Moscow. Only for Lenin, urgent.

Lozovaya, 4/8.

I communicate for your orientation the following data on the Crimean front:

First, at the front and in the immediate rear, the enemy as of July 30 had thirty-six thousand bayonets and fourteen thousand sabers; of these, eighteen thousand bayonets and eight thousand sabers have been committed to battle. We have at the front and in the immediate rear forty thousand bayonets and six thousand sabers; of these, only ten thousand bayonets and five thousand sabers have been committed to battle (the rest are en route and concentrating). This is what explains our present reverses. Thus, the enemy's immediate reserve is six thousand sabers and eighteen thousand bayonets; our immediate reserve is one thousand sabers and thirty thousand bayonets. Obviously, while our infantry reserves are in good shape, our cavalry situation is disastrously bad, for the enemy outnumbers us in cavalry by more than two to one.

Second. I have just received your questions. What we need is not the division of fronts but the reinforcement of the Crimean sector, the transfer of all western armies to the Western Front without dismantling the South-Western Front apparatus. I have already set forth my considerations in a telegram addressed to Krestinsky. I have no replacement; the CC can find one within two weeks. The Commander-in-Chief has been letting us down from the very start of the Crimean operation, for he (and not he alone) has underestimated the Wrangel danger and has always been late in fulfilling his promises by precisely the amount that Wrangel needs -- there are heaps of examples; writing about them is pointless. As for our diplomacy, I shall say nothing of it; we had better talk about it later when we meet.

Third. You probably already know that we have taken Kovel, Lutsk, and Bugach.

Fourth. I have just been given your inquiry about the prospects on the fronts in anticipation of the CC Plenum. I do not know what precisely my opinion is needed for, and therefore I am unable to transmit the assessment you request and shall confine myself to communicating bare facts without interpretation. Budyonny's delay is temporary; the enemy has thrown against Budyonny the Lvov, Lutsk, and Galician groups in order to save Lvov. Budyonny assures that he will smash the enemy (he has already taken a large number of prisoners), but Lvov will evidently be taken with some delay. In a word, Budyonny's delay does not signify a turning of the tide in the enemy's favor. As for Wrangel, we are now, it is true, weak for the reasons set forth above, but we are still containing the enemy. No later than a week from now, we shall commit thirty thousand fresh bayonets, and by all indications we shall create a preponderance on our side, dislodge Wrangel from his positions, and our situation will improve with each passing day, as the delayed units will be arriving. Of course, war is a gamble and one cannot foresee everything, but insofar as one can foresee at all, Wrangel's chances must inevitably fall. The general prospect on the fronts is, in my opinion, as follows: Poland is exhausted and needs a breathing space; consequently, we must put forward conditions that make the recovery of bourgeois Poland impossible. Wrangel will be knocked back in the nearest days, and if the Commander-in-Chief transfers cavalry to us, Wrangel will be completely liquidated by the beginning of autumn.

Stalin.

Source: Bolshevik Leadership. Correspondence. 1912-1927, pp. 153-154.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5556. L. 3-6.