Comrades! Since the October Revolution, we are discussing the national question for the third time: the first time at the VIII Congress, the second at the X, and the third at the XII. Is this a sign that something has changed in principle in our views on the national question? No, our principled view of the national question remains the same as before and after October. But since the X Congress, the international situation has changed in the sense that the specific weight of those heavy reserves of revolution, which the countries of the East now represent, has increased. That is the first thing. Second, since the X Congress, our party in its internal situation, in connection with NEP, has also undergone certain changes. All these new factors must be taken into account and summed up. It is in this sense that one should speak of a new formulation of the national question at the XII Congress.

The international significance of the national question. You know, comrades, that we represent -- we, as a Soviet federation -- by the will of historical destinies, we represent the advance detachment of the world revolution. You know that we were the first to break through the general capitalist front, finding ourselves, by the will of fate, ahead of everyone. You know that in our advance, we reached Warsaw, and then retreated, consolidating on those positions that we considered most durable. From that moment, we shifted to NEP, and from that moment we took account of the slowing of the tempo of the international revolutionary movement; from that moment, our policy became not offensive but defensive. To advance further after we suffered a setback at Warsaw (let us not conceal the truth), to advance further we could not, for we risked cutting ourselves off from the rear, and our rear is a peasant one; and finally, we risked running too far ahead of those reserves of revolution given by the will of fate -- the western and eastern reserves. That is why we undertook a turn internally -- toward NEP, and externally -- toward a slowing of the advance, having decided that we must catch our breath, heal our wounds -- the wounds of the advance detachment, of the proletariat -- establish contact with the peasant rear, and carry on further work among the reserves that had fallen behind us -- the western reserves and the eastern reserves, the heavy reserves constituting the basic rear of world capitalism. It is about these reserves -- the heavy reserves that at the same time constitute the rear of world imperialism -- that we are speaking when we discuss the national question.

It is one of two things: either we stir up and revolutionize the deep rear of imperialism -- the eastern colonial and semi-colonial countries -- and thereby accelerate the fall of imperialism, or we miss the mark here and thereby strengthen imperialism, thereby weakening the force of our movement. That is how the question stands.

The fact is that the entire East looks upon our Union of Republics as an experimental field. Either we resolve the national question correctly in its practical application within this Union, either we establish here, within this Union, truly fraternal relations between peoples, genuine cooperation -- and then the entire East will see that in our federation it has a banner of liberation, has an advance detachment in whose footsteps it must follow, and this will be the beginning of the collapse of world imperialism. Or we commit a mistake here, undermine the trust of the formerly oppressed peoples in the proletariat of Russia, deprive the Union of Republics of that attractive force in the eyes of the East that it possesses -- and then imperialism will win, and we will lose.

Therein lies the international significance of the national question.

The national question has significance for us also from the standpoint of the internal situation, not only because in numerical terms the former ruling nation represents about 75 million and the other nations 65 million (which is, after all, no small number), and not only because the formerly oppressed nationalities occupy the regions most needed for economic development and the points most important from the standpoint of military strategy, but above all because in these two years we have introduced the so-called NEP, and in connection with this, Great Russian nationalism has been growing and intensifying; the idea of smenovekhovism has been born; aspirations are stirring to accomplish by peaceful means what Denikin failed to accomplish -- that is, to create the so-called "one and indivisible."

Thus, in connection with NEP, a new force is being born in our internal life -- Great Russian chauvinism, nesting in our institutions, penetrating not only Soviet but also party institutions, roaming through every corner of our federation and leading to the fact that if we do not give this new force a resolute rebuff, if we do not cut it off at the root -- and NEP conditions foster it -- we risk confronting a rupture between the proletariat of the former ruling nation and the peasants of the formerly oppressed nations, which would mean the undermining of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But NEP fosters not only Great Russian chauvinism; it also fosters local chauvinism, especially in those republics that have several nationalities. I have in mind Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara, and partly Turkestan, where we have several nationalities whose advanced elements will perhaps soon begin to compete among themselves for primacy. This local chauvinism, of course, does not represent by its force the same danger as Great Russian chauvinism. But it is a danger nevertheless, threatening to turn some republics into arenas of national squabbling and to undermine the bonds of internationalism there.

Such are the considerations of an international and internal character that testify to the important, paramount significance of the national question in general and at the present moment in particular.

What is the class essence of the national question? The class essence of the national question in the conditions of present-day Soviet development consists in establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the former ruling nation and the peasantry of the formerly oppressed nationalities. The question of the alliance has been discussed here more than sufficiently, but in the discussion of the alliance in the reports of Kamenev, Kalinin, Sokolnikov, Rykov, and Trotsky, what was mainly had in mind was the relationship of the Russian proletariat to the Russian peasantry. Here, in the national sphere, we have a more complex mechanism. Here we are dealing with the question of establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the former ruling nation, representing the most cultured stratum of the proletariat of our entire federation, and the peasantry, predominantly the peasantry of the formerly oppressed nationalities. Therein lies the class essence of the national question. If the proletariat succeeds in establishing with the non-Russian peasantry relations capable of undermining all the survivals of distrust toward everything Russian, which was cultivated and implanted for decades by the policy of tsarism; if the Russian proletariat succeeds, moreover, in achieving full mutual understanding and trust, in establishing a genuine alliance not only between the proletariat and the Russian peasantry but also between the proletariat and the peasantry of the formerly oppressed nationalities -- then the task will be resolved. For this, it is necessary that the power of the proletariat be as native to the non-Russian peasantry as to the Russian. For Soviet power to become native also to the non-Russian peasantry, it is necessary that it be comprehensible to them, that it function in the native language, that schools and organs of power be built from local people who know the language, customs, habits, and way of life of the non-Russian nationalities. Only then and only insofar as Soviet power, which until recently was Russian power, will become not only Russian but international, native to the peasants of the formerly oppressed nationalities -- when the institutions and organs of power in the republics of these countries begin to speak and work in the native language.

Therein lies one of the foundations of the national question in general and in Soviet conditions in particular.

What is the characteristic feature of the resolution of the national question at the present moment, in 1923? What form have the questions requiring resolution along national lines taken in 1923? The form of establishing cooperation between the peoples of our federation along economic, military, and political lines. I have in mind inter-national relations. The national question, which has at its foundation the task of establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the former ruling nation and the non-Russian peasantry, at the present moment takes the particular form of establishing cooperation and fraternal coexistence among those peoples that were previously divided and that are now uniting within the framework of a single state.

That is the essence of the national question in the form it has assumed in 1923.

The concrete form of this state unification is that Union of Republics of which we spoke at the end of last year at the Congress of Soviets and which we established then.

The foundation of this Union is voluntariness and legal equality of the members of the Union. Voluntariness and equality -- because the starting point of our national program is the point concerning the right of nations to independent statehood, what was formerly called the right to self-determination. Proceeding from this, we must say definitely that no union of peoples, no unification of peoples into a single state can be durable unless it has as its foundation complete voluntariness, unless the peoples themselves wish to unite. The second foundation is the legal equality of the peoples composing the Union. And this is understandable. I am not speaking of actual equality; I shall speak of that later, for the establishment of actual equality between nations that have advanced and nations that are backward is a very complex, very difficult matter, requiring a number of years. I am speaking here of legal equality. Equality here is expressed in the fact that all the republics -- in the present case, the four republics: Transcaucasia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and the RSFSR -- entering the Union equally enjoy the benefits of the Union and at the same time equally renounce some of their rights of independence in favor of the Union. If the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Transcaucasian Republic no longer have their own people's commissariats of foreign affairs, then it is clear that with the abolition of these commissariats and the creation of a common commissariat of foreign affairs in the Union of Republics, there occurs a certain limitation of the independence that these republics possessed and which is limited equally for all republics entering the Union. It is clear that if formerly these republics had their own foreign trade organs, and now these are abolished both in the RSFSR and in the other republics, in order to create a common foreign trade organ in the Union of Republics, here too there occurs a certain limitation of independence, which formerly existed in full and which has now been curtailed in favor of the common Union, and so on and so forth. Some pose the purely scholastic question: after the unification, do the republics remain independent? This is a scholastic question. Their independence is limited, for every unification is a certain limitation of the previously existing rights of those who have united. But the basic elements of independence remain unconditionally with each republic, if only because each republic has the right of unilateral withdrawal from the Union.

And so, the concrete form of the national question in our situation at the present moment has come down to the question of establishing cooperation among the peoples: economic, foreign-political, and military. We must unite these republics along these lines into a single union called the USSR. These are the concrete forms the national question has assumed at the present moment.

But the tale is quickly told, while the deed is not quickly done. The fact is that in our situation, we have a whole series of factors not only favoring the unification of peoples into a single state, but also impeding this unification.

The favoring factors are known to you: above all, the economic rapprochement of peoples, established even before Soviet power and consolidated by Soviet power, a certain division of labor among peoples, established before us and consolidated by us, by Soviet power -- this is the fundamental factor favoring the unification of the republics into a Union. The second factor favoring unification should be considered the nature of Soviet power itself. This is understandable. Soviet power is the power of the workers, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which by its nature inclines the working elements of the republics and peoples comprising the Union toward friendly relations with one another. This is understandable. And the third factor favoring unification is the imperialist encirclement constituting the environment in which the Union of Republics must act.

But there are also factors impeding this unification, retarding it. The main force retarding the unification of the republics into a single union is that force which, as I have already said, is growing among us under the conditions of NEP: Great Russian chauvinism. It is no accident, comrades, that the smenovekhovtsy have acquired a mass of supporters among Soviet functionaries. This is no accident at all. Nor is it an accident that the gentlemen smenovekhovtsy praise the Communist-Bolsheviks, as if to say: you can talk about Bolshevism as much as you like, you can chatter about your internationalist tendencies as much as you like, but we know that what Denikin failed to accomplish, you will accomplish, that you Bolsheviks have restored the idea of a Great Russia, or at any rate will restore it. All this is no accident. Nor is it an accident that even in some of our party institutions this idea has penetrated. I witnessed at the February plenum, where the question of the second chamber was first raised, speeches within the CC that did not correspond to Communism -- speeches that had nothing in common with internationalism. All this is a sign of the times, an epidemic. The basic danger arising from this consists in the fact that in connection with NEP, great-power chauvinism is growing among us not by the day but by the hour, striving to obliterate everything non-Russian, to gather all the threads of governance around the Russian element and to crush the non-Russian. The basic danger consists in the fact that with such a policy we risk losing the trust in the Russian proletarians on the part of the formerly oppressed peoples, trust that they won in the October days, when the Russian proletarians overthrew the landlords, the Russian capitalists, when they destroyed national oppression within Russia, withdrew troops from Persia, from Mongolia, proclaimed the independence of Finland, Armenia, and generally placed the national question on an entirely new foundation. The trust we won then we may squander to the last remnants if we do not all arm ourselves against this new, I repeat, Great Russian chauvinism, which is advancing and creeping forward, drop by drop infiltrating ears and eyes, step by step corrupting our workers. This danger, comrades, we must at all costs lay flat on its back. Otherwise, we face the prospect of losing the trust of the workers and peasants of the formerly oppressed peoples; we face the prospect of a rupture of ties between these peoples and the Russian proletariat, and thereby we face the danger of allowing a crack in the system of our dictatorship.

Do not forget, comrades, that if we advanced with unfurled banners against Kerensky and overthrew the Provisional Government, it was, among other things, because behind us we had the trust of those oppressed peoples who expected liberation from the Russian proletarians. Do not forget about such reserves as the oppressed peoples, who are silent but by their silence exert pressure and decide much. Often this is not felt, but they, these peoples, are alive, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Do not forget that if behind Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel, and Yudenich we had not had the so-called "aliens," the formerly oppressed peoples who undermined the rear of these generals by their silent sympathy for the Russian proletarians -- comrades, this is a special factor in our development: silent sympathy, which no one sees or hears, but which decides everything -- if not for this sympathy, we would not have toppled a single one of these generals. While we advanced against them, their rear began to disintegrate. Why? Because these generals relied on the colonizing element from among the Cossacks, they painted for the oppressed peoples the prospect of their continued oppression, and the oppressed peoples were compelled to come into our embrace, while we unfurled the banner of liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of these generals; that is the sum of factors overshadowed by the successes of our troops but which in the final analysis decided everything. This must not be forgotten. That is why we are obliged to make a sharp turn in the sense of fighting the new chauvinist sentiments and to nail to the pillory of shame those officials of our institutions and those party comrades who forget about our conquest of October -- namely, the trust of the formerly oppressed peoples, which we must cherish.

It must be understood that if such a force as Great Russian chauvinism blooms in full flower and goes on the rampage, there will be no trust on the part of the formerly oppressed peoples, we shall build no cooperation in a single union, and there will be no Union of Republics for us.

Such is the first and most dangerous factor retarding the unification of peoples and republics into a single union.

The second factor, comrades, also impeding the unification of the formerly oppressed peoples around the Russian proletariat, is that actual inequality of nations that we inherited from the period of tsarism.

We have proclaimed and are implementing legal equality, but from legal equality, which of course has the greatest significance in the history of the development of the Soviet republics, it is still far to actual equality. All the backward nationalities and all peoples formally have as many rights as all the other, more advanced nations within our federation. But the trouble is that some nationalities do not have their own proletariats, have not undergone industrial development, have not even begun it, are terribly backward culturally, and are completely unable to utilize those rights that the revolution has granted them. This, comrades, is a more important question than the question of schools. Some of our comrades think that by pushing to the foreground the question of schools and language, they can thereby cut the knot. This is wrong, comrades; schools alone will not get you far here; the schools themselves are developing, language is also developing, but actual inequality remains the foundation of all discontent and all friction. Here one cannot get by with schools and language; what is needed is real, systematic, sincere, genuine proletarian assistance on our part to the laboring masses of nationalities that are backward in cultural and economic respects. It is necessary that, in addition to schools and language, the Russian proletariat take every measure to ensure that in the borderlands, in the culturally backward republics -- and they are backward not through their own fault but because they were formerly regarded as sources of raw materials -- it is necessary to ensure that centers of industry are established in these republics. Some attempts in this direction have been made. Georgia has taken one factory from Moscow, and it should be operating soon. Bukhara has taken one factory; it could have taken four. Turkestan is taking one large factory, and thus there is every reason to believe that these republics, backward economically and lacking a proletariat, must, with the help of the Russian proletariat, establish centers of industry at home, even if small, so that these centers may contain groups of local proletarians who can serve as a transmission bridge from the Russian proletarians and peasants to the laboring masses of these republics. In this area, we will have to do serious work, and here one cannot get by with schools alone.

But there is yet a third factor retarding the unification of the republics into a single union -- nationalism in the individual republics. NEP acts not only on the Russian population but on the non-Russian as well. NEP develops private trade and industry not only in central Russia but in the individual republics as well. It is precisely this NEP and the private capital associated with it that feed and foster Georgian nationalism, Azerbaijani nationalism, Uzbek nationalism, and so forth. Of course, if there were no Great Russian chauvinism -- which is offensive because it is strong, because it was strong before, and the habits of oppression and denigration remain -- if there were no Great Russian chauvinism, then perhaps local chauvinism, as a response to Great Russian chauvinism, would exist, so to speak, in a minimal, a miniature form, because in the final analysis, anti-Russian nationalism is a defensive form, a certain distorted form of defense against Great Russian nationalism, against Great Russian chauvinism. If this nationalism were only defensive, one could perhaps refrain from raising a fuss about it. One could concentrate the full force of one's actions and the full force of one's struggle on Great Russian chauvinism, hoping that once this powerful enemy is brought down, anti-Russian nationalism will be brought down along with it, for it, this nationalism, I repeat, is in the last analysis a reaction to Great Russian nationalism, a response to it, a certain defense. Yes, this would be so, if on the ground anti-Russian nationalism went no further than a reaction to Great Russian nationalism. But the trouble is that in some republics, this defensive nationalism is turning into offensive nationalism.

Take Georgia. There, more than 30 percent of the population is non-Georgian. Among them are Armenians, Abkhazians, Adjarians, Ossetians, Tatars. At the head stand the Georgians. Among a section of Georgian Communists, the idea has been born and is developing that these small nationalities need not be taken into great account: they are less cultured, they say, less developed, and consequently one need not reckon with them. This is chauvinism -- chauvinism that is harmful and dangerous, for it can turn the small Georgian Republic into an arena of squabbling. Indeed, it has already turned it into an arena of squabbling.

Azerbaijan. The basic nationality is Azerbaijani, but there are also Armenians. Among one section of the Azerbaijanis, there is also such a tendency, sometimes quite undisguised, to the effect that we, they say, are Azerbaijanis, the indigenous people, while they, the Armenians, are newcomers -- cannot they perhaps be pushed back a bit, their interests disregarded? This, too, is chauvinism. It undermines that equality of nationalities on the basis of which Soviet power is built.

Bukhara. There, in Bukhara, there are three nationalities: the Uzbeks, the basic nationality; the Turkmen, a "less important" nationality from the standpoint of Bukharan chauvinism; and the Kirghiz. There are few of them there, and it turns out they are "less important."

In Khorezm it is the same: Turkmen and Uzbeks. The Uzbeks are the basic nationality, and the Turkmen are "less important."

All this leads to conflicts, to a weakening of Soviet power. This tendency toward local chauvinism must also be cut off at the root. Of course, in comparison with Great Russian chauvinism, which constitutes three-quarters of the whole in the overall system of the national question, local chauvinism is not as important, but for local work, for local people, for the peaceful development of the national republics themselves, this chauvinism is of paramount importance.

This chauvinism sometimes begins to undergo a very interesting evolution. I have in mind Transcaucasia. You know that Transcaucasia consists of three republics comprising ten nationalities. From early times, Transcaucasia was an arena of massacres and squabbling, and then, under Menshevism and the Dashnaks, an arena of wars. You know about the Georgian-Armenian war. The massacres at the beginning and end of 1905 in Azerbaijan are also known to you. I can name a whole series of districts where the Armenian majority slaughtered the entire remaining population consisting of Tatars -- for example, Zangezur. I can point to another province -- Nakhichevan. There the Tatars predominated, and they slaughtered all the Armenians. This was just before the liberation of Armenia and Georgia from the yoke of imperialism. (A voice from the floor: "They resolved the national question in their own way.") This, too, is of course a certain form of resolving the national question. But it is not the Soviet form of resolution. In this atmosphere of mutual national enmity, the Russian workers are of course not involved, for it is the Tatars and Armenians fighting, without the Russians. That is why a special organ is needed in Transcaucasia, one that could regulate relations between the nationalities.

One can say with confidence that the relations between the proletariat of the former ruling nation and the working people of all the other nationalities represent three-quarters of the entire national question. But one-quarter of this question must be assigned to the mutual relations among the formerly oppressed nationalities themselves.

And in this atmosphere of mutual distrust, if Soviet power had not managed to establish in Transcaucasia an organ of national peace capable of regulating frictions and conflicts, we would have returned to the era of tsarism, or the era of the Dashnaks, Musavatists, and Mensheviks, when people burned and slaughtered one another. That is why the CC confirmed three times the necessity of preserving the Transcaucasian federation as an organ of national peace.

We had and still have one group of Georgian Communists who do not object to Georgia uniting with the Union of Republics but object to this unification passing through the Transcaucasian federation. They would, you see, like to be closer to the Union; they say there is no need for this partition between us Georgians and the Union of Republics in the form of the Transcaucasian federation; federation, they say, is unnecessary. This, supposedly, sounds very revolutionary.

But there is another design here. First, these declarations show that in the sphere of the national question in Georgia, the attitude toward the Russians is of secondary importance, for these comrade deviationists (as they are called) have nothing against Georgia uniting directly with the Union -- that is, they are not afraid of Great Russian chauvinism, considering it one way or another to have been cut down, or that it is of no decisive significance. They are evidently more afraid of the Transcaucasian federation. Why? Why should the three main peoples living in Transcaucasia, who fought among themselves for so long, slaughtered one another, warred against one another -- why should these peoples now, when Soviet power has at last established bonds of a fraternal union between them in the form of a federation, when this federation has yielded positive results -- why should these bonds of federation now be broken? What is the matter, comrades?

The matter is that the bonds of the Transcaucasian federation deprive Georgia of the share of a privileged position that it could occupy by virtue of its geographical location. Judge for yourselves. Georgia has its own port -- Batumi, from which goods flow in from the West; Georgia has such a railway junction as Tiflis, which is unavoidable for Armenia, unavoidable for Azerbaijan, which receives its goods from Batumi. If Georgia were a separate republic, if it did not belong to the Transcaucasian federation, it could present something of a small ultimatum to Armenia, which cannot get along without Tiflis, and to Azerbaijan, which cannot get along without Batumi. There would be certain advantages here for Georgia. It is no accident that the universally known notorious decree on border cordons was drawn up precisely in Georgia. Now this blame is being heaped on Serebryakov. Granted. But this decree was born in Georgia, not in Azerbaijan or Armenia.

Then there is another reason as well. Tiflis is the capital of Georgia, but Georgians in it number no more than 30 percent, Armenians no less than 35 percent, and then come all the other nationalities. There is your capital of Georgia. If Georgia were a separate republic, then a certain transfer of population could be effected -- for example, of the Armenian population from Tiflis. There was indeed adopted in Georgia a well-known decree on the "regulation" of the population of Tiflis, about which Comrade Makharadze declared that it was not directed against the Armenians. They had in mind a certain transfer of population so that year by year there would be fewer Armenians in Tiflis than Georgians, thus transforming Tiflis into a genuine Georgian capital. I grant that they withdrew the eviction decree. But they have at their disposal a mass of possibilities, a mass of such flexible forms -- for instance, "deloading" -- by means of which, while maintaining the appearance of internationalism, they could arrange things so that there would be fewer Armenians in Tiflis.

It is these geographic advantages, which the Georgian deviationists do not want to lose, and the disadvantageous position of Georgians in Tiflis itself, where there are fewer Georgians than Armenians, that impel our deviationists to fight against the federation. The Mensheviks simply evicted Armenians and Tatars from Tiflis. Now, under Soviet power, eviction is impossible, and therefore one must secede from the federation, and then there will be legal possibilities to independently carry out certain operations that will lead to the full exploitation of the advantageous position of Georgians against Azerbaijan and Armenia. And as a result of all this, a privileged position for Georgians within Transcaucasia would be created. Therein lies the entire danger.

Can we, ignoring the interests of national peace in Transcaucasia, create conditions under which Georgians would find themselves in a privileged position in relation to the Armenian and Azerbaijani republics? No. We cannot permit this.

There is an old, special system of governing nations, whereby the bourgeois power draws certain nationalities close to itself, grants them privileges, while it denigrates the other nations, not wishing to bother with them. Thus, by drawing one nationality close, it rules through it over the rest. This was how, for example, they governed in Austria. Everyone remembers the statement of the Austrian minister Beust, when he called in the Hungarian minister and said: "You govern your hordes, and I will manage mine." That is: you squeeze and crush your nationalities in Hungary, and I will crush mine in Austria. You and I are privileged nations, and crush the rest.

The same was true of the Poles within Austria itself. The Austrians drew the Poles close to themselves, granted them privileges, so that the Poles would help strengthen the Austrians' positions in Poland, and for this they gave the Poles the opportunity to stifle Galicia.

This is a special, purely Austrian system -- to single out certain nationalities and grant them privileges, in order then to cope with the rest. From the standpoint of bureaucracy, this is an "economical" mode of government, because one has to deal with only one nationality, but from the political standpoint, it is the certain death of the state, for to violate the principles of equality of nationalities and to permit any privileges for one nationality means to doom one's national policy to death.

In just the same way, England now governs India. In order to cope more easily from a bureaucratic standpoint with the nationalities and tribes of India, England divided India into British India (240,000,000 population) and Native India (72,000,000). On what grounds? On the grounds that England wanted to single out one group of nations and grant it privileges, in order more conveniently to govern the rest. In India itself, there are several hundred nationalities, and England decided: rather than bother with all these nationalities, it is better to single out a few nations, grant them certain privileges, and govern the others through them, for, first, the discontent of the remaining nations will in that case be directed against these privileged nations rather than against England, and second, the "bother" with two or three nations will cost less.

This, too, is a system of government -- the English system. Where does it lead? To the "cheapening" of the apparatus -- that is true. But, comrades, if one looks beyond the bureaucratic conveniences, herein lies the certain death of English rule in India; herein, in this system, lies inevitable death, as surely as two times two is four -- the death of English governance and English dominion.

It is onto this dangerous path that our Georgian deviationist comrades are pushing us, insofar as they are fighting against the federation, violating all party rules, insofar as they want to secede from the federation in order to preserve their advantageous position. They are pushing us onto the path of granting them certain privileges at the expense of the Armenian and Azerbaijani republics. We cannot take this path, for it means the certain death of our entire policy and of Soviet power in the Caucasus.

It is no accident that this danger was sensed by our comrades in Georgia. This Georgian chauvinism, which has gone on the offensive against Armenians and Azerbaijanis, has stirred up the Communist Party of Georgia. It is entirely understandable that the Communist Party of Georgia, which has held two congresses since the time of its legal existence, each time unanimously rejected the position of the deviationist comrades, for without the Transcaucasian federation, under present conditions, peace in the Caucasus cannot be preserved, equality cannot be established. One nation cannot be allowed to be more privileged than another. Our comrades sensed this. That is why, over two years of struggle, the Mdivani group represents a tiny handful, constantly being thrown out by the party in Georgia itself.

It is also no accident that Comrade Lenin was in such a hurry and pressed so hard for the federation to be introduced immediately. Nor is it an accident that three times our CC confirmed the necessity of a federation in Transcaucasia, having its own CEC and its own executive power, whose decisions are binding on the republics. Nor is it an accident that both commissions -- Comrade Dzerzhinsky's and Kamenev's with Kuibyshev's -- upon arriving in Moscow, said that the federation was indispensable.

Finally, it is also no accident that the Mensheviks from the "Socialist Herald" praise our deviationist comrades for their fight against the federation, carrying them on their shoulders: a fisherman sees another fisherman from afar.

I turn to an examination of the means, the paths by which we must overcome these three basic factors retarding unification: Great Russian chauvinism, the actual inequality of nations, and local nationalism, especially when it turns into chauvinism. Of the means that can help us painlessly overcome all this old legacy retarding the rapprochement of peoples, I shall note three.

The first means: to take every measure so that Soviet power in the republics becomes comprehensible and native, so that Soviet power is with us not only Russian but international. For this, it is necessary that not only schools but all institutions, all organs, both party and Soviet, be step by step nationalized, that they function in a language comprehensible to the masses, that they operate under conditions corresponding to the way of life of the given people. Only under this condition shall we obtain the possibility of transforming Soviet power from Russian into international, close, comprehensible, and native to the laboring masses of all the republics, and especially to those that are backward in economic and cultural respects.

The second means, which can facilitate the painless overcoming of the legacy inherited from tsarism and from the bourgeoisie, is such a structure of the commissariats of the Union of Republics as would give at least the basic nationalities the opportunity to have their own people in the collegiums, and would create such conditions under which the needs and requirements of the individual republics would unconditionally be met.

The third means: it is necessary that in the composition of our highest central organs there be such an organ as would serve to reflect the needs and requirements of all without exception republics and nationalities.

I wish to draw your special attention to this last point.

If we could establish within the Union CEC two chambers with equal rights, of which the first would be elected at the Union Congress of Soviets, regardless of nationalities, and the second chamber would be elected by the republics and national regions (the republics equally and the national regions equally as well) and confirmed by the same Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics, I think we would then have in the composition of our supreme institutions a reflection not only of the class interests of all without exception working people, but also of demands that are purely national. We would have an organ reflecting the special interests of nationalities, peoples, and tribes inhabiting the territory of the Union of Republics. It is impossible, comrades, under our conditions, when the Union unites in all not less than 140 million people, of whom some 65 million are non-Russian -- it is impossible to govern such a state without having before one here, in Moscow, in the highest organ, emissaries of these nationalities who would reflect not only interests common to the entire proletariat but also special, specific, national interests. Without this, comrades, it is impossible to govern. Without having this barometer in hand and people capable of formulating the special needs of individual nationalities, it is impossible to govern.

There are two methods of governing a country: one method, where the apparatus is "simplified" and at the head of it sits, let us say, a group or one person who has eyes and hands in the localities in the form of governors. This is a very simple form of government, with the head governing the country, receiving the information that can be obtained from the governors, and the head consoling himself with the hope that he is governing honestly and correctly. Then frictions arise, frictions turn into conflicts, conflicts into revolts. Then the revolts are suppressed. Such a system of government is not our system; moreover, it is too expensive, even though it is simple. But there is another system of government as well -- the Soviet system. In the Soviet country we are implementing a different system of government, a system of government that makes it possible to anticipate with precision all changes, all circumstances both among the peasants and among the nationals, and among the so-called "aliens," and among the Russians, so that in the system of supreme organs there is a series of barometers that detect every change, take account of and prevent both the Basmachi movement and banditry and Kronstadt and every possible storm and adversity. This is the Soviet system of government. It is called Soviet power, people's power, because, resting on the very lowest strata, it detects every change sooner than anyone, takes the corresponding measures, and corrects the line in time if it has been bent -- it criticizes itself and corrects its line. This system of government is the Soviet system, and it demands that in the system of supreme organs we have organs that reflect national needs and requirements without remainder.

There is an objection that this system complicates governance, that it piles up new organs. This is true. Up to now we had the CEC of the RSFSR, then we convened the CEC of the Union, and now the CEC of the Union will have to be divided into two parts. There is nothing to be done about it. I have already said that the simplest system of government is to seat one person and give him governors. But after October, one can no longer engage in such experiments. The system has become more complex, but it facilitates governance and makes all governance profoundly Soviet. That is why I think the congress must accept the establishment of a special organ -- a second chamber within the CEC of the Union -- as an absolutely necessary organ.

I will not say that this is a perfect form of establishing cooperation among the peoples of the Union; I will not say it is the last word of science. We shall raise the national question more than once, for national and international conditions are changing and may yet change. I do not rule out the possibility that we may have to separate some of the commissariats that we are merging within the Union of Republics, if experience shows that certain commissariats, having merged, produced a minus. But one thing is clear -- that under the given conditions and in the given situation, we have no better method and no other more suitable organ at our disposal. A better means and another path for creating an organ capable of reflecting all fluctuations and all changes within the individual republics, other than the establishment of a second chamber, we do not yet have.

It goes without saying that in the second chamber, not only the four republics that have united must be represented, but all peoples, for the matter concerns not only the republics that have formally united (there are four of them) but all the peoples and nationalities of the Union of Republics. Therefore, we must have such a form as would reflect the requirements of all without exception nationalities and republics.

I shall sum up, comrades.

Consequently, the importance of the national question is determined by the new situation in the international position, by the fact that we must here, in Russia, in our federation, resolve the national question correctly, in an exemplary fashion, in order to give an example to the East, which represents the heavy reserves of revolution, and thereby strengthen their trust, their gravitation toward our federation.

From the standpoint of the internal situation, the conditions of NEP, the intensifying Great Russian chauvinism, and local chauvinism also oblige us to underline the special importance of the national question.

I spoke further of the fact that the essence of the national question consists in establishing correct relations between the proletariat of the former ruling nation and the peasantry of the former non-ruling nations, that from this standpoint the concrete form of the national question at the present moment is expressed in the need to find paths, to find means for establishing cooperation among the peoples in the Union of Republics, in a single state.

I spoke further of the factors favoring such rapprochement of peoples. I spoke of the factors retarding such unification. I dwelt especially on Great Russian chauvinism as a force that is growing stronger. This force is the basic danger capable of undermining the trust of the formerly oppressed peoples in the Russian proletariat. This is our most dangerous enemy, whom we must bring down, for if we bring it down, we shall thereby bring down nine-tenths of that nationalism that has survived and is developing in the individual republics.

Further. We face the danger that certain groups of comrades may push us onto the path of granting privileges to some nationalities at the expense of others. I declared that we cannot take this path, for it can undermine national peace and kill the trust of the non-Russian masses in Soviet power.

I spoke further of the fact that the basic means that can give us the possibility of painlessly overcoming these factors impeding unification is the creation of a second chamber within the CEC, about which I spoke more openly at the February plenum of the CC and about which the theses speak in a more veiled form, in order to give comrades the opportunity themselves, perhaps, to suggest another, more flexible form, another, more suitable organ capable of reflecting the interests of nationalities.

Such are the conclusions.

I think that only by standing on this path shall we achieve the correct resolution of the national question; we shall achieve the broad unfurling of the banner of the proletarian revolution and shall gather around it the sympathy and trust of the countries of the East, which represent the heavy reserves of revolution and can play a decisive role in the future battles of the proletariat with imperialism. (Applause.)

Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1923.