Comrades! The concluding word will consist of two parts: the first will deal with the organizational practice of the CC insofar as it was criticized by the speakers, and the second will address those organizational proposals of the CC that the speakers did not criticize and with which, evidently, the congress is in solidarity.

Let me say a few words first about the critics of the CC's report.

On Lutovinov. He is dissatisfied with the regime in our party: there is no freedom of speech in our party, no legality, no democracy. He knows, of course, that in the past six years the CC has never prepared a congress as democratically as it has now. He knows that immediately after the February plenum, CC members and candidate members traveled to every corner of our federation and reported on the work of the CC. Lutovinov should know that we already have four issues of the discussion bulletin, where the activities of the CC are dissected and debated every which way -- precisely every which way. But this is not enough for him, for Lutovinov. He wants "real" democracy, so that all, or at least the most important, questions are discussed in all cells from bottom to top, so that the entire party is set in motion on every question and participates in discussing it. But, comrades, now that we hold power, when we have no fewer than 400,000 party members, when we have no fewer than 20,000 cells, I do not know where such a procedure would lead. Under such a system, our party would turn into a debating club, perpetually talking and deciding nothing. And yet our party must above all be a party of action, for we hold power.

Moreover, Lutovinov forgets that although we do hold power within the federation and enjoy all the advantages of legality, from an international standpoint we are living through a period analogous to the one we experienced in 1912, when the party was semi-legal, or more likely illegal, when the party had certain legal footholds in the form of the Duma fraction, legal newspapers, and clubs, when the party was at the same time surrounded by adversaries, and when it strove to accumulate its forces in order to advance and expand the legal framework. We are living through a similar period now on an international scale. We are surrounded by enemies -- this is clear to everyone. The wolves of imperialism that surround us do not slumber. There is not a moment when our enemies are not trying to seize upon some crack through which they might crawl and do us harm. There is no reason to assert that our enemies, who surround us, are not engaged in some preparatory work in the way of blockade or intervention. Such is the situation. Can we, under these circumstances, take all questions of war and peace to the street? After all, to discuss a question at meetings of 20,000 cells means taking the question to the street. What would have become of us if we had carried all our preliminary work on the Genoa Conference out to the street beforehand? We would have failed spectacularly. One must remember that under conditions when we are surrounded by enemies, a sudden blow on our part, an unexpected maneuver, speed -- these decide everything. What would have become of us if, instead of discussing our political campaign at the Lausanne Conference in a close circle of trusted party members, we had taken all this work to the street, revealed our cards? The enemies would have calculated all the minuses and pluses, would have wrecked our campaign, and we would have left Lausanne in disgrace. What would have become of us if we had taken questions of war and peace, the most important questions of all, to the street beforehand? For, I repeat, to submit questions for discussion in 20,000 cells means taking questions to the street. We would have been torn apart in no time. It is clear, comrades, that both on organizational and political grounds, so-called Lutovinov's democracy is a fantasy, a democratic pipe dream. It is false and dangerous. We are not on the same road as Lutovinov.

I turn to Osinsky. He seized upon my phrase about the need, when expanding the CC, to introduce people who are independent. Yes, yes, Sorin, independent, not self-reliant. Osinsky imagines that on this point I arranged a certain rapprochement with Osinsky, with democratic centralism. I did indeed speak about the need to supplement the CC with independent comrades. Independent of what -- I did not say, knowing in advance that it is inadvisable to exhaust all questions in the main speech; one must save something for the concluding word as well. (Laughter. Applause.) We need independent people in the CC, but independent not from Leninism -- no, comrades, God forbid! We need independent people, free from personal influences, from those habits and traditions of struggle within the CC that have taken shape among us and that sometimes create anxiety within the CC. You recall Comrade Lenin's article. It speaks of the prospect of a split. Since that passage of Comrade Lenin's article might have given organizations the impression that a split was already ripening among us, the CC members unanimously decided to dispel any doubts that might arise and stated that there is no split in the CC -- which fully corresponds to reality. But the CC also said that the prospect of a split is not excluded. And that is entirely correct. In the course of work within the CC over the past six years, certain habits and certain traditions of internal CC struggle have inevitably taken shape, creating at times an atmosphere that is not altogether healthy. I observed this atmosphere at one of the recent CC plenums in February, and it was then that I noticed that the intervention of people from the localities often decides everything. We need people independent of these traditions and these personal influences so that, by entering the CC and bringing with them the experience of practical work and ties with the localities, they may serve as the cement that could bind the CC together as a united and indivisible collective leading our party. Such independent comrades, free from old traditions forged within the CC, are needed by us precisely as people who bring a new, refreshing element that strengthens the CC and prevents any and all possibilities of a split within it. It is in this sense that I spoke of independent members.

I cannot, comrades, pass over that sally of Osinsky's against Zinoviev. He praised Comrade Stalin, praised Kamenev, and kicked Zinoviev, deciding that for the time being it was sufficient to remove one, and then the turn of the others would come. He took a course toward decomposing the nucleus that has formed within the CC over years of work, so as to gradually, step by step, decompose everything. If Osinsky seriously intends to pursue such a goal, if he seriously intends to undertake such attacks against this or that member of the nucleus of our CC, I must warn him that he will run up against a wall against which, I am afraid, he will crack his head.

Finally, on Mdivani. Permit me to say a few words on this question that has tired the entire congress. He spoke of vacillations in the CC: today, he says, they decide on the unification of the economic efforts of the three Transcaucasian republics, tomorrow there comes a decision that these republics should unite in a federation, and the day after that, a third decision that all Soviet republics should unite in a Union of Republics. This he calls vacillations of the CC. Is this true? No, comrades, these are not vacillations; it is a system. The independent republics first draw closer together on an economic basis. This step was taken as far back as 1921. After it turns out that the experience of drawing the republics closer yields beneficial results, the next step is taken -- unification into a federation. Especially in a place like Transcaucasia, where a special organ of national peace is indispensable. You know, Transcaucasia is a country where there were Tatar-Armenian massacres even under the tsar, and war under the Musavatists, Dashnaks, and Mensheviks. To put an end to this strife, an organ of national peace is needed, that is, a supreme authority that could speak an authoritative word. The creation of such an organ of national peace without the participation of representatives of the Georgian nation is absolutely impossible. So then, several months after the unification of economic efforts, the next step is taken -- a federation of republics, and a year after that, the next step as the concluding stage on the path of unifying the republics -- the creation of a Union of Republics. Where are the vacillations here? This is a system of our national policy. Mdivani simply failed to grasp the essence of our Soviet policy, even though he fancies himself an old Bolshevik.

He posed a series of questions, hinting that the most important questions concerning the national aspect of Transcaucasian affairs, especially in Georgia, were decided, supposedly, either by the CC or by individual persons. The fundamental question in Transcaucasia is the question of the Transcaucasian federation. Allow me to read a short document speaking to the history of the CC RCP directive on the Transcaucasian federation.

On November 28, 1921, Comrade Lenin sends me a draft of his proposal on the formation of a federation of the Transcaucasian republics. It states:

"1) To recognize the federation of the Transcaucasian republics as correct in principle, absolutely correct, and unconditionally subject to implementation, but premature in the sense of immediate practical realization, that is, requiring several weeks for discussion, propaganda, and implementation from below;

2) To propose that the Central Committees of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan carry out this decision."

I correspond with Comrade Lenin and propose not to rush this, to wait, to allow the local workers some period of time to carry through the federation. I write to him:

"Comrade Lenin. I do not object to your resolution if you agree to accept the following amendment: instead of the words 'requiring several weeks of discussion' in point 1, to say 'requiring a certain period of time for discussion,' etc., in accordance with your resolution. The fact is that 'carrying through' the federation 'from below' in Georgia 'in the Soviet manner' in 'several weeks' is impossible, since in Georgia the Soviets are only beginning to be built. They are not yet fully formed. A month ago they did not exist at all, and to convene a congress of Soviets there in 'several weeks' is inconceivable -- and a Transcaucasian federation without Georgia would be a paper federation. I think two to three months must be allowed for the idea of federation to win out among the broad masses of Georgia. Stalin."

Comrade Lenin replies: "I accept this amendment."

A day later, this proposal is adopted by the votes of Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Molotov, and Stalin. Zinoviev was absent; Molotov substituted for him. This decision was adopted by the Politburo at the end of 1921, as you can see, unanimously. From this same time dates the struggle of the group of Georgian Communists, headed by Mdivani, against the CC directive on federation. You see, comrades, that the matter stood differently from how Mdivani depicted it here. I cite this document against the unseemly insinuations that Mdivani employed here.

Second question: what, in fact, explains the fact that the group of comrades headed by Mdivani was recalled by the Central Committee of the party -- what is the reason? There are two basic and, at the same time, formal reasons. I am obliged to say this, since there were reproaches against the CC and, in particular, against me.

The first reason is that the Mdivani group does not enjoy influence in its own Georgian Communist Party, that it is rejected by the Georgian Communist Party itself. This party has had two congresses: in 1922, at the beginning of the year, there was the first congress, and in 1923, at the beginning of the year, the second congress. At both congresses, the Mdivani group with its idea of rejecting federation met resolute rebuff from its own party. At the first congress, it seems that out of 122 votes, he gathered something around 18; at the second congress, out of 144 votes, he gathered around 20; he was persistently not elected to the CC, and his position was systematically rejected. The first time, at the beginning of 1922, we in the CC put pressure on the Communist Party of Georgia and, contrary to the will of the Communist Party of Georgia, forced the acceptance of the old comrades (Mdivani is certainly an old comrade, and Makharadze is also an old comrade), thinking that both groups, majority and minority, would work together. In the interval between the first and second congresses, however, there were a number of conferences, city-wide and all-Georgian, where every time the Mdivani group received blows from its party, and finally, at the last congress, Mdivani barely gathered 18 votes out of 140.

The Transcaucasian federation is an organization affecting not only Georgia but all of Transcaucasia. Usually, following the Georgian party congress, an all-Transcaucasian congress is convened. The picture there is the same. At the last all-Transcaucasian congress, out of 244, it seems, Mdivani barely gathered about 10 votes. Such are the facts. What is the CC of the party to do in such a situation, if the party, if the Georgian organization itself cannot stomach the Mdivani group? I understand our policy on the national question as a policy of concessions to the nationals and to national prejudices. This policy is undoubtedly correct. But can one endlessly violate the will of the party within the framework of which the Mdivani group has to work? One cannot, in my opinion. On the contrary, one must try to coordinate one's actions with the will of the party in Georgia to the extent possible. The CC did just that by recalling certain members of this group.

The second reason that dictated the CC's recall of some comrades from this group is that they constantly violated decisions of the CC of the RCP. I have already recounted the history of the decision on the federation; I have already said that without this organ, national peace is impossible, that in Transcaucasia only Soviet power, by creating the federation, achieved the establishment of national peace. Therefore, we in the CC considered this decision unconditionally binding. Yet what do we see? The Mdivani group's insubordination to this decision -- more than that: a struggle against it. This was established both by Comrade Dzerzhinsky's commission and by the Kamenev-Kuibyshev commission. Even now, after the decision of the March plenum on Georgia, Mdivani continues the struggle against federation. What is this if not a mockery of the CC's decisions?

Such are the circumstances that compelled the CC of the party to recall Mdivani.

Mdivani portrays the matter as though, despite his recall, he nevertheless won. I do not know what to call defeat, then. Though it is known that the late Don Quixote also considered himself victorious when the windmills smashed him. I think that among certain comrades working in a certain piece of Soviet territory called Georgia, up in the upper story, things are apparently not quite in order.

I turn to Comrade Makharadze. He declared here that he is an old Bolshevik on the national question, from Lenin's school. This is untrue, comrades. In April 1917, at the conference, I, together with Comrade Lenin, fought against Comrade Makharadze. He stood then against the self-determination of nations, against the foundation of our program, against the right of peoples to independent statehood. He held this position and fought against the party. Later he changed his view (which, of course, does him credit), but still, he should not have forgotten this! He is not quite an old Bolshevik on the national question, but rather a more or less young one.

Comrade Makharadze addressed a parliamentary inquiry to me as to whether I recognize, or whether the CC recognizes, the Georgian Communist organization as a genuine organization deserving of trust, and if so, whether the CC agrees that this organization has the right to raise questions and submit proposals. If all this is recognized, then does the CC consider the regime established there, in Georgia, intolerable?

I will answer this parliamentary inquiry.

Of course, the CC trusts the Communist Party of Georgia -- whom else could it trust? The Communist Party of Georgia represents the best juices, the best elements of the Georgian people, without whom governing Georgia is impossible. But every organization consists of a majority and a minority. We do not have a single organization where there is no majority and minority. And in practice, we see that the CC of the Communist Party of Georgia consists of a majority that carries out the party line and a minority that does not always carry out this line. The question is, evidently, about trust in the organization as represented by its majority.

Second question: do the national CCs have the right of initiative, of raising questions, do they have the right to submit proposals?

Obviously, they do -- that is clear. The only thing that is unclear is why Comrade Makharadze did not present us with facts showing that the CC of the Communist Party of Georgia is not allowed to raise questions, is not allowed to submit proposals and discuss them? I know of no such facts. I think Comrade Makharadze will submit such materials to the CC, if he has any at all.

Third question: can the regime that has developed in Georgia be tolerated?

Unfortunately, the question is not specified -- what regime? If the reference is to the regime under which Soviet power in Georgia has recently been dislodging the nobility from their nests, as well as Mensheviks and counter-revolutionaries, if that is the regime in question, then this regime does not represent, in my opinion, anything bad. That is our Soviet regime. If the reference is to the claim that the Transcaucasian Regional Committee has created intolerable conditions for the development of the Communist Party of Georgia, then I have no such facts. The CC of Georgia that was elected at the last congress of the Communist Party of Georgia by a majority of 110 votes against 18 has not raised these questions before us. It is working in full contact with the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of our party. If there is a small group, a tendency, in short, party members who are dissatisfied with the party regime, then the corresponding materials must be submitted to the CC. There, in Georgia, there have already been two commissions to examine such complaints: one was the Dzerzhinsky commission, the other was the Kamenev-Kuibyshev commission. A third can be created if necessary.

With this I conclude the first part of my concluding word on the organizational practice of the CC for the year.

I turn to the second part, to the organizational proposals of the CC submitted for the congress's consideration. As far as I know, none of the speakers touched upon, from a critical standpoint, any of the proposals submitted by the CC. I understand this as an expression of full solidarity with those CC proposals that we submitted for your consideration. Nevertheless, I would like to help and introduce a number of amendments. I will introduce these amendments in the section that, in the CC's conception, should be created -- the organizational section, in which the basic work on the party line will be conducted by Comrade Molotov, and on the Soviet line by Comrade Dzerzhinsky.

The first amendment proposes that the number of CC candidate members be increased from five to at least 15.

The second amendment concerns the need to pay special attention to strengthening and expanding the organs of personnel registration and assignment, both at the top and at the bottom, for these organs are now acquiring colossal and paramount importance, as they are the most real means of keeping all the threads of the economy and the Soviet apparatus in the party's hands.

The third amendment will concern a confirmation by the congress of the proposal to create a school for district secretaries at the CC, so that by the end of the year the gubernia committees would have 200-300 secretaries of district caliber.

And the fourth amendment concerns the press. I have nothing concrete to submit on this point, but I would like to draw the special attention of the congress to the need to raise the press to the proper level. It is moving forward, it has advanced far, but not to the extent required. The press must grow not by the day, but by the hour -- it is the sharpest and most powerful weapon of our party.

In conclusion, a few words about this congress. Comrades! I must say that it has been a long time since I have seen such a cohesive congress, animated by a single idea. I regret that Comrade Lenin is not here. If he were here, he could say: "For twenty-five years I have nurtured the party and have raised it to be great and strong." (Prolonged applause.)

Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1923.