution. This assumption, however, was not borne out in practice. Trotsky recently came out with a letter to Party conferences, which cannot be interpreted otherwise than as an attempt to weaken the will of Party members for unity in supporting the Central Committee and its position.

Judge for yourselves.

Having mentioned the bureaucratism of the party apparatus and the danger of the degeneration of the old guard, i.e., the Leninists, the main core of our party, Trotsky writes:

“The degeneration of the ‘old guard’ has been observed more than once in history. Let us take the most recent and striking historical example: the leaders and parties of the Second International. We know, after all, that Wilhelm Liebknecht, Bebel, Singer, Victor Adler, Kautsky, Bernstein, Lafargue, Guesde, and others were direct and immediate disciples of Marx and Engels. We know, however, that all these leaders – some partially, others entirely – degenerated towards opportunism.” ... “We must say – precisely we, the ‘old men’ – that our generation, which naturally plays a leading role in the party, does not, however, contain within itself any self-sufficient guarantee against the gradual and imperceptible weakening of the proletarian and revolutionary spirit, if we allow the party to suffer further growth and consolidation of apparatus-bureaucratic methods of politics, which turn the younger generation into passive material for upbringing and inevitably sow alienation between the apparatus and the masses, between the old and the young.” ... “The youth – the party’s truest barometer – react most sharply to party bureaucratism.” ... “The youth must seize revolutionary formulas by storm...”

First, I must dispel a possible misunderstanding. Trotsky, as is evident from his letter, counts himself among the old guard of Bolsheviks, thereby expressing his readiness to accept upon himself those possible accusations that might fall upon the head of the old guard, if it indeed embarks on the path of degeneration. It must be acknowledged that this readiness to sacrifice oneself is undoubtedly a trait of nobility. But I must defend Trotsky from Trotsky, for he, for understandable reasons, cannot and must not bear responsibility for the possible degeneration of the core cadres of the old Bolshevik guard. Sacrifice is, of course, a good thing, but do the old Bolsheviks need it? I think it is not needed.

Secondly, it is incomprehensible how one can place on the same level such opportunists and Mensheviks as Bernstein, Adler, Kautsky, Guesde, and others, and the old guard of Bolsheviks, which has always fought and, I hope, will fight with honor against opportunism, against the Mensheviks, against the Second International. What has caused this confusion and this mixing, who needs them, if one has in mind the interests of the party, and not some ulterior considerations aimed by no means at defending the old guard? How are we to understand these hints about opportunism in relation to old Bolsheviks, who grew up in the struggle against opportunism?

Thirdly, I by no means think that the old Bolsheviks are absolutely guaranteed against the danger of degeneration, just as I have no grounds to assert that we are absolutely guaranteed against, say, an earthquake. Such a danger, as a possible one, can and must be admitted. But does this mean that this danger is a real, present one? I think it does not. And Trotsky himself did not cite any data indicating the danger of degeneration as a real danger. Meanwhile, within the party we have a number of elements that could give rise to a genuine danger of degeneration of certain ranks of our party. I am referring to one segment of the Mensheviks who joined our party under duress and have not yet outlived their old opportunist habits. Here is what Comrade Lenin wrote about these Mensheviks and this danger during the purge of our party:

“Every opportunist is distinguished by adaptability… and the Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt, so to speak, ‘on principle’ to the current prevailing among the workers, repainting themselves in a protective color, just as a hare turns white in winter. This peculiarity of the Mensheviks must be known and must be taken into account. And to take it into account means to purge the Party of approximately ninety-nine hundredths of the total number of Mensheviks who joined the RCP after 1918, i.e., when the victory of the Bolsheviks began to become first probable, then certain” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 13).

How could it happen that Trotsky, losing sight of this and similar dangers that exist in reality, pushed to the forefront a possible danger, the danger of the degeneration of the old guard of Bolsheviks? How can one close one’s eyes to a real danger, pushing to the forefront a danger that is, properly speaking, not real, but possible, if one has in mind the interests of the party and not considerations of undermining the authority of the majority of the Central Committee, which represents the leading core of the old guard of Bolsheviks? Is it not clear that such “approaches” can only pour water on the mill of the opposition?

Fourthly, where did Trotsky get this juxtaposition of the "old men," who can degenerate, with the "youth," who are the "surest barometer" of the party, and the "old guard," which can become bureaucratic, with the "young guard," which must "take revolutionary formulas by storm"? Where did this juxtaposition come from, and why was it needed? Have not the youth and the old guard always marched in a united front against internal and external enemies? Does not the unity of the "old men" and the "young" constitute the fundamental strength of our revolution? Where did this attempt to dethrone the old guard and demagogically titillate the youth come from, in order to open and widen a little crack between these fundamental detachments of our party? Who needs all this, if we bear in mind the interests of the party, its unity, its cohesion, and not an attempt to shake this unity to please the opposition?

Is that how the Central Committee and its resolution on inner-party democracy, adopted unanimously at that, are defended?

However, Trotsky evidently did not set himself such a task when he came forward with a letter to the Party conferences. Apparently, there was another intent here, namely: to diplomatically support the opposition in its struggle against the Central Committee of the Party, under the guise of defending the Central Committee’s resolution.

This, in fact, explains the stamp of duality that lies upon Trotsky's letter.

Trotsky is in a bloc with the democratic centralists and a section of the “left” communists – this is the political meaning of Trotsky’s speech.

"Pravda" No. 285,

December 15, 1923

Signature: I. Stalin