October 1, 1950

Beijing, Soviet Ambassador

For immediate transmission to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai.

I am far from Moscow, on leave, and somewhat cut off from events in Korea. However, from the information that reached me today from Moscow, I can see that the situation of the Korean comrades is becoming desperate.

As early as September 16, Moscow warned the Korean comrades that the American landing at Inchon was of great significance and aimed at cutting off the first and second army groups of the North Koreans from their rear in the north. Moscow warned them to immediately withdraw at least four divisions from the south, create a front north and east of Seoul, then gradually withdraw the bulk of the southern forces northward, and thus secure the 38th parallel. But the command of the 1st and 2nd army groups did not carry out Kim Il Sung's order to withdraw units to the north, and this gave the Americans the opportunity to cut off the troops and encircle them. In the Seoul area, the Korean comrades have no forces capable of resistance, and the road toward the 38th parallel must be considered open.

I think that if you, given the present circumstances, consider it possible to render assistance to the Koreans with troops, then you should immediately move at least five or six divisions toward the 38th parallel, so as to give the Korean comrades the opportunity to organize troop reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your forces. The Chinese divisions could operate in the guise of volunteers, naturally with Chinese commanders at their head.

I have not communicated and do not intend to communicate any of this to the Korean comrades, but I have no doubt that they will be glad when they learn of it.

I await your reply.

Greetings,

Filippov

October 1, 1950

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Vestnik, 1996, No. 1, pp. 130-131.

AP RF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 334. L. 99-103.

Note:

Behind the signature "Filippov" is Stalin.

Reply from Mao Zedong:

"Your telegram of October 1, 1950 has been received. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions into North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades once the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought the matter over carefully, we now believe that such actions could lead to extremely serious consequences.

First, it would be very difficult to resolve the Korean question with just a few divisions (the equipment of our troops is very poor; there is no confidence in the success of a military operation against American forces), and the enemy may force us to retreat.

Second, it is most likely that this would provoke an open conflict between the United States and China, with the result that the Soviet Union could also be drawn into the war, and the matter would thus become extremely large [sic in the original. -- Ed.].

Many comrades in the CC of the CPC believe that caution is necessary here.

Of course, not sending our troops to provide assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who find themselves in such a difficult position at the present time, and we ourselves are deeply troubled by this; but if we commit several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat, and if on top of that this provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely wrecked, and very many people in the country will be discontented (the wounds inflicted on the people by war have not healed; peace is needed).

Therefore it is better to endure for now, not commit troops, and actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous when the time comes to fight the enemy.

Korea, having temporarily suffered defeat, will change its form of struggle to partisan warfare.

We are convening a meeting of the CC at which responsible comrades from the various CC bureaus will be present. No final decision on this question has yet been adopted. This is our preliminary telegram; we wish to consult with you. If you agree, we are prepared to immediately send Comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao by plane to the place of your rest to discuss this matter with you and report on the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.

Mao Zedong. October 2, 1950."