Comrades! Usually our speakers at discussion meetings begin with the history of the question: how did the question of inner-party democracy arise, who first said A, who then said B, and so on. I think this method is unsuitable for us, because it introduces an element of squabbling and mutual accusations and yields nothing useful. I think it will be far better if we begin with the question of how the party received the Politburo resolution on democracy, subsequently confirmed by the CC plenum.

I must establish that this resolution is, it seems, the only one in the entire history of our party which, after a fierce discussion on the question of democracy, received the full -- I would say literally unanimous -- approval of the entire party. Even oppositional organizations and cells, which were generally disposed against the majority of the party and against the CC, even they, for all their desire to find fault with something, found no occasion or grounds for fault, and usually in their resolutions these organizations and cells, while acknowledging the correctness of the basic propositions of the Politburo resolution on inner-party democracy, tried to distinguish themselves from other organizations by appending a certain tail -- say, like this: yes, everything is fine with you, but don't offend Trotsky; or like this: everything is correct, but you were a little late; it would have been better to do all this earlier. I do not raise here the question of who is offending whom. I think that if one examines the matter carefully, it may turn out that the well-known saying about Tit Titych applies rather closely to Trotsky: "Who could offend you, Tit Titych? You yourself offend everyone." (Laughter.) But I said that I would not go into this question. I even allow that someone really is offending Trotsky. But is that the point? What is principled about the question of offense? After all, the issue concerns the principled side of the resolution, not who offended whom. By this I want to say that even sharply and crudely oppositional cells and organizations, even they did not dare to raise any principled objection against the resolution of the Politburo of the CC and the Presidium of the CCC. I establish this as a fact in order to note once more that it is difficult to find in the entire history of our party another such fact, when a resolution that passed through fire and water of a fierce discussion enjoyed not only majority support, but literally unanimous approval from the entire party.

From this I draw two conclusions. The first conclusion is that, consequently, the resolution of the Politburo and the CCC fully meets the needs and demands of the party at the present moment. And the second conclusion is that, consequently, the party will emerge from this discussion on the question of inner-party democracy strengthened and more united. This conclusion is a direct hit at those foreign ill-wishers of ours who have long been rubbing their hands in connection with our discussion, thinking that our party will be weakened as a result of the discussion and power will disintegrate.

I shall not dwell at length on the essence of inner-party democracy. The foundations of this democracy are set forth in the resolution; the resolution has been debated inside out by the entire party -- why should I repeat myself here? I will say only one thing: that a fully developed, complete democracy will obviously not come about. Obviously this democracy will be democracy within the limits outlined by the X, XI, and XII Congresses. What these limits consist of is well known to you, and I shall not repeat myself here. Nor shall I elaborate on the fact that the basic guarantee for inner-party democracy to become flesh and blood of our party is to strengthen the activity and consciousness of the party masses. This too is stated in sufficient detail in our resolution.

I turn to the question of how some comrades and some organizations fetishize the question of democracy, regarding it as something absolute, outside time and space. By this I want to say that democracy is not something given for all times and conditions, for there are moments when there is neither possibility nor sense in implementing it. In order for inner-party democracy to become possible, two conditions or two groups of conditions, internal and external, are needed, without which it is futile to speak of democracy.

It is necessary, first of all, that industry develop, that the material condition of the working class not worsen, that the working class grow quantitatively, that the cultural level of the working class rise, and that the working class grow qualitatively as well. It is necessary that the party, as the vanguard of the working class, also grow -- above all, qualitatively, and above all at the expense of proletarian elements of the country. These conditions of an internal character are absolutely necessary in order to raise the question of genuine, not paper, implementation of inner-party democracy.

But these conditions alone are not sufficient. I have already said that there is yet a second group of conditions, conditions of an external character, without which democracy within the party is impossible. I have in mind certain international conditions that more or less ensure peace, peaceful development, without which democracy in the party is unthinkable. In other words, if we are attacked and are forced to defend the country with arms in hand, then there can be no talk of democracy, for it will have to be curtailed. The party will be mobilized; we shall, most likely, militarize it; and the question of inner-party democracy will fall away of itself.

That is why I think that democracy must be viewed in dependence on conditions, that there must be no fetishism in questions of inner-party democracy, for the implementation of inner-party democracy, as you see, depends on the concrete conditions of time and place at any given moment.

So that there may be no further unnecessary enthusiasms and unfounded accusations, I must also recall the obstacles that stand before the party in the matter of implementing democracy -- obstacles that hinder the implementation of democracy even given the two basic favorable conditions, internal and external, outlined above. Comrades, these obstacles exist, they profoundly affect our party work, and I have no right to be silent about them. What do these obstacles consist of?

These obstacles, comrades, consist, first, in the fact that in the heads of one section of our workers there still live survivals of the old military period, when the party was militarized -- survivals which give rise to certain un-Marxist views, to the effect that our party is supposedly not a self-active organism living an independent ideological and practical life, but something like a system of institutions, lower, middle, and higher. This absolutely un-Marxist view has, admittedly, nowhere yet acquired a finished form, has nowhere been expressed in finished fashion, but elements of this view live in the heads of one section of our workers carrying out party duties, and they prevent them from consistently implementing inner-party democracy. That is why the struggle against such views, the struggle against survivals of the military period both in the center and in the localities, is a current task of the party.

The second obstacle standing in the way of implementing democracy in the party is the pressure of the bureaucratic state apparatus upon the party apparatus, upon our party workers. The pressure of this cumbersome apparatus upon our party workers is not always noticeable and does not always strike the eye, but it does not cease for a single second. This pressure of the cumbersome bureaucratic state apparatus ultimately results in a whole number of our workers, both in the center and in the localities, often against their will and quite unconsciously, deviating from inner-party democracy, from that line in whose correctness they believe but which they are often unable to carry through to the end. You can imagine the bureaucratic state apparatus with no fewer than a million employees, consisting of elements mostly alien to the party, and our party apparatus, having no more than 20,000-30,000 people, charged with subordinating the state apparatus to the party, with socializing it. What is our state apparatus worth without the party's support? Without the aid, without the support of our party apparatus, it is worth very little, unfortunately. And each time our party apparatus inserts its tentacles into all branches of state administration, it finds itself not infrequently having to align its party work in these organs with the line of the state apparatuses. Concretely: the party must carry on work in the political education of the working class, in deepening the consciousness of the working class, but at the same time it is necessary to collect the tax in kind, carry out this or that campaign, for without a campaign, without help from the party, the state apparatuses are unable to fulfill their assignments. And here our workers find themselves between two fires, between the need to correct the line of work of the state apparatuses, which operate in the old way, and the need to maintain ties with the workers. And they themselves often become bureaucratized here.

Such is the second obstacle, which is difficult to overcome but which must be overcome at all costs in order to facilitate the implementation of inner-party democracy.

Finally, there exists yet a third obstacle standing in the way of implementing democracy -- the low cultural level of a whole number of our organizations, our cells, especially in the borderlands (no offense to them), which prevents our party organizations from carrying inner-party democracy through to the end. You know that democracy requires some minimum of cultural level among cell members and the organization as a whole, and some minimum of active workers who can be elected and placed in posts. And if such a minimum of active workers does not exist in an organization, if the cultural level of the organization itself is low -- what then? Naturally, one has to retreat from democracy, resort to the appointment of officials, and so forth.

Such are the obstacles that stood before us, that will yet stand, and that we must overcome in order honestly and fully to implement inner-party democracy.

I have reminded you of these obstacles standing before us, and of those external and internal conditions without which democracy turns into empty demagogic phrases, because some comrades fetishize, absolutize the question of democracy, thinking that democracy is always and under all conditions possible, and that "its implementation is hindered supposedly only by the 'evil' will of 'apparatus men.'" It is against this idealistic view, a view that is not ours, not Marxist, not Leninist, that I have reminded you, comrades, of the conditions for implementing democracy and of the obstacles standing before us at the present moment.

I could, comrades, end my report at this point, but I consider that we are obliged to sum up the results of the discussion and draw from these results certain conclusions that may be of serious significance for us. I could divide our entire struggle along the lines of the discussion, on the question of democracy, into three periods.

The first period was when the opposition attacked the CC and accused it of the entire line of the CC over the last two years, over the period of NEP in general, being allegedly incorrect. This was the period before the publication of the resolution of the Politburo and the Presidium of the CCC. I shall not touch here upon who was right and who was wrong. The attacks were harsh and, as you know, not always well-founded. But one thing is clear: this period can be characterized as the period of the most intense attacks on the CC by the opposition.

The second period began from the moment the resolution of the Politburo and the CCC was published, when the opposition was placed in the necessity of counterposing to the CC's resolution something integral, concrete, and when the opposition turned out to have nothing either integral or concrete. This was the period of the greatest rapprochement between the CC and the opposition. The matter, apparently, was ending, or could have ended, with a certain reconciliation of the opposition with the line of the CC. I remember well how in Moscow, at the center of the discussion struggle, on about December 12, at a meeting in the Hall of Columns, Preobrazhensky introduced a resolution, which for some reason was rejected, that differed little from the resolution of the CC. In essence, this resolution, even in certain secondary points, did not diverge at all from the CC's resolution. And at that point it seemed to me that, really, there was nothing more to fight about: there was the CC's resolution, it satisfied everyone, at least nine-tenths, the opposition itself evidently felt this, was coming closer, and perhaps we would end the disagreements on this. This was the second, conciliatory period.

But then a third period set in. This period opened with Trotsky's intervention, his appeal to the districts -- an intervention that instantly liquidated conciliatory tendencies and turned everything upside down. Following Trotsky's intervention, there began a period of the fiercest inner-party struggle -- a struggle that would not have taken place if Trotsky had not come out with his letter the day after he had voted for the Politburo resolution. You know that the first intervention of Trotsky was followed by a second, after the second a third, and the struggle in connection with this became even more acute.

I think, comrades, that in these interventions Trotsky committed at least six serious errors. These errors led to the sharpening of the inner-party struggle. I turn to an analysis of these errors.

Trotsky's first error was expressed in the very fact of his coming out with an article the day after the publication of the resolution of the Politburo of the CC and the CCC -- an article that cannot be assessed otherwise than as a platform counterposed to the CC's resolution. I repeat and emphasize that this was an article that cannot be regarded otherwise than as a new platform counterposed to the resolution of the CC, adopted unanimously. Just think, comrades: on such-and-such a date the Politburo and the Presidium of the CCC convene, the question of a resolution on inner-party democracy is placed on the agenda, the resolution is adopted unanimously, and only one day later, independently of the CC, without the will of the CC, over the head of the CC, Trotsky's article is dispatched to the districts -- a new platform, raising anew the question of the apparatus and the party, of cadres and youth, of factions and party unity, and so on and so forth -- a platform that the entire opposition seized upon and counterposed to the CC's resolution. This cannot be regarded otherwise than as the counterposing of oneself to the Central Committee. This was an open and sharp counterposing of himself on Trotsky's part to the entire CC. The question confronting the party was: is there a CC as a leading body, or is there one no longer; does a CC exist whose unanimous decisions are respected by members of that CC, or does there exist only a superman standing above the CC, a superman for whom laws are not written, who can permit himself to vote for the CC's resolution today and tomorrow publish and put forward a new platform against that resolution? Comrades, one cannot demand of workers submission to party discipline if one of the members of the CC openly, before everyone's eyes, ignores the Central Committee and its unanimously adopted decision. One cannot maintain two disciplines: one for workers and another for dignitaries. Discipline must be one.

Trotsky's error consists precisely in the fact that he counterposed himself to the CC and fancied himself a superman standing above the CC, above its laws, above its decisions, thereby giving a section of the party occasion to conduct work toward undermining confidence in the CC.

Some comrades expressed dissatisfaction that this anti-party act of Trotsky was noted in certain articles in Pravda and by individual members of the CC. Comrades, I must say in reply to these comrades that no party can respect a CC which, at such a difficult moment, does not show the ability to uphold the dignity of the party when one CC member tries to place himself above the entire CC. The CC would have killed itself morally had it passed over this attempt of Trotsky's.

The second error committed by Trotsky consists in the fact that throughout the entire period of the discussion Trotsky conducted himself ambiguously, crudely ignoring the will of the party, which wished to know his actual position, and diplomatically evading the question directly posed by a whole number of organizations: whom, in the end, does Trotsky support -- the CC or the opposition? A discussion is not conducted for evasions, but in order directly and honestly to lay out the whole truth before the party, as Ilyich knows how to do, as every Bolshevik is obliged to do. It is said that Trotsky is seriously ill. Let us allow that he is seriously ill. But during his illness he wrote three articles and four new chapters of his pamphlet published today. Is it not clear that Trotsky has every possibility of writing two lines to satisfy the organizations inquiring of him -- that he is for the opposition or against the opposition? Need it be proved that this ignoring of the will of a number of organizations could not but sharpen the inner-party struggle?

The third error committed by Trotsky consists in the fact that in his interventions he counterposed the party apparatus to the party, giving the slogan of struggle against "apparatus men." Bolshevism cannot accept the counterposing of the party to the party apparatus. What does our party apparatus actually consist of? The party apparatus is the CC, the regional committees, the provincial committees, the county committees. Are they subordinate to the party? Of course they are subordinate, for they are 90 percent elected by the party. Those who say that the provincial committees were appointed are wrong. Wrong. You know, comrades, that the provincial committees are elected, just as the county committees and the CC are elected. They are subordinate to the party. But after they are elected, they must lead the work -- that is the point. Is party work conceivable without the CC, after being elected by the congress, without the provincial committee, after being elected by the provincial conference, leading the work? After all, without this, party work is unthinkable for us. This is some sort of reckless anarcho-Menshevik view, denying the very principle of leadership of party work. I fear that Trotsky, whom I of course do not intend to put on the same level as the Mensheviks, by such counterposing of the party apparatus to the party, pushes certain inexperienced elements of our party toward the standpoint of anarcho-Menshevik laxity and organizational license. I fear that this error of Trotsky will put at risk inexperienced members of the party -- our entire party apparatus -- an apparatus without which the party is unthinkable.

The fourth error committed by Trotsky consists in the fact that he counterposed the youth to the cadres of our party, that he hurled an unfounded accusation of degeneration at our cadres. Trotsky placed our party on the same level as the Social Democratic Party in Germany, cited examples of how certain pupils of Marx, old Social Democrats, degenerated, and from this he drew the conclusion that our party cadres face the same danger of degeneration. One should, properly speaking, laugh at how one of the members of the CC, who only yesterday fought against Bolshevism hand in hand with opportunists and Mensheviks, how he now, in the seventh year of Soviet power, attempts, even if in a hypothetical form, to assert that the cadres of our party, born, raised, and tempered in the struggle against Menshevism and opportunism -- that these cadres supposedly face degeneration. One should, I repeat, laugh at such an attempt. But since this assertion was made not at an ordinary time but during a discussion, and since here we are dealing with a certain counterposing of cadres that may degenerate to the youth, which is allegedly free from such danger or almost free, this supposition, essentially laughable and unserious, can acquire and has already acquired a certain practical significance. That is why I think we must dwell on this question.

It is sometimes said that old people must be respected, since they have lived longer than the young, know more, and will guide better. I, comrades, must say that this view is completely wrong. Not every old person must be respected, and not every kind of experience is important to us. What kind of experience -- that is the whole point. In the German Social Democracy there are cadres of their own, very experienced: Scheidemann, Noske, Wels, and others, cadres experienced in the highest degree, who have eaten the dog in their struggle... But in the struggle against what? In the struggle against whom? What kind of experience -- that is the whole point. There the cadres grew up in the struggle against revolutionary spirit, in a struggle not for the dictatorship of the proletariat but against the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is enormous experience, but this experience is negative experience. To smash this experience, comrades, to destroy it and drive out such old people -- the youth is obligated to do so. There, in the German Social Democracy, where the youth is free from the experience of struggle against revolutionary spirit, there this youth is closer to revolutionary spirit or closer to Marxism than the old cadres, who are burdened with the experience of struggle against the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, who are burdened with the experience of struggle for opportunism against revolutionism. Such cadres must be smashed, and all our sympathies should be on the side of the youth, which, I repeat, is free from this experience of struggle against revolutionary spirit and which for this reason more easily assimilates new methods and new techniques of struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat against opportunism. There, in Germany, this posing of the question is understandable to me. If Trotsky were speaking about the Social Democracy of Germany and the cadres of such a party, I would sign his statement with both hands. But with us the matter concerns a different party -- a communist party, a Bolshevik party, whose cadres were born in the struggle against opportunism, who were tempered in the struggle against opportunism, who grew up, took power in the struggle against imperialism, in the struggle against every manner of opportunist lackey of imperialism. Is it not clear that here we are dealing with a principled difference? How can one place on the same level cadres that grew up in the struggle for revolutionary spirit, cadres that waged the struggle for revolutionary spirit, cadres that came to power in battles with imperialism, cadres that are shaking the foundations of world imperialism -- how can these cadres, if one speaks in all conscience, without equivocation -- how can these cadres be placed on the same level with such cadres as the German Social Democracy, which consorted earlier with Wilhelm against the working class and consorts now with Seeckt, which was tempered and formed in battles against the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat -- how can these principally heterogeneous cadres be placed on the same level, how can they be confused? Is it not hard to understand that the abyss between these cadres is impassable? Is it hard to understand that this crude distortion, this crude confusion, permitted by Trotsky, is calculated to undermine the authority of our revolutionary cadres, the nucleus of our party? Is it not clear that this distortion could only inflame passions and sharpen the inner-party struggle?

The fifth error committed by Trotsky consists in the fact that in his letters he gave occasion and gave the slogan to orient by the student youth, by this "most faithful barometer of our party." "The youth is the most faithful barometer of the party, reacting most sharply to party bureaucratism," he says in his first article. And so that there be no doubt as to which youth is meant, Trotsky adds in his second letter: "Particularly keenly, as we have seen, the student youth reacts to bureaucratism." If one proceeds from this proposition, absolutely incorrect, theoretically wrong, practically harmful, then one must go further, giving the slogan: "More student youth in our party, wider doors for student youth in our party."

Until now things stood as follows: we oriented ourselves on the proletarian sector of our party and said: wider doors to the party for proletarian elements, let our party grow at the expense of the proletarian part. Now Trotsky turns this formula upside down.

The question of the intelligentsia and the workers in our party is not new for us. It was already raised at the II Congress of our party, when the formulation of the first paragraph of the rules on party membership was being discussed. It is well known that Martov then demanded an expansion of the party's framework for non-proletarian elements, against Comrade Lenin, who demanded decisive restriction of access to the party for non-proletarian elements. Subsequently, at the III Congress of our party, this question arose again with new force. I remember how Comrade Lenin sharply posed there the question of workers and intellectuals in our party. Here is what Comrade Lenin said then:

"They pointed out that intellectuals were usually at the head of splits. This point is very important, but it does not resolve the question... I think that we must look at the matter more broadly. To bring workers into the committees is not only a pedagogical but also a political task. Workers have class instinct, and with a little political experience workers fairly quickly become steady Social Democrats. I would very much welcome it if in the composition of our committees for every 2 intellectuals there were 8 workers" (see Vol. VII, p. 282).

That is how the question stood as far back as 1905. Since then, this directive of Comrade Lenin has served for us as the guiding idea in the matter of party construction. And now Trotsky proposes to us, in essence, to break with the organizational line of Bolshevism.

And, finally, the sixth error of Trotsky, expressed in his proclamation of freedom of groupings. Yes, freedom of groupings! I remember how, even in the subcommission that was drafting the resolution on democracy, we argued with Trotsky about groupings and factions. Trotsky, while not objecting to the prohibition of factions, firmly upheld the idea of permitting groupings within the party. The opposition takes the same position. These people, evidently, do not understand that by permitting freedom of groupings they are opening a crack for Myasnikov-type elements, making it easier for them to deceive the party and to pass off a faction as a grouping. For what is the difference between a grouping and a faction? Only an external one. Here is how Comrade Lenin defines factionalism, subsuming it under grouping:

"Even before the general party discussion on the trade unions, certain signs of factionalism had appeared in the party, i.e., the emergence of groups with special platforms and with a striving to a certain degree to close ranks and to create their own group discipline" (see Stenographic Report of the X Congress of the RCP(b), p. 309).

As you see, there is essentially no difference between a faction and a group. When here, in Moscow, the opposition created a special bureau, headed by Serebryakov, and when it dispatched its speakers, obliging them to appear at such-and-such meetings, to object in such-and-such a way, and when the oppositionists in the course of the struggle were forced to retreat and changed their resolutions on command -- there was, of course, both a grouping and group discipline. This, they say, is not a faction, but what is a faction then -- let Preobrazhensky explain. Trotsky's interventions, his letters, his articles on the question of generations and factions push the party toward tolerating groupings in its ranks. This is an attempt to legalize factions and, above all, Trotsky's faction.

Trotsky asserts that groupings arise because of the bureaucratic regime of the Central Committee, that if we did not have a bureaucratic regime, there would be no groupings. This is a non-Marxist approach, comrades. Groupings arise among us and will continue to arise because we have in the country the most diverse forms of economy -- from embryonic forms of socialism to the Middle Ages. That is the first reason. Then we have NEP, that is, we have permitted capitalism, the revival of private capital and the revival of corresponding ideas, which penetrate into the party. That is the second reason. And, third, because our party is tripartite in composition: there are workers, there are peasants, there are intellectuals in the party. These are the reasons, if one approaches the question in a Marxist manner, the reasons that pull from the party certain elements for the creation of groupings, which we must sometimes cut off by surgical measures and sometimes dissolve ideologically through discussion.

It is not the regime that is at fault. If we had the most freely possible regime, there would be far more groupings. So the regime is not to blame, but rather the conditions within which we live, the conditions that we have in our country, the conditions of the party's own development.

If, given such a state of affairs, given such complexity, we also permit groupings, we will ruin the party, turn it from a monolithic, cohesive organization into a federation of groups and factions making arrangements among themselves and forming temporary associations and agreements. That will not be a party, that will be the disintegration of the party. Never, not for a single minute, did the Bolsheviks conceive of the party otherwise than as a monolithic organization, hewn from a single block, having a single will, and uniting in its work all shades of thought in a single stream of practical action.

And what Trotsky proposes is profoundly erroneous, goes against Bolshevik organizational principles, and will lead to the inevitable decomposition of the party, to its loosening, its softening, to the transformation of a united party into a federation of groups. We, in our situation of capitalist encirclement, need not just a united, not just a solid, but a genuine steel party, capable of withstanding the onslaught of the enemies of the proletariat, capable of leading the workers to the decisive battle.

What are the results?

The first result consists in the fact that we gave a concrete, definite resolution on the results of this discussion, that we said: we cannot tolerate groupings and factions, the party must be united, monolithic; one cannot counterpose the party to the apparatus; one cannot chatter about the danger of degeneration of cadres, for these cadres are revolutionary; one cannot seek cracks between these revolutionary cadres and the youth, which marches step by step with these cadres and will march step by step in the future.

We also have certain positive conclusions. The first and basic conclusion consists in this: that henceforth the party must decisively orient itself and align itself with the proletarian sector of our party, must tighten, narrow the entrance for non-proletarian elements or close it altogether, opening the doors wider for proletarian elements.

As regards groupings and factions, I think the time has come when we must make public that point of the resolution on unity which, on the proposal of Comrade Lenin, was adopted by the X Congress of our party and which was not subject to publication. Party members have forgotten about this point. I fear not everyone remembers. This point, which until now remained secret, must become public and find a place in the resolution we adopt on the results of the discussion. If you will permit, I shall read it. It states:

"In order to implement strict discipline within the party and in all Soviet work and to achieve the greatest unity while eliminating all factionalism, the congress authorizes the CC to apply, in case(s) of violation of discipline or revival or toleration of factionalism, all measures of party penalties, up to and including expulsion from the party, and with respect to members of the CC -- their transfer to candidate status and even, as an extreme measure, expulsion from the party. The condition for applying (to members of the CC, candidate members of the CC, and members of the Control Commission) such an extreme measure shall be the convocation of a CC plenum with the invitation of all candidate members of the CC and all members of the Control Commission. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the party recognizes by a two-thirds vote the necessity of transferring a CC member to candidate status or expelling him from the party, such a measure shall be implemented immediately."

I think we must incorporate this point into the resolution on the results of the discussion and make it public.

Finally, one question that the opposition constantly raises and to which they apparently do not always receive a satisfactory answer. Whose sentiments, they say, do we the opposition express? -- they often ask. I think that the opposition expresses the sentiments of the non-proletarian sector of our party. I think that the opposition, perhaps without itself realizing it, against its own will, is an involuntary transmitter of the sentiments of the non-proletarian element of our party. I think that the opposition, in its unbridled agitation for democracy, which it frequently absolutizes and fetishizes, is unleashing the petty-bourgeois element.

Are you familiar with the sentiments of such comrades as the students Martynov, Kazaryan, and the like? Have you read Khodorovsky's feuilleton in Pravda, where he cited quotations from the speeches of these comrades? Here, for example, is the speech of Martynov (he turns out to be a party member): "It is our business to decide, and the CC's business to carry out and not to argue too much." The reference here is to a cell at a higher educational institution under the People's Commissariat of Transport. But, comrades, we have no fewer than 50,000 cells in the party; if every cell were to address the CC in this manner -- that the cells' business is to decide and the CC's business is not to argue -- I fear we shall never get any decision. Where does this sentiment come from in the Martynovs? What is proletarian about it? And the Martynovs support the opposition -- bear that in mind. Is there a difference between Martynov and Trotsky? The only difference is that Trotsky opened the attack on the party apparatus, and Martynov finishes it off.

And here is another university student, Kazaryan, also, it turns out, a party member. "What have we got," he asks, "a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the Communist Party over the proletariat?" This is spoken, comrades, not by the Menshevik Martov, but by "Communist" Kazaryan. The difference between Trotsky and Kazaryan is that, according to Trotsky, the cadres are degenerating, while according to Kazaryan, the cadres must be driven out, for in his opinion they sit on the neck of the proletariat.

I ask: whose sentiments do the Martynovs and Kazaryans express? Proletarian ones? Of course not. Whose, then? The sentiments of the non-proletarian elements of the party and the country. Is it an accident that these exponents of non-proletarian sentiments vote for the opposition? No, it is not an accident. (Applause.)

Thirteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Bulletin. Moscow, 1924.