No. 0759, December 28, 1939, 20:00 hours

1. NKVD regiments must under no circumstances be thrown into battle to assist front-line infantry units; they are to be used only for the protection of the army's rear areas and the roads leading to them from flanking movements and destruction by the enemy.

2. It is mandatory to construct passing loops and blockhouses along the roads, in accordance with Stavka Order No. 0625 of December 22, 1939.

3. Do not get carried away with the tactic of rapid forward movement, do not overextend; advance only after thorough preparation of the front and as the rear is secured against flanking movements by the enemy, bearing in mind that units that rush too far forward may fall into an ambush. The experience of the war with the Finns in 1808-1809 should be taken into account, when the Finns and their Swedish commanders deliberately retreated deep into the country, lured the pursuing Russian military units, and then surrounded and captured them. There can be no doubt that the Finns will employ this tried and tested tactic in the present war against Soviet forces.

4. Advance and enter battle not in crowds, not in large masses, not in a headlong rush, but in small units -- companies and battalions -- disposing them in several echelons one behind the other, for only great depth of front ensures certain success in the conditions of warfare in Finland. This means that we must have approximately three times as many forces at the front as the Finns.

5. Forward infantry units must have mandatory detachments of ski troops for reconnaissance of the enemy and for striking the enemy from the flanks and from the rear.

6. In view of the absence of bulky fodder and the presence of severe frost, avoid bringing horses to the front wherever possible, since, as experience has shown, horses in the winter conditions of Finland have become a burden for the front. All transport, artillery, and supply trains are to be gradually converted to mechanized traction. The "Komsomolets" tractor for regimental and light artillery, the STZ-5 tractor for heavier artillery, and trucks for the transport of personnel and supply items -- all this will be provided to you in the near future.

7. The high-speed BT tanks have proved unsuitable for the conditions of warfare in Finland. The best course is not to bring them to the front. Amphibious tanks are of little effectiveness in winter conditions. The most effective tanks in the conditions of warfare in Finland have proved to be the T-26. It is recommended to use T-26 tanks at the front and in the rear at blockhouses. T-26 tanks will be delivered to you in the near future.

8. Where the Finns have a system of fortified concrete defensive zones -- for example, on the Karelian Isthmus and in part in the area of the 8th Army -- the advance of our infantry must be preceded by a well-organized artillery preparation; moreover, the artillery preparation must aim not only at area bombardment of the enemy's rear but above all at directed fire against targets, against the permanent firing positions (pillboxes) on the forward edge of the enemy's defenses, and at the destruction of those positions. It must be borne in mind that as long as the pillboxes on the forward edge of the enemy's defenses have not been destroyed, the infantry must not be sent forward to attack.

9. Divisions and reinforcements being sent to you must under no circumstances be thrown into action at the front immediately. Before committing them to the front, the Military Council and army headquarters are obliged to inspect their condition, armaments, supply, uniforms, and reserves; eliminate any deficiencies noted; explain to the soldiers and commanding personnel that the war in Finland is a serious war, sharply different from our autumn campaign in Poland; familiarize them with the conditions of warfare in Finland; and only after all this direct the units to the front.

10. Strictly observe the secrecy of orders and directives; do not transmit secret directives by telephone and, in general, reduce telephone chatter. Secret directives are to be transmitted orally, and if they are transmitted by radio or telegraph, they must be in encrypted form.

Commander-in-Chief

K. VOROSHILOV

Member of the Main Military Council

I. STALIN

Chief of the General Staff

B. SHAPOSHNIKOV

Secrets and Lessons of the Winter War 1939-1940. Pp. 222-224.

RGVA. F. 37977. Op. 1. D. 233. L. 88-90.