Greetings, Comrade Molotov! 1) On England. Litvinov is wrong. Litvinov does not want to understand that Henderson substituted the question of procedure with the question of resolving (and not merely negotiating) the disputed (all!) questions. To agree to this means to nullify our gains on the diplomatic front, to arm our enemies against ourselves, and to drive ourselves into a dead end. Whatever conversations Dovgalevsky might conduct after Henderson's declaration and the response of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, they (the conversations) would be portrayed as negotiations on the substance of the matter, and we would find ourselves in a most foolish position. I think that transferring the matter from the Presidium to the session of the Central Executive Committee will not be necessary, since if Henderson renounces his position, the matter can be settled in the Presidium; if he does not renounce it, we can decide the matter directly in the session of the Central Executive Committee (bypassing the Presidium), tacitly proceeding from the assumption that the "plenum of the presidium" means the session of the Central Executive Committee. Consequently, your question about "emphasizing the transfer of the matter from the Presidium to the session of the Central Executive Committee" is rendered moot. 2) On Azerbaijan. Gikalo must be supported wholeheartedly, for he is fundamentally correct (preserving more or less capable people from the old cadres of local workers). Artak and Shatunovskaya regard the removal of Mirzoyan by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as their victory, just as Shatskin regards the party's victory over the rightists as his victory over the Slepkovites.

All this is nonsense and stupidity. Both Shatunovskaya and Artak should have been sent back to Moscow to the Communist Academy (where they had been previously seconded and from where they have now returned to Baku "by decision of the Baku aktiv").

No good can be expected from them in Baku. What can be expected from them is evident from the stupid article by Krasny in “Komsomolskaya Pravda” about Baku (once again “Komsomolskaya Pravda” has meddled in something that is none of its business!). We must retain both Buniat-zade and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan. All the Shatunovskys and Artakis combined are not worth, as workers, a single Buniat-zade. Bagirov (despite his past sins) will have to be confirmed as chairman of the Cheka of Azerbaijan: at present he is the only person who will be able to cope with the Musavatists and Ittihadists who have raised their heads in the Azerbaijani countryside. This is a serious matter, and one cannot joke about it here. It is a pity (a great pity) about Kasumov. He is one of the best workers, capable of becoming a major figure in the future. A request: do not decide the question of his assignment anywhere without my participation. 3) On the Transcaucasian Regional Committee. The Transcaucasian Regional Committee does not guide the national Central Committees. It is incapable of guiding them. It must be thoroughly purged and renewed. This question is a complex one. It will have to be postponed until autumn. 4) The “Statement” by I.N. Smirnov is an abomination. No concessions whatsoever must be made to these gentlemen, who wish to have Article 58 lifted from them and then to settle in Moscow for their wrecking “work.” 5) You are right in saying that Bukharin is sliding downhill. It is sad, but a fact. Well, then — so be it — “fate.” It is only strange that he hopes to deceive the party with petty swindling “maneuvers.” A typical representative of spineless intellectual deadwood in politics, with a leaning toward a Cadet lawyer. God be with him… 6) The proposals on grain procurements have been adopted by the Politburo. That is good. But, in my opinion, it is not enough. The matter now lies in the execution of the Politburo’s decision. There is no need to prove that all procurement organizations (especially in Ukraine) will circumvent this decision. I fear, furthermore, that the OGPU will learn nothing of the Politburo’s decision, and it (the decision) will get stuck in the “depths” of the OGPU. It is therefore necessary to demand from the procurement organizations, the OGPU, the Kolkhoz Center, etc.: a) copies of their orders to their subordinate organs in execution of the PB’s decision; b) a regular report every two weeks (or even better, once a week) on the results of the execution of the decision. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection-Central Control Commission must also be drawn into this matter. I do not know how you view the matter and the prospects of grain procurements (Mikoyan, perhaps, imagines that, since the decisions have been adopted, he already has 130 million poods of untouchable reserve lying in the elevators). I, for my part, think that with grain procurements things are not going well for us so far. Judge for yourself: for the first ten-day period of August we have fulfilled only 15% of the plan. Let us suppose that for the remaining two ten-day periods we will have not 15% but 20% — that is still not what we need now. I fear that this unsatisfactory pace will form the basis for further procurements. And grain procurements this year are the main thing in our practice — if we stumble on this, everything will be crushed. And the danger of stumbling will grow if you do not press for the execution of the Central Committee’s decisions with all severity and inexorability. 7) Pay serious attention to the oil business in the Urals. It turns out they have decided to set up only 10 drilling rigs in a year. The drilling tools are mostly percussion, not rotary, meaning the drilling rate will be murderously slow. This means that the Supreme Council of National Economy and the “patrons” of Uralneft — Azneft and Grozneft — are treating the matter of oil extraction in the Urals just as superficially as Nobel treated Ukhta.

This is an outrage and a crime. It is necessary, in my opinion: a) to organize right now a special trust “Uralneft,” freeing the Urals from its “patrons,” who are ready to stifle oil extraction in the Urals; b) to put an experienced communist oilman at the head of “Uralneft,” driving out of the Urals the wrecker Dobrynsky (I think it’s Dobrynsky), provided by the “patron” Grozneft (here, God, is what we don’t need); c) to oblige VSNKh to deliver this same year from 40 to 80 drilling rigs with rotary machines. Without such and similar measures, the matter will be stalled (or even die out) and we will have no real exploration in the Urals. Well, that’s all for now. I shake your hand. I. Stalin.

P.S. About Khlopkom. According to information, both the Khlopkom people and the Gosplan people (especially the Khlopkom people) do not believe in the correctness of the Politburo’s decision regarding the expansion of the cotton five-year plan and want to sabotage it in practice in order to prove their rightness. If this is true (I think there is a high degree of probability in this), it must be acknowledged that such an “idea” of the Khlopkom people is the most vile form of wrecking, deserving the most severe punishment. One must suppose, in general, that Mamaev will not remain long at the head of Khlopkom. It is possible that he will manage to free himself from the old routine traditions of Khlopkom, but this, it seems to me, is unlikely. Therefore, it is entirely correct that the Central Committee has decided to immediately supply Glavkhlopkom with new major workers. Fushman, perhaps, will be useful for this matter. Kharitonov, maybe, would also suit, if he is capable of working honestly. Shadunts would be very good, but Sergo resolutely objects. Therefore, it would be better to give Reingold to Glavkhlopkom instead of Shadunts. In exchange for Fushman and Kharitonov, other equally valuable workers should be given to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. 21/VIII-29. I. Stalin.