Moscow, Kremlin, only for Lenin.

Kharkov, 24/7.

First, the situation on Budyonny's front is good. The enemy has evidently set the goal of wearing down Budyonny's units, for instead of the smashed enemy units, fresh ones appear each time and press at Budyonny like flies. This circumstance somewhat slows our advance. Yesterday we ordered Budyonny to break through the front and capture Lvov by July 30; it is possible that this operation will succeed.

Second, on the Crimean front we are preparing an offensive, which can be launched no earlier than August 5-10. If the enemy does not preempt our offensive, the operation should succeed for certain. We are taking precautionary measures.

Third, I convey my opinion in reply to your memorandum No. 371. Now, when we have the Comintern, a defeated Poland, and a more or less passable Red Army; when, on the other hand, the Entente is seeking a breathing space for Poland in order to reorganize, rearm the Polish army, create a cavalry, and then strike again, perhaps in alliance with other states -- at such a moment and with such prospects, it would be sinful not to encourage revolution in Italy. It must be recognized that we have already entered the period of direct struggle with the Entente, that the policy of maneuvering has already lost its predominant significance, that we can now and must pursue a policy of offensive (not to be confused with a policy of provocative lunges), if we wish to retain the initiative in foreign affairs that we recently won. Therefore the Comintern must place on the agenda the question of organizing an uprising in Italy and in such unconsolidated states as Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Romania will have to be smashed). The three hundred thousand lumpenproletarians in Germany, even if they did actually exist in nature, certainly do not and cannot change the matter. In short: we must weigh anchor and set sail, while imperialism has not yet managed to patch up its broken-down cart even partially, and while it can still patch it up somehow for a certain period and has not itself gone over to a decisive offensive.

Fourth, the telephone conversation was unsuccessful, as someone on the line is eavesdropping and interfering. I shall report daily on the situation at the front by written message.

Stalin.

Source: Bolshevik Leadership. Correspondence. 1912-1927, p. 148.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5551. L. 3-4.