The general remarks the credit system has given us occasion to make so far come down to these:
I. Credit has to form to mediate the equalizing of the rate of profit, or the movement of that equalizing, which the whole of capitalist production rests on.
II. It cuts the costs of circulation.
1. One of the main costs of circulation is money itself, so far as money itself has value. Credit economizes on this in three ways.
A. For a large part of transactions, money drops out entirely.
B. It speeds up the circulation of the money in use. This partly overlaps with what comes under point 2 below. On one side the speeding-up is technical: with the real turnover of goods for consumption staying the same in size and number, a smaller amount of money or money-tokens does the same job. That is tied to the technique of banking. On the other side, credit speeds up how fast a commodity passes through its changes of form, and with that, how fast money circulates.
C. Paper replaces gold money.
2. Credit speeds up the separate phases of circulation, or of a commodity's change of form, and further the change of form capital itself goes through, and so speeds up the whole process of reproduction. (On the other hand, credit also lets the acts of buying and selling be held apart for longer, and so serves as the basis for speculation.) It also contracts the reserve funds a business must hold, which can be looked at two ways: on one side as a reduction of the money in circulation, on the other as a limit on the part of capital that must always exist in money form.
III. The formation of joint-stock companies. Through this:
1. A tremendous expansion in the scale of production and of undertakings that would have been impossible for individual capitals. At the same time, undertakings that used to be government undertakings become social ones.
2. Capital, which already rests, in itself, on a social mode of production and presupposes a social concentration of means of production and of labour-power, here directly takes on the form of social capital - the capital of directly associated individuals - as opposed to private capital, and its undertakings appear as social undertakings as opposed to private ones. This is the abolition of capital as private property, but only within the limits of the capitalist mode of production itself.
3. The capitalist who actually does the functioning turns into a mere manager, someone in charge of another's capital, and the owner of the capital turns into a mere owner, a mere money capitalist. Even where the dividends they draw include both interest and profit of enterprise - that is, the total profit (since the manager's salary is, or should be, simply the wage for a certain kind of skilled labour, its price set on the labour market the way any other labour's price is) - this total profit is now drawn only in the form of interest, that is, as a bare reward for owning the capital, which is now separated from its function in the actual process of production every bit as completely as that function, in the person of the manager, is separated from owning the capital.
Profit then presents itself - and no longer just the one part of it, interest, which draws its justification from the profit of the borrower - as nothing but the appropriation of other people's surplus labour, arising from the turning of means of production into capital, that is, from their estrangement from the actual producers, from their standing opposed, as someone else's property, to every individual really at work in production, from the manager down to the lowest day-labourer. In joint-stock companies the function is separated from owning the capital, so labour too is completely separated from owning the means of production and the surplus labour. This result of capitalist production at its highest development is a necessary point of transition toward capital being turned back into the property of the producers - no longer, though, as the private property of separate individual producers, but as their property as associated producers, as directly social property. It is, on the other hand, also a point of transition toward turning every function still tied to owning capital in the reproduction process into a mere function of the associated producers, into a social function.
Before going further, there is one more economically important point to note. Since profit here takes purely the form of interest, undertakings that yield nothing but interest are still able to carry on, and this is one of the causes that hold up the fall in the general rate of profit, since these undertakings, where constant capital stands in such an enormous ratio to variable capital, do not necessarily enter into the equalizing of the general rate of profit.
Since Marx wrote this, new and more advanced forms of business organization have grown up — the next two stages beyond the plain joint-stock company, as everyone now knows. Production in every big industry can be ramped up faster each year, but the market for all that extra output only grows wider at a crawl. What a factory can turn out in months, buyers can barely absorb in years. On top of that, tariff walls let every industrial country shut out its rivals — England especially — while artificially pumping up its own output even further. The result is constant, general overproduction: prices pushed down, profits shrinking or vanishing altogether. The old, much-praised freedom of competition has run out of road and is about to declare its own scandalous bankruptcy.
It does so in this way: in each country, the big manufacturers in one line of business band together into a cartel to control production. A committee sets how much each firm may produce and has the final say in dividing up the orders that come in. In a few cases this even grew into international cartels — for example between English and German iron producers. But even this way of pooling production was not enough. The clashing interests of the individual firms kept breaking the cartel apart and bringing competition back. So, wherever the stage of production allowed it, people went a step further: they merged the whole of a given branch into one big joint-stock company under a single management. This has already happened several times in America; in Europe the biggest case so far is the United Alkali Trust, which put the whole of Britain's alkali production into the hands of a single firm. The former owners of more than thirty separate works were paid the assessed value of their entire plants in shares — about £5 million in all, which forms the trust's fixed capital. The old managers still run the technical side, but overall business control now sits with a single general management. The floating capital, amounting to some £1 million, was offered to the public to subscribe. Total capital: £6 million. So in this branch, which underlies the whole chemical industry, competition in England has been replaced by monopoly — laying the most agreeable possible groundwork for its eventual expropriation by society as a whole, by the nation.
The joint-stock system is capitalism abolishing itself — but only from within, only inside the limits of the capitalist mode of production itself. It is a contradiction that cancels itself out, and at first sight it looks like nothing more than a mere stepping-stone to a new form of production. And it doesn't just look that way to us — the contradiction shows up as itself even in how things actually appear on the surface. In some fields it produces monopoly outright, and that in turn forces the state to step in. At the same time it breeds a new financial aristocracy — a new species of parasite: company promoters, founders, directors who are directors in name only — and a whole system of swindling and fraud around setting up companies, issuing shares, and trading them. It is production carried on privately, with no control any longer exercised by private ownership.
IV. Set the joint-stock system itself aside for a moment — it already abolishes capitalist private industry on the very ground of the capitalist system, and it wipes out private industry further with every new field it takes over. Credit does something else again: it gives the individual capitalist — or anyone who can pass for one — an absolute command, within certain limits, over other people's capital and property, and through that, over other people's labour. What puts him in command of social labour is precisely that he commands capital that is social, not his own. The capital he actually owns, or is merely believed to own, becomes just the foundation for a whole superstructure of credit built on top of it. This is above all true in wholesale trade, through which most of the social product passes. Every yardstick, every explanation that still made some sense within the capitalist mode of production, disappears here. What the speculating wholesale trader risks is social property, not his own.
The old story that capital originates in saving becomes equally absurd, since what this speculator actually demands is that other people do the saving for him. {As recently as our own day, the whole of France scraped together one and a half thousand million francs for the Panama swindlers. The whole Panama swindle is described here exactly, a full twenty years before it happened. — F. E.} And the other old story, about abstaining from consumption, is flatly contradicted by his luxury, which itself now becomes just another means of getting credit. Ideas that still meant something at an earlier, less developed stage of capitalist production become completely meaningless here. Both success and failure now lead, equally, to the centralization of capitals — and so to expropriation on an enormous scale. This expropriation now reaches beyond the immediate producers to the small and medium capitalists themselves.
Expropriation is where the capitalist mode of production starts; carrying it through to the end is its goal — ultimately, expropriating every single individual from the means of production. Those means, as social production develops, stop being tools and products of private production and can only go on existing as means of production in the hands of the associated producers — as their social property, the way they are already their social product. But within the capitalist system itself, this same expropriation shows up in an inverted, antagonistic shape: as the seizure of social property by a few. And credit turns those few more and more into pure adventurers. Since ownership now takes the form of shares, its movement and its transfer become simply the outcome of stock-exchange gambling, where the small fish get eaten by the sharks and the sheep by the wolves of the exchange. The joint-stock form already conflicts with the older form, in which the means of social production appear as someone's individual property; but turning it into shares still stays trapped inside capitalist limits. So instead of overcoming the opposition between wealth as something social and wealth as something private, it only builds that same opposition up again in a new shape.
The cooperative factories the workers run themselves are, while still inside the old form, the first crack in that old form — even though, in how they actually operate, they inevitably reproduce every defect of the existing system, and cannot help doing so. But within them the opposition between capital and labour is abolished, even if at first only in the form that the workers, joined together, are their own capitalist — they use the means of production to make their own labour pay off. They show how, once the material forces of production and the social forms that go with them reach a certain stage, a new mode of production naturally grows and takes shape out of the old one. The cooperative factory could not have developed without the factory system that capitalism itself produced, and just as little without the credit system that grows out of the same mode of production. That credit system is the main basis on which capitalist private firms gradually turn into capitalist joint-stock companies — and by that same means, it offers a way for cooperative enterprises to spread gradually too, on a more or less national scale. Capitalist joint-stock companies and cooperative factories should both be seen as transition forms, leading out of the capitalist mode of production and into the associated one — except that in one, the opposition is abolished negatively, and in the other, positively.
So far we have looked at the growth of the credit system — and the abolition of capital ownership lying hidden within it — mainly as it bears on industrial capital. In the chapters that follow we take up credit as it bears on interest-bearing capital itself: both what credit does to it, and the form credit takes here. There are still a few more specifically economic points to make about this.
But first, this:
If the credit system appears to be the chief lever of overproduction and reckless speculation in trade, that is only because the process of reproduction — which is elastic by its very nature — gets forced here to its most extreme limit. And it gets forced that far because a large part of social capital is put to work by people who do not own it, and who therefore go about it quite differently from an owner who, when he acts for himself, anxiously weighs the limits of his own private capital. All this really shows is that the way capital valorizes itself, built as it is on the antagonistic character of capitalist production, allows genuinely free development only up to a certain point — in other words, that it forms a real, built-in fetter and barrier to production, one that the credit system keeps on breaking through. Because of that, the credit system speeds up the material development of the productive forces and the creation of a world market — bringing both to a certain level, as the material foundations of the new form of production, is capitalist production's own historical task. But at the same time, credit also speeds up the violent outbreaks of this same contradiction — the crises — and with them, the forces that will dissolve the old mode of production.
The credit system carries a double character built into it. On one side, it takes the driving force of capitalist production — getting rich by exploiting other people's labour — and develops it into the purest, most colossal system of gambling and swindling there is, while narrowing ever further the small number of people who exploit society's wealth. On the other side, it forms the transition to a new mode of production. It is this two-sidedness that gives credit's leading prophets, from Law all the way to Isaac Péreire, their oddly agreeable double role: swindler and prophet at once.
The general remarks the credit system has given us occasion to make so far come down to these:
I. Credit has to form to mediate the equalizing of the rate of profit, or the movement of that equalizing, which the whole of capitalist production rests on.
II. It cuts the costs of circulation.
1. One of the main costs of circulation is money itself, so far as money itself has value. Credit economizes on this in three ways.
A. For a large part of transactions, money drops out entirely.
B. It speeds up the circulation of the money in use. This partly overlaps with what comes under point 2 below. On one side the speeding-up is technical: with the real turnover of goods for consumption staying the same in size and number, a smaller amount of money or money-tokens does the same job. That is tied to the technique of banking. On the other side, credit speeds up how fast a commodity passes through its changes of form, and with that, how fast money circulates.
C. Paper replaces gold money.
2. Credit speeds up the separate phases of circulation, or of a commodity's change of form, and further the change of form capital itself goes through, and so speeds up the whole process of reproduction. (On the other hand, credit also lets the acts of buying and selling be held apart for longer, and so serves as the basis for speculation.) It also contracts the reserve funds a business must hold, which can be looked at two ways: on one side as a reduction of the money in circulation, on the other as a limit on the part of capital that must always exist in money form.
III. The formation of joint-stock companies. Through this:
1. A tremendous expansion in the scale of production and of undertakings that would have been impossible for individual capitals. At the same time, undertakings that used to be government undertakings become social ones.
2. Capital, which already rests, in itself, on a social mode of production and presupposes a social concentration of means of production and of labour-power, here directly takes on the form of social capital - the capital of directly associated individuals - as opposed to private capital, and its undertakings appear as social undertakings as opposed to private ones. This is the abolition of capital as private property, but only within the limits of the capitalist mode of production itself.
3. The capitalist who actually does the functioning turns into a mere manager, someone in charge of another's capital, and the owner of the capital turns into a mere owner, a mere money capitalist. Even where the dividends they draw include both interest and profit of enterprise - that is, the total profit (since the manager's salary is, or should be, simply the wage for a certain kind of skilled labour, its price set on the labour market the way any other labour's price is) - this total profit is now drawn only in the form of interest, that is, as a bare reward for owning the capital, which is now separated from its function in the actual process of production every bit as completely as that function, in the person of the manager, is separated from owning the capital.
Profit then presents itself - and no longer just the one part of it, interest, which draws its justification from the profit of the borrower - as nothing but the appropriation of other people's surplus labour, arising from the turning of means of production into capital, that is, from their estrangement from the actual producers, from their standing opposed, as someone else's property, to every individual really at work in production, from the manager down to the lowest day-labourer. In joint-stock companies the function is separated from owning the capital, so labour too is completely separated from owning the means of production and the surplus labour. This result of capitalist production at its highest development is a necessary point of transition toward capital being turned back into the property of the producers - no longer, though, as the private property of separate individual producers, but as their property as associated producers, as directly social property. It is, on the other hand, also a point of transition toward turning every function still tied to owning capital in the reproduction process into a mere function of the associated producers, into a social function.
Before going further, there is one more economically important point to note. Since profit here takes purely the form of interest, undertakings that yield nothing but interest are still able to carry on, and this is one of the causes that hold up the fall in the general rate of profit, since these undertakings, where constant capital stands in such an enormous ratio to variable capital, do not necessarily enter into the equalizing of the general rate of profit.
Since Marx wrote this, new and more advanced forms of business organization have grown up — the next two stages beyond the plain joint-stock company, as everyone now knows. Production in every big industry can be ramped up faster each year, but the market for all that extra output only grows wider at a crawl. What a factory can turn out in months, buyers can barely absorb in years. On top of that, tariff walls let every industrial country shut out its rivals — England especially — while artificially pumping up its own output even further. The result is constant, general overproduction: prices pushed down, profits shrinking or vanishing altogether. The old, much-praised freedom of competition has run out of road and is about to declare its own scandalous bankruptcy.
It does so in this way: in each country, the big manufacturers in one line of business band together into a cartel to control production. A committee sets how much each firm may produce and has the final say in dividing up the orders that come in. In a few cases this even grew into international cartels — for example between English and German iron producers. But even this way of pooling production was not enough. The clashing interests of the individual firms kept breaking the cartel apart and bringing competition back. So, wherever the stage of production allowed it, people went a step further: they merged the whole of a given branch into one big joint-stock company under a single management. This has already happened several times in America; in Europe the biggest case so far is the United Alkali Trust, which put the whole of Britain's alkali production into the hands of a single firm. The former owners of more than thirty separate works were paid the assessed value of their entire plants in shares — about £5 million in all, which forms the trust's fixed capital. The old managers still run the technical side, but overall business control now sits with a single general management. The floating capital, amounting to some £1 million, was offered to the public to subscribe. Total capital: £6 million. So in this branch, which underlies the whole chemical industry, competition in England has been replaced by monopoly — laying the most agreeable possible groundwork for its eventual expropriation by society as a whole, by the nation.
The joint-stock system is capitalism abolishing itself — but only from within, only inside the limits of the capitalist mode of production itself. It is a contradiction that cancels itself out, and at first sight it looks like nothing more than a mere stepping-stone to a new form of production. And it doesn't just look that way to us — the contradiction shows up as itself even in how things actually appear on the surface. In some fields it produces monopoly outright, and that in turn forces the state to step in. At the same time it breeds a new financial aristocracy — a new species of parasite: company promoters, founders, directors who are directors in name only — and a whole system of swindling and fraud around setting up companies, issuing shares, and trading them. It is production carried on privately, with no control any longer exercised by private ownership.
IV. Set the joint-stock system itself aside for a moment — it already abolishes capitalist private industry on the very ground of the capitalist system, and it wipes out private industry further with every new field it takes over. Credit does something else again: it gives the individual capitalist — or anyone who can pass for one — an absolute command, within certain limits, over other people's capital and property, and through that, over other people's labour. What puts him in command of social labour is precisely that he commands capital that is social, not his own. The capital he actually owns, or is merely believed to own, becomes just the foundation for a whole superstructure of credit built on top of it. This is above all true in wholesale trade, through which most of the social product passes. Every yardstick, every explanation that still made some sense within the capitalist mode of production, disappears here. What the speculating wholesale trader risks is social property, not his own.
The old story that capital originates in saving becomes equally absurd, since what this speculator actually demands is that other people do the saving for him. {As recently as our own day, the whole of France scraped together one and a half thousand million francs for the Panama swindlers. The whole Panama swindle is described here exactly, a full twenty years before it happened. — F. E.} And the other old story, about abstaining from consumption, is flatly contradicted by his luxury, which itself now becomes just another means of getting credit. Ideas that still meant something at an earlier, less developed stage of capitalist production become completely meaningless here. Both success and failure now lead, equally, to the centralization of capitals — and so to expropriation on an enormous scale. This expropriation now reaches beyond the immediate producers to the small and medium capitalists themselves.
Expropriation is where the capitalist mode of production starts; carrying it through to the end is its goal — ultimately, expropriating every single individual from the means of production. Those means, as social production develops, stop being tools and products of private production and can only go on existing as means of production in the hands of the associated producers — as their social property, the way they are already their social product. But within the capitalist system itself, this same expropriation shows up in an inverted, antagonistic shape: as the seizure of social property by a few. And credit turns those few more and more into pure adventurers. Since ownership now takes the form of shares, its movement and its transfer become simply the outcome of stock-exchange gambling, where the small fish get eaten by the sharks and the sheep by the wolves of the exchange. The joint-stock form already conflicts with the older form, in which the means of social production appear as someone's individual property; but turning it into shares still stays trapped inside capitalist limits. So instead of overcoming the opposition between wealth as something social and wealth as something private, it only builds that same opposition up again in a new shape.
The cooperative factories the workers run themselves are, while still inside the old form, the first crack in that old form — even though, in how they actually operate, they inevitably reproduce every defect of the existing system, and cannot help doing so. But within them the opposition between capital and labour is abolished, even if at first only in the form that the workers, joined together, are their own capitalist — they use the means of production to make their own labour pay off. They show how, once the material forces of production and the social forms that go with them reach a certain stage, a new mode of production naturally grows and takes shape out of the old one. The cooperative factory could not have developed without the factory system that capitalism itself produced, and just as little without the credit system that grows out of the same mode of production. That credit system is the main basis on which capitalist private firms gradually turn into capitalist joint-stock companies — and by that same means, it offers a way for cooperative enterprises to spread gradually too, on a more or less national scale. Capitalist joint-stock companies and cooperative factories should both be seen as transition forms, leading out of the capitalist mode of production and into the associated one — except that in one, the opposition is abolished negatively, and in the other, positively.
So far we have looked at the growth of the credit system — and the abolition of capital ownership lying hidden within it — mainly as it bears on industrial capital. In the chapters that follow we take up credit as it bears on interest-bearing capital itself: both what credit does to it, and the form credit takes here. There are still a few more specifically economic points to make about this.
But first, this:
If the credit system appears to be the chief lever of overproduction and reckless speculation in trade, that is only because the process of reproduction — which is elastic by its very nature — gets forced here to its most extreme limit. And it gets forced that far because a large part of social capital is put to work by people who do not own it, and who therefore go about it quite differently from an owner who, when he acts for himself, anxiously weighs the limits of his own private capital. All this really shows is that the way capital valorizes itself, built as it is on the antagonistic character of capitalist production, allows genuinely free development only up to a certain point — in other words, that it forms a real, built-in fetter and barrier to production, one that the credit system keeps on breaking through. Because of that, the credit system speeds up the material development of the productive forces and the creation of a world market — bringing both to a certain level, as the material foundations of the new form of production, is capitalist production's own historical task. But at the same time, credit also speeds up the violent outbreaks of this same contradiction — the crises — and with them, the forces that will dissolve the old mode of production.
The credit system carries a double character built into it. On one side, it takes the driving force of capitalist production — getting rich by exploiting other people's labour — and develops it into the purest, most colossal system of gambling and swindling there is, while narrowing ever further the small number of people who exploit society's wealth. On the other side, it forms the transition to a new mode of production. It is this two-sidedness that gives credit's leading prophets, from Law all the way to Isaac Péreire, their oddly agreeable double role: swindler and prophet at once.