I have taken the floor to make several observations on the speeches of the comrades who spoke here. As for the principled aspect of the question raised in connection with the Sultan-Galiev affair, I will endeavor to elucidate it in my report on the second item.

First of all, on the question of this conference itself. Someone here said (I forget who exactly) that this conference represents an extraordinary phenomenon. This is untrue. Such conferences are nothing new for our party. This conference is the fourth in number since the establishment of Soviet power. Before the beginning of 1919, there were three conferences. At that time the situation allowed us to convene such conferences. Later, after 1919, in 1920-1921, when we were immersed in the civil war, we had no time for such conferences. And only now, after we have finished with the civil war, when our work has deepened along the line of economic construction, after party work itself has become more concrete, especially in the national regions and republics, have we again had the opportunity to convene such a conference. I think the CC will resort to this means more than once in order to create complete mutual understanding between those who carry out policy on the ground and those who formulate it. I think that such conferences should be convened not only from all the republics and regions together, but also from individual regions and republics separately, for the development of more concrete decisions. Only such an approach can satisfy both the CC and the workers on the ground.

I listened to some comrades who spoke about how I warned Sultan-Galiev when I had the opportunity to familiarize myself with his first conspiratorial letter addressed to, it seems, Adigamov, who for some reason is silent and does not speak, although he of all people should have spoken first and most of all. I received a reproach from these comrades that I excessively defended Sultan-Galiev. Yes, I did indeed defend him to the last possibility, and I considered this and continue to consider it my duty. But I defended him up to a certain limit. And when that limit was crossed by Sultan-Galiev, I turned away from him. His first conspiratorial letter indicated that he, Sultan-Galiev, was already breaking with the party, for the tone of his letter was almost White Guardist, for he wrote about CC members in a way that only enemies could write. I met him by chance at the Politburo, where he was defending the demands of the Tatar Republic in the Commissariat of Agriculture line. I warned him right then, passing him a note in which I called his conspiratorial letter anti-party, accused him of organizing a group of the Validov type, and told him that if he did not cease his illegal anti-party work, he would end badly, and all support from my side would be ruled out. He replied with great embarrassment that I had been misled, that he had indeed written to Adigamov, but had written something different, something else, that he was and remained a party man, and he gave his word of honor to remain one in the future as well. Nevertheless, a week after this he sends a second conspiratorial letter, instructing Adigamov to establish contact with the Basmachi and their leader Validov, and to "burn" the letter. The result, thus, was baseness, deception, which compelled me to sever all ties with Sultan-Galiev. From that moment, Sultan-Galiev became for me a person standing outside the party, outside the Soviets, and I did not consider it possible to speak with him, despite the fact that he made several attempts to come see me for a "chat." I was reproached by "left" comrades as early as the beginning of 1919 for supporting Sultan-Galiev, safeguarding him for the party, sparing him, in the hope that he would cease to be a nationalist and become a Marxist. I did indeed consider it my duty to support him for the time being. Intellectuals, thinking people, even simply literate people in the eastern republics and regions are so few that they can be counted on one's fingers -- how can one not value them after this? It would be criminal not to take every measure to save useful people from the East from corruption and to preserve them for the party. But everything has a limit. And that limit came at the moment when Sultan-Galiev crossed from the camp of the Communists to the camp of the Basmachi. From that time he ceased to exist for the party. That is why the Turkish ambassador turned out to be more acceptable to him than the CC of our party.

I heard the same reproach from Shamigulov, that I, despite his insistence on finishing off Validov in one blow, defended Validov, trying to preserve him for the party. I did indeed defend him, hoping that Validov could reform. People no worse than him have reformed -- we know this from the history of political parties. I decided that Shamigulov was resolving the question too simply. I did not follow his advice. True, Shamigulov's prediction came true a year later; Validov did not reform, he went over to the Basmachi. But still, the party gained from the fact that we delayed Validov's departure from the party by a year. If we had dealt with Validov in 1918, I am convinced that such comrades as Murtazin, Adigamov, Khalikov, and others would not have remained in our ranks. (A voice: "Khalikov would have stayed.") Perhaps Khalikov would not have left, but an entire group of comrades working in our ranks would have left together with Validov. That is what we achieved through our patience and foresight.

I listened to Ryskulov and must say that his speech was not entirely sincere, semi-diplomatic (a voice: "That's right"), and overall his speech makes a painful impression. I expected greater clarity and sincerity from him. Whatever Ryskulov may say, it is clear that he has at home two conspiratorial letters from Sultan-Galiev that he showed to no one; it is clear that he was connected with Sultan-Galiev ideologically. The fact that Ryskulov is distancing himself from the Sultan-Galiev affair in its criminal aspect, asserting that he is not connected with Sultan-Galiev along the line leading to the Basmachi movement -- that is a trifle. That is not what the conference is about. The issue is the ideological, ideological connection with Sultan-Galievism. But that such a connection between Ryskulov and Sultan-Galiev existed is clear, comrades; Ryskulov himself cannot deny this. But has the time not come, here, from this rostrum, to dissociate at last from Sultan-Galievism decisively and without reservations? In this sense, Ryskulov's speech was semi-diplomatic and unsatisfactory.

Yenbaev also gave a diplomatic, insincere speech. Is it not a fact that Yenbaev and a group of Tatar workers, whom I consider splendid practitioners despite their ideological unreliability, that they appealed to the CC after Sultan-Galiev's arrest demanding his immediate release, with full guarantees for Sultan-Galiev, hinting that the documents taken from Sultan-Galiev were not genuine? Is this not a fact? What, however, was revealed by the investigation? It was revealed that all the documents were genuine. Sultan-Galiev himself acknowledged their authenticity, and in doing so reported more about his sins than the documents contained, acknowledged his guilt fully, and having acknowledged it, repented. Is it not clear that after all this, Yenbaev should have decisively and irreversibly acknowledged his mistakes and dissociated himself from Sultan-Galiev? This, however, Yenbaev did not do. He found occasion to mock the "lefts," but to dissociate from Sultan-Galievism decisively and in a Communist manner, to dissociate from the abyss into which Sultan-Galiev fell, he did not wish to do, apparently believing that diplomacy would save him.

Firdevs's speech was sheer diplomacy from beginning to end. Who led whom ideologically -- Sultan-Galiev led Firdevs, or Firdevs led Sultan-Galiev -- this question I leave open. I think, however, that ideologically it was rather Firdevs who led Sultan-Galiev than the reverse. I see nothing especially impermissible in Sultan-Galiev's theoretical exercises. If Sultan-Galiev's affair had been limited to the ideology of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, it would have been half the trouble; I would say that this ideology, despite the prohibition contained in the resolution of the X Congress of the party on the national question, could be considered tolerable, and that one could confine oneself to criticizing it within the ranks of our party. But when ideological exercises end in work to establish contact with the leaders of the Basmachi, with Validov and others, then to justify Basmachi practice with innocent ideology, as Firdevs tries to do, is absolutely impossible. You will deceive no one with such a justification of Sultan-Galiev's activities. One could in this way find justification for imperialism and tsarism as well, for they too have their ideology, sometimes quite innocent in appearance. One cannot argue this way. You are not standing before a tribunal here, but before a conference of responsible workers who demand from you straightforwardness and sincerity, not diplomacy.

Khodzhanov spoke well, in my opinion. Ikramov spoke fairly well. But I must note one passage in the speeches of these comrades, a passage that gives one pause. Both of them said that there is no difference between present-day Turkestan and tsarist Turkestan, that only the sign has changed, that Turkestan has remained the same as it was under the tsar. Comrades, if this is not a slip of the tongue, if this is a thought-out speech, and if it was said in full awareness, then it must be said that in that case the Basmachi are right and we are wrong. If Turkestan is indeed a colony, as under tsarism, then the Basmachi are right; then it is not we who should judge Sultan-Galiev, but he who should judge us, as people who tolerate the existence of a colony within the framework of Soviet power. If this is true, I do not understand why you did not go over to the Basmachi yourselves. Obviously, Khodzhanov and Ikramov did not think through this passage of their speech, for they cannot but know that present-day Soviet Turkestan differs fundamentally from tsarist Turkestan. I wanted to note this dark passage in the speeches of these comrades so that the comrades would try to think it over and correct their mistake.

I accept part of those accusations that Ikramov laid out, having in mind the activities of the CC -- that we were not always attentive and did not always manage to raise in time those practical questions that were dictated by the situation of the eastern republics and regions. Of course, the CC is overburdened and is unable to keep up everywhere. But it would be laughable to think that the CC can do everything in its own time. Of course, there are few schools in Turkestan. Local languages have not yet entered the practice of government institutions; the institutions have not been nationalized. The general cultural level is low. All this is true. But can one seriously hope that the CC or the party as a whole will manage in two or three years to raise the culture of Turkestan? We all shout and complain that Russian culture, the culture of the Russian people, the most cultured of the peoples of the Union of Republics, is low. Ilyich stated more than once that we lack culture, that it is impossible in two or three or even ten years to raise Russian culture substantially. And if it is impossible in two or three or even ten years to raise Russian culture substantially, then how can one demand an accelerated raising of culture in the non-Russian, backward, semi-literate regions? Is it not clear that nine-tenths of the "blame" falls on the circumstances, on backwardness, and that this, as they say, cannot be disregarded?

On the "lefts" and the rights.

Do they exist in the Communist organizations in the regions and republics? Of course they do. This cannot be denied.

What do the sins of the rights consist of? They consist in the fact that the rights do not and cannot represent an antidote, a reliable bulwark against the nationalist tendencies that are developing and intensifying in connection with NEP. The fact that Sultan-Galievism took place, the fact that it created a certain circle of supporters in the eastern republics, especially in Bashkiria and Tataria -- this unmistakably indicates that the right-wing elements, who in those republics represent the predominant majority, are not a sufficient bulwark against nationalism.

One must remember that our Communist organizations in the borderlands, in the republics and regions, can develop and stand on their own feet, can become genuine internationalist Marxist cadres, only if they overcome nationalism. Nationalism is the fundamental ideological obstacle on the path to cultivating Marxist cadres, a Marxist vanguard in the borderlands and republics. The history of our party shows that the Bolshevik Party in its Russian part grew and strengthened by fighting Menshevism, for Menshevism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie, Menshevism is the conduit of bourgeois ideology into our party, and without overcoming Menshevism, it could not have stood on its own feet. Ilyich wrote about this several times. Only to the extent that Bolshevism overcame Menshevism in its organizational and ideological forms did it grow and strengthen as a genuine leading party. The same must be said about nationalism in relation to our Communist organizations in the borderlands and republics. Nationalism plays for these organizations the same role that Menshevism played in the past for the Bolshevik Party. Only through a nationalist cover can various bourgeois, including Menshevist, influences penetrate our organizations in the borderlands. Our organizations in the republics can become Marxist only if they manage to withstand the nationalist tide that is pressing into our party in the borderlands -- pressing because the bourgeoisie is being reborn, NEP is growing, nationalism is growing, there are survivals of Great Russian chauvinism that also push forward local nationalism, and there is the influence of foreign states that support nationalism in every way. The struggle against this enemy in the republics and regions represents the stage that our Communist organizations in the national republics must pass through if they want to become strong as genuinely Marxist organizations. There is no other path. And in this struggle the rights are weak. Weak, because they are infected with skepticism toward the party and easily succumb to the influence of nationalism. That is the sin of the right wing of the Communist organizations in the republics and regions.

But no less, if not more, sinful are the "lefts" in the borderlands. If the Communist organizations in the borderlands cannot become strong and develop into genuine Marxist cadres without overcoming nationalism, then these cadres themselves can become mass organizations, can rally around themselves the majority of the working masses, only if they learn to be sufficiently flexible to attract all somewhat loyal national elements into our state institutions, making concessions to them, if they learn to maneuver between a decisive struggle against nationalism in the party and an equally decisive struggle to attract to Soviet work all more or less loyal elements from among the local people, the intelligentsia, and so forth. The "lefts" in the borderlands are more or less free from a skeptical attitude toward the party, from susceptibility to the influence of nationalism. But the sins of the "lefts" consist in the fact that they do not know how to be flexible in relation to bourgeois-democratic and simply loyal elements of the population; they do not know how and do not want to maneuver in the matter of attracting these elements; they distort the party line on winning the majority of the working population in the country. And yet this flexibility and this ability to maneuver between the struggle against nationalism and the attraction of all somewhat loyal elements into the ranks of our state institutions must be created and developed at all costs. It can be created and developed only if we reckon with all the complexity and specificity that we encounter in our regions and republics; if we do not engage in the simple transplantation of models that are created in the central industrial regions and that cannot be mechanically transplanted to the borderlands; if we do not wave away the nationalistically inclined elements of the population, the nationalistically inclined petty bourgeoisie; if we learn to involve these elements in the common work of the state. The "lefts" sin in that they are infected with sectarianism and do not understand the paramount importance of these complex tasks of the party in the national republics and regions.

If the rights threaten, by their susceptibility to nationalism, to impede the growth of our Communist cadres in the borderlands, the "lefts" threaten the party in that, carried away by their oversimplified and hasty "communism," they may cut our party off from the peasantry and the broad strata of the local population.

Which of these dangers is most dangerous? If the comrades deviating "to the left" intend to continue practicing on the ground a policy of artificial stratification of the population -- and this policy was practiced not only in Chechnya and the Yakut Region, not only in Turkestan... (Ibragimov: "This is a tactic of differentiation.") Now Ibragimov has devised to replace the tactic of stratification with the tactic of differentiation, but nothing has changed from this. If, I say, they intend to continue practicing a policy of stratification from above; if they think that Russian models can be mechanically transplanted into the specific national setting without regard for the way of life and concrete conditions; if they think that in fighting nationalism one must at the same time throw overboard everything national; in short, if the "left" communists in the borderlands think they will remain incorrigible -- then I must say that of the two dangers, the "left" danger may prove the most dangerous.

That is all I wanted to say on the question of the "lefts" and the rights. I have run somewhat ahead, but that is because the entire conference has run ahead, anticipating the discussion of the second item.

The rights must be spurred on in order to compel them, to teach them to fight nationalism for the sake of forging genuine Communist cadres from among local people. But the "lefts" must also be spurred on in order to teach them flexibility, skillful maneuvering for the sake of winning the broad masses of the population. All this must be done because the truth lies "in the middle," between the rights and the "lefts," as Khodzhanov correctly observed.

Fourth Conference of the CC of the RCP with Responsible Workers of National Republics and Regions. Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1923.