We are still not finished with the question: how far does the accumulation of capital in the form of loanable money capital coincide with genuine accumulation, with the widening of the reproduction process?
Turning money into loanable money capital is a far simpler business than turning money into productive capital. But here we have to keep two things apart:
first, money simply being turned into loan capital;
second, capital or revenue being turned into money, and that money then being turned into loan capital.
Only the second of these can carry a positive accumulation of loan capital, one bound up with the genuine accumulation of industrial capital.
We have already seen that loan capital can pile up, can become over-abundant, and that this relates to productive accumulation only by standing in inverse proportion to it. It happens in two phases of the industrial cycle. First, when industrial capital — in both its forms, productive capital and commodity capital — has contracted, that is, at the start of the cycle, after the crisis. Second, when the improvement begins but commercial credit still makes little call on bank credit. In the first case, the money capital that was formerly at work in production and trade shows up as loan capital lying idle; in the second, it appears to be at work on an increasing scale, but at a very low rate of interest, because now it is the industrial and commercial capitalist who lays down the terms to the money capitalist. In the first case the surplus of loan capital expresses a stagnation of industrial capital; in the second, the relative independence of commercial credit from bank credit — an independence resting on the fluidity of the returns, on short credit terms, and on business being done predominantly with one's own capital. The speculators who count on credit capital belonging to other people have not yet come onto the scene; the people working with their own capital are still far from anything like pure credit operations. In the earlier phase, the surplus of loan capital is the exact opposite of an expression of real accumulation. In the second phase it coincides with a renewed expansion of the reproduction process: it accompanies that expansion, but is not its cause. The surplus of loan capital is already shrinking, and is now only relative — relative to the demand. In both cases the expansion of the real accumulation process is helped along, because the low rate of interest — which in the first case goes together with low prices and in the second with slowly rising prices — enlarges the part of the profit that turns into profit of enterprise. This happens still more when interest rises to its average level at the height of the boom: it has grown, yes, but not in proportion to profit.
On the other side we have seen that loan capital can accumulate with no real accumulation at all, through purely technical means: the expansion and concentration of the banking system, savings on the circulation reserve, or savings on private people's reserve funds of means of payment, which are thereby turned into loan capital for short stretches at a time. This loan capital — which is why it is also called floating capital — never holds the form of loan capital for more than short periods (just as it is only meant to be discounted for short periods); all the same, it flows in and out constantly. If one person draws it out, another brings it in. So the mass of loanable money capital — and here we are not speaking at all of loans for years, only of short-lived loans against bills of exchange and deposits — really does grow quite independently of real accumulation.
Bank Committee, 1857, question 501. Asked what he understands by 'floating capital', Mr Weguelin, Governor of the Bank of England, answers that it is capital that can be applied to money loans for short periods ... (502) Bank of England notes ... those of the provincial banks, and the amount of money present in the country. The question is then put to him: judging by the returns before the Committee, it does not appear that, if by floating capital he means the active circulation (that is, of the Bank of England's notes), there is any very great variation in that active circulation. (It makes a very great difference, though, who it is that advances the active circulation: the money-lender, or the reproductive capitalist himself.) Weguelin's answer: he includes in floating capital the reserves of the bankers, and it is in those that there is considerable fluctuation.
That is to say, the considerable fluctuation is in the part of the deposits that the bankers have not lent out again — the part figuring as their own reserve, and to a large extent also as the reserve of the Bank of England, with which it is deposited. Finally the same gentleman says that floating capital is bullion, that is, bars and coin. (503.) It is quite wonderful how, in this credit gibberish of the money market, every category of political economy takes on a different meaning and a different form. Floating capital there stands for circulating capital, which of course is something completely different; and there, money passes for capital, bullion passes for capital, banknotes pass for circulation, capital is a commodity, debts are commodities, and fixed capital is money sunk in paper that is hard to sell!
The joint-stock banks of London, the return tells us, have increased their deposits from £8,850,774 in 1847 to £43,100,724 in 1857. The evidence and statements laid before the Committee allow the inference that a large part of this enormous sum has been drawn from sources that were not formerly usable for this purpose, and that the habit of opening an account with a banker and depositing money with him has spread to numerous classes who formerly did not lay out their capital (!) in this way. Mr Rodwell, president of the Association of Private Country Bankers (as distinct from the joint-stock banks) and its delegate to give evidence, states that in the district around Ipswich this habit has lately grown four-fold among the farmers and small traders there; that almost every farmer, even one paying only £50 a year in rent, now keeps deposits with a bank. The mass of these deposits naturally finds its way into the uses of business, and gravitates in particular to London, the centre of commercial activity, where it is first employed in the discount of bills and in other advances to the London bankers' customers. A large part of it, however, for which the bankers themselves have no immediate demand, passes into the hands of the bill-brokers, who give the bankers in return commercial bills that they have already discounted once for people in London and in the provinces. (Bank Committee, 1858, p. V, para. 8.)
When the banker advances money to the bill-broker against bills the broker has already discounted once, he is in fact rediscounting them a second time; but in reality very many of these bills have already been rediscounted by the broker, and with the very money the banker uses to rediscount the broker's bills, the broker rediscounts new ones. And where that leads:
Extensive fictitious credits, the return states, have been created by accommodation bills and blank credits — greatly facilitated by the practice of the provincial joint-stock banks, which discounted such bills and then had them rediscounted with the bill-brokers in the London market, on the credit of the bank alone, and without regard to the quality of the bills otherwise. (ibid., p. XXI, para. 54.)
On this rediscounting, and on the help that this purely technical increase of loanable money capital gives to credit swindles, the following passage from The Economist is interesting:
For many years, capital — that is, loanable money capital — accumulated in some districts of the country faster than it could be put to use, while in others the means of employing it grew faster than the capital itself. So while the bankers in the farming districts found no way of placing their deposits profitably and safely in their own district, those in the industrial districts and the commercial towns had more demand for capital than they could supply. The effect of these different situations in the different districts has been, in recent years, the rise and very rapid expansion of a new class of houses dealing in the distribution of capital: usually called bill-brokers, they are in reality bankers on the very largest scale.
The business of these houses is to take over, for agreed periods and at agreed rates of interest, the surplus capital of the banks in those districts where it could not be used, as well as the temporarily idle funds of joint-stock companies and large commercial houses, and to advance this money at a higher rate of interest to the banks in those districts where capital is more in demand — as a rule by rediscounting the bills they have taken from their customers... In this way Lombard Street became the great centre where idle capital is transferred from one part of the country, where it cannot be usefully employed, to another where there is demand for it; and this both between the different parts of the country and between similarly placed individuals.
At first these dealings were almost exclusively confined to borrowing and lending against banking security. But as the country's capital grew rapidly, and was economized more and more by the founding of banks, the funds at the disposal of these discount houses became so large that they went on to make advances — first on dock warrants (storage notes for goods in the docks), and then also on bills of lading representing produce that had not even arrived, although sometimes, if not regularly, bills had already been drawn on the commodity broker against it. This practice soon changed the whole character of English business. The facilities offered in Lombard Street gave the commodity brokers in Mincing Lane a much stronger position; they in turn passed the whole advantage on to the importing merchants, and these made such use of it that, whereas 25 years earlier borrowing against one's bills of lading or even one's dock warrants would have ruined a merchant's credit, in recent years the practice has become so general that it can be regarded as the rule, and no longer, as 25 years before, as a rare exception. Indeed the system has been carried so far that large sums have been raised in Lombard Street on bills drawn against the still growing harvests of distant colonies.
What these facilities led to was that the importing merchants extended their foreign business and locked up their floating capital — the capital with which their business had been conducted up to then — in the most objectionable of all investments, colonial plantations, over which they had little or no control. So we see the direct interlinking of credits. The capital of the country, accumulated in our farming districts, is laid down in small amounts as deposits in country banks and centralized in Lombard Street for use. But it has been made useful, first, for expanding business in our mining and industrial districts, by rediscounting bills to the banks there; and then also for granting greater facilities to importers of foreign produce, by advances on dock warrants and bills of lading, which set free the 'legitimate' mercantile capital of houses in foreign and colonial trade and allowed it to be put into the most objectionable of all investments, overseas plantations. (The Economist, 1847, p. 1334.)
That is the 'fine' interweaving of credits. The rural depositor imagines he is depositing only with his own banker, and further imagines that when the banker lends, it goes to private individuals the banker knows. He has not the remotest idea that this banker puts his deposit at the disposal of a London bill-broker, over whose operations neither of them has the slightest control.
We have already seen how large public undertakings, railway building for instance, can temporarily increase loan capital, in that the sums paid in remain available in the banks' hands for a certain time, until they are actually used.
The mass of loan capital, moreover, is quite a different thing from the quantity of circulation. By the quantity of circulation we mean here all the banknotes circulating in a country together with all its metal money, bars of precious metal included. One part of that total makes up the banks' reserve, and that part is always changing in size.
On 12 November 1857 — the day the Bank Act of 1844 was suspended — the whole reserve of the Bank of England, its branch banks included, came to only £580,751; deposits at the same time came to 22 1/2 million pounds, and close to 6 1/2 million of that belonged to the London bankers. (Bank Acts, 1858, p. LVII.)
Variations in the rate of interest depend on the supply of loan capital — and here we leave aside the variations that come about over longer periods, and the differences between the rates of interest in different countries; the first are conditioned by variations in the general rate of profit, the second by differences in profit rates and in the development of credit. That supply is the capital lent in the form of money, in metal and in notes, with all other circumstances, the state of confidence and so on, taken as equal. It is a different supply from industrial capital, which is lent as such, in commodity form, through commercial credit among the reproductive agents themselves.
But even so, the mass of this loanable money capital is different from the mass of circulating money, and independent of it.
Suppose £20 were lent out five times in a day. A money capital of £100 would then be lent — and that would also mean that this same £20 had acted at least four times as means of purchase or payment. For if it went without any purchase or payment in between, so that it had not stood for the transformed form of capital (commodities, labour-power among them) at least four times, it would not amount to a capital of £100, but only to five claims of £20 each.
In countries where credit is developed, we may assume that all money capital available for lending exists in the form of deposits with banks and money-lenders. That at least holds for business as a whole, on the large scale. Beyond that, in good times, before speculation proper is let loose, when credit is easy and confidence is growing, the greater part of the work of circulation is settled by a simple credit transfer, with no metal or paper money stepping in between.
The bare possibility of large deposit sums, while the quantity of means of circulation is relatively small, depends entirely on:
(1) how many purchases and payments the same piece of money carries out;
(2) how many times it comes back — how often it returns to the banks as a deposit — so that its repeated work as means of purchase and payment goes through its renewed transformation into a deposit. Take a retail trader who deposits £100 in money with his banker every week. The banker pays out part of a manufacturer's deposit with it; the manufacturer pays it out to the workers; the workers pay the retail trader with it; and he deposits it with the bank again. So the £100 the retail trader deposited has served: first, to pay out a deposit of the manufacturer's; second, to pay the workers; third, to pay the retail trader himself; and fourth, to deposit a further part of that same retail trader's money capital. For at the end of twenty weeks, if he had had nothing of his own to draw against this money, he would have deposited £2,000 in the bank with the same £100.
How far this money capital sits unused can be seen only from what flows in and out of the banks' reserve funds. That is why Mr Weguelin — Governor of the Bank of England in 1857 — concluded that the Bank of England's gold is the 'only' reserve capital:
1258. 'In my view, the rate of discount is in fact determined by the amount of unemployed capital that is present in the country. The amount of unemployed capital is represented by the reserve of the Bank of England, which is in fact a reserve of gold. So when the gold flows away, that reduces the amount of unemployed capital in the country, and therefore raises the value of the part that remains.' — 1364. [Newmarch:] 'The gold reserve of the Bank of England is in truth the central reserve, or the hoard of coin, on the basis of which the whole business of the country is carried on ... It is on this hoard, or this reservoir, that the effect of the foreign exchanges always falls.' (Report on Bank Acts, 1857.)
A measure of the accumulation of real capital, that is, of productive and commodity capital, is given by the statistics of exports and imports. And there it always shows that for the period over which English industry moved in ten-year cycles (1815–1870), the peak of the last prosperity before a crisis turns up again each time as the low point of the prosperity that follows next, and then rises to a far higher new peak.
In the prosperous year 1824, the real or declared value of the products exported by Great Britain and Ireland was £40,396,300. With the crisis of 1825, exports fall below that sum and swing between 35 and 39 million a year. With the returning prosperity of 1834 they rise above the earlier highest level, to £41,649,191, and in 1836 reach a new maximum of £53,368,571. In 1837 they fall again to 42 million, so that the new low already stands higher than the old peak, and then swing between 50 and 53 million.
The return of prosperity lifts the export figure in 1844 to 58 1/2 million, well past the maximum of 1836. In 1845 it reaches £60,111,082; falls again to a little over 57 million in 1846, almost 59 million in 1847, almost 53 million in 1848; rises in 1849 to 65 1/2 million, in 1853 to almost 99 million, 1854 to 97 million, 1855 to 94 1/2 million, 1856 to almost 116 million, and reaches its maximum in 1857 at 122 million. In 1858 it falls to 116 million, but is already up again in 1859 at 130 million, in 1860 at almost 136 million, in 1861 at only 125 million (here once more the new low is higher than the earlier peak), and in 1863 at 146 1/2 million.
The same could naturally be demonstrated for imports as well, since it is imports that show the market expanding. Here we are dealing only with the scale of production. (For England, of course, this applies only during the period of its actual industrial monopoly; but it applies in general to every country with modern large-scale industry, so long as the world market keeps expanding. — F. E.)
What we are looking at here is the accumulation of money capital — and only in so far as it does not express a stall in the flow of commercial credit, or a saving on the medium actually in circulation, or on the reserve capital held by those taking part in reproduction.
Besides these two cases, money capital can also pile up through an exceptional inflow of gold, as in 1852 and 1853, after the new gold mines in Australia and California. That gold was deposited in the Bank of England. The depositors took notes against it, and did not put those notes straight back on deposit with bankers. That swelled the circulating medium far beyond the usual. (Weguelin's evidence, B. A. 1857, no. 1329.) The Bank tried to put these deposits to work by cutting its discount rate to 2 per cent. Over six months of 1853 the pile of gold in the Bank rose to some £22-£23 million.
Money-lending capitalists plainly accumulate straight in the money form, whereas we have seen that the real accumulation of industrial capitalists as a rule takes place by adding to the elements of reproductive capital itself. So the growth of the credit system, and the huge concentration of the money-lending business in the hands of big banks, must by itself already speed up the accumulation of loanable capital — as a form that is different from real accumulation. This rapid growth of loan capital is therefore a result of real accumulation, since it follows from the development of the reproduction process; and the profit that is the source of accumulation for these money capitalists is only a deduction from the surplus-value that those engaged in reproduction extract (and at the same time an appropriation of part of the interest on other people's savings). The accumulation of loan capital comes at the cost of the industrial and the commercial capitalists alike.
We have seen how, in the bad phases of the industrial cycle, the rate of interest can climb so high that for particular branches — especially those badly placed — it temporarily swallows up the profit completely. At the same time, government paper and other securities fall in price. That is the moment when the money capitalists buy up these devalued securities in bulk, since in the later phases they soon rise back to their normal level and above it. They then sell them off, and in this way take over part of the public's money capital. The part they keep yields a higher interest, because it was bought below its price.
But all the profit the money capitalists make, and turn back into capital, they first turn into loanable money capital. So the accumulation of that loanable capital — distinct from real accumulation even though it is the offshoot of it — already follows if we look at the money capitalists, bankers and so on themselves: it is the accumulation of this particular class of capitalists. And it must grow with every extension of the credit system, as that extension accompanies the real expansion of the reproduction process.
When the rate of interest is low, this loss of value in money capital falls mainly on the depositors, not on the banks. Before joint-stock banking developed, three-quarters of all deposits in England lay in the banks earning no interest at all. Where interest is paid for them now, it is at least 1 per cent below the market rate.
As for the accumulation of money by the other classes of capitalists, we leave aside the part that is invested in interest-bearing paper and accumulates in that form. We look only at the part that is thrown on the market as loanable money capital.
Take first the part of the profit that is not spent as revenue but set aside for accumulation, and for which the industrial capitalists have no use yet in their own business. This profit exists to begin with in commodity capital, as part of its value, and is realized in money together with it. If it is not turned back into the elements of production of that commodity capital — we leave the merchant aside for now, since he gets a section of his own later — then it has to stay in the money form for a while. Its size grows with the size of the capital itself, even when the rate of profit is falling. The part to be spent as revenue is gradually consumed, but in the meantime it forms loan capital as a deposit with the banker. So even the growth of the part of profit that is spent as revenue finds expression in a gradual, constantly repeated accumulation of loan capital. And the same goes for the other part, the one meant for accumulation.
With the development of the credit system and its organization, the rise in revenue — that is, in the consumption of the industrial and commercial capitalists — likewise finds expression as an accumulation of loan capital. And this holds of every kind of revenue, in so far as it is consumed only gradually: ground-rent, the higher forms of salary, the incomes of the unproductive classes, and so on. All of them take the form of money revenue for a time, and can therefore be converted into deposits, and so into loan capital. It holds of all revenue, whether meant for consumption or meant for accumulation, that as soon as it exists in any money form at all it is a portion of value of the commodity capital that has been turned into money, and hence the expression and result of real accumulation — but not productive capital itself.
If a spinner has exchanged his yarn for cotton, except the part that forms his revenue, which he exchanged for money, then the real existence of his industrial capital is the yarn that has passed into the hands of the weaver, or perhaps of a private consumer; and that yarn, whether it serves for reproduction or for consumption, is the existence of both the capital value and the surplus-value contained in it. How large the surplus-value turned into money is depends on how large the surplus-value contained in the yarn is. But once it is turned into money, this money is only the value-existence of that surplus-value. And as such it becomes an element of loan capital. Nothing more is needed for that than its turning into a deposit, unless its owner has already lent it out. To be turned back into productive capital, on the other hand, it must first have grown to a certain minimum size.
We are still not finished with the question: how far does the accumulation of capital in the form of loanable money capital coincide with genuine accumulation, with the widening of the reproduction process?
Turning money into loanable money capital is a far simpler business than turning money into productive capital. But here we have to keep two things apart:
first, money simply being turned into loan capital;
second, capital or revenue being turned into money, and that money then being turned into loan capital.
Only the second of these can carry a positive accumulation of loan capital, one bound up with the genuine accumulation of industrial capital.
We have already seen that loan capital can pile up, can become over-abundant, and that this relates to productive accumulation only by standing in inverse proportion to it. It happens in two phases of the industrial cycle. First, when industrial capital — in both its forms, productive capital and commodity capital — has contracted, that is, at the start of the cycle, after the crisis. Second, when the improvement begins but commercial credit still makes little call on bank credit. In the first case, the money capital that was formerly at work in production and trade shows up as loan capital lying idle; in the second, it appears to be at work on an increasing scale, but at a very low rate of interest, because now it is the industrial and commercial capitalist who lays down the terms to the money capitalist. In the first case the surplus of loan capital expresses a stagnation of industrial capital; in the second, the relative independence of commercial credit from bank credit — an independence resting on the fluidity of the returns, on short credit terms, and on business being done predominantly with one's own capital. The speculators who count on credit capital belonging to other people have not yet come onto the scene; the people working with their own capital are still far from anything like pure credit operations. In the earlier phase, the surplus of loan capital is the exact opposite of an expression of real accumulation. In the second phase it coincides with a renewed expansion of the reproduction process: it accompanies that expansion, but is not its cause. The surplus of loan capital is already shrinking, and is now only relative — relative to the demand. In both cases the expansion of the real accumulation process is helped along, because the low rate of interest — which in the first case goes together with low prices and in the second with slowly rising prices — enlarges the part of the profit that turns into profit of enterprise. This happens still more when interest rises to its average level at the height of the boom: it has grown, yes, but not in proportion to profit.
On the other side we have seen that loan capital can accumulate with no real accumulation at all, through purely technical means: the expansion and concentration of the banking system, savings on the circulation reserve, or savings on private people's reserve funds of means of payment, which are thereby turned into loan capital for short stretches at a time. This loan capital — which is why it is also called floating capital — never holds the form of loan capital for more than short periods (just as it is only meant to be discounted for short periods); all the same, it flows in and out constantly. If one person draws it out, another brings it in. So the mass of loanable money capital — and here we are not speaking at all of loans for years, only of short-lived loans against bills of exchange and deposits — really does grow quite independently of real accumulation.
Bank Committee, 1857, question 501. Asked what he understands by 'floating capital', Mr Weguelin, Governor of the Bank of England, answers that it is capital that can be applied to money loans for short periods ... (502) Bank of England notes ... those of the provincial banks, and the amount of money present in the country. The question is then put to him: judging by the returns before the Committee, it does not appear that, if by floating capital he means the active circulation (that is, of the Bank of England's notes), there is any very great variation in that active circulation. (It makes a very great difference, though, who it is that advances the active circulation: the money-lender, or the reproductive capitalist himself.) Weguelin's answer: he includes in floating capital the reserves of the bankers, and it is in those that there is considerable fluctuation.
That is to say, the considerable fluctuation is in the part of the deposits that the bankers have not lent out again — the part figuring as their own reserve, and to a large extent also as the reserve of the Bank of England, with which it is deposited. Finally the same gentleman says that floating capital is bullion, that is, bars and coin. (503.) It is quite wonderful how, in this credit gibberish of the money market, every category of political economy takes on a different meaning and a different form. Floating capital there stands for circulating capital, which of course is something completely different; and there, money passes for capital, bullion passes for capital, banknotes pass for circulation, capital is a commodity, debts are commodities, and fixed capital is money sunk in paper that is hard to sell!
The joint-stock banks of London, the return tells us, have increased their deposits from £8,850,774 in 1847 to £43,100,724 in 1857. The evidence and statements laid before the Committee allow the inference that a large part of this enormous sum has been drawn from sources that were not formerly usable for this purpose, and that the habit of opening an account with a banker and depositing money with him has spread to numerous classes who formerly did not lay out their capital (!) in this way. Mr Rodwell, president of the Association of Private Country Bankers (as distinct from the joint-stock banks) and its delegate to give evidence, states that in the district around Ipswich this habit has lately grown four-fold among the farmers and small traders there; that almost every farmer, even one paying only £50 a year in rent, now keeps deposits with a bank. The mass of these deposits naturally finds its way into the uses of business, and gravitates in particular to London, the centre of commercial activity, where it is first employed in the discount of bills and in other advances to the London bankers' customers. A large part of it, however, for which the bankers themselves have no immediate demand, passes into the hands of the bill-brokers, who give the bankers in return commercial bills that they have already discounted once for people in London and in the provinces. (Bank Committee, 1858, p. V, para. 8.)
When the banker advances money to the bill-broker against bills the broker has already discounted once, he is in fact rediscounting them a second time; but in reality very many of these bills have already been rediscounted by the broker, and with the very money the banker uses to rediscount the broker's bills, the broker rediscounts new ones. And where that leads:
Extensive fictitious credits, the return states, have been created by accommodation bills and blank credits — greatly facilitated by the practice of the provincial joint-stock banks, which discounted such bills and then had them rediscounted with the bill-brokers in the London market, on the credit of the bank alone, and without regard to the quality of the bills otherwise. (ibid., p. XXI, para. 54.)
On this rediscounting, and on the help that this purely technical increase of loanable money capital gives to credit swindles, the following passage from The Economist is interesting:
For many years, capital — that is, loanable money capital — accumulated in some districts of the country faster than it could be put to use, while in others the means of employing it grew faster than the capital itself. So while the bankers in the farming districts found no way of placing their deposits profitably and safely in their own district, those in the industrial districts and the commercial towns had more demand for capital than they could supply. The effect of these different situations in the different districts has been, in recent years, the rise and very rapid expansion of a new class of houses dealing in the distribution of capital: usually called bill-brokers, they are in reality bankers on the very largest scale.
The business of these houses is to take over, for agreed periods and at agreed rates of interest, the surplus capital of the banks in those districts where it could not be used, as well as the temporarily idle funds of joint-stock companies and large commercial houses, and to advance this money at a higher rate of interest to the banks in those districts where capital is more in demand — as a rule by rediscounting the bills they have taken from their customers... In this way Lombard Street became the great centre where idle capital is transferred from one part of the country, where it cannot be usefully employed, to another where there is demand for it; and this both between the different parts of the country and between similarly placed individuals.
At first these dealings were almost exclusively confined to borrowing and lending against banking security. But as the country's capital grew rapidly, and was economized more and more by the founding of banks, the funds at the disposal of these discount houses became so large that they went on to make advances — first on dock warrants (storage notes for goods in the docks), and then also on bills of lading representing produce that had not even arrived, although sometimes, if not regularly, bills had already been drawn on the commodity broker against it. This practice soon changed the whole character of English business. The facilities offered in Lombard Street gave the commodity brokers in Mincing Lane a much stronger position; they in turn passed the whole advantage on to the importing merchants, and these made such use of it that, whereas 25 years earlier borrowing against one's bills of lading or even one's dock warrants would have ruined a merchant's credit, in recent years the practice has become so general that it can be regarded as the rule, and no longer, as 25 years before, as a rare exception. Indeed the system has been carried so far that large sums have been raised in Lombard Street on bills drawn against the still growing harvests of distant colonies.
What these facilities led to was that the importing merchants extended their foreign business and locked up their floating capital — the capital with which their business had been conducted up to then — in the most objectionable of all investments, colonial plantations, over which they had little or no control. So we see the direct interlinking of credits. The capital of the country, accumulated in our farming districts, is laid down in small amounts as deposits in country banks and centralized in Lombard Street for use. But it has been made useful, first, for expanding business in our mining and industrial districts, by rediscounting bills to the banks there; and then also for granting greater facilities to importers of foreign produce, by advances on dock warrants and bills of lading, which set free the 'legitimate' mercantile capital of houses in foreign and colonial trade and allowed it to be put into the most objectionable of all investments, overseas plantations. (The Economist, 1847, p. 1334.)
That is the 'fine' interweaving of credits. The rural depositor imagines he is depositing only with his own banker, and further imagines that when the banker lends, it goes to private individuals the banker knows. He has not the remotest idea that this banker puts his deposit at the disposal of a London bill-broker, over whose operations neither of them has the slightest control.
We have already seen how large public undertakings, railway building for instance, can temporarily increase loan capital, in that the sums paid in remain available in the banks' hands for a certain time, until they are actually used.
The mass of loan capital, moreover, is quite a different thing from the quantity of circulation. By the quantity of circulation we mean here all the banknotes circulating in a country together with all its metal money, bars of precious metal included. One part of that total makes up the banks' reserve, and that part is always changing in size.
On 12 November 1857 — the day the Bank Act of 1844 was suspended — the whole reserve of the Bank of England, its branch banks included, came to only £580,751; deposits at the same time came to 22 1/2 million pounds, and close to 6 1/2 million of that belonged to the London bankers. (Bank Acts, 1858, p. LVII.)
Variations in the rate of interest depend on the supply of loan capital — and here we leave aside the variations that come about over longer periods, and the differences between the rates of interest in different countries; the first are conditioned by variations in the general rate of profit, the second by differences in profit rates and in the development of credit. That supply is the capital lent in the form of money, in metal and in notes, with all other circumstances, the state of confidence and so on, taken as equal. It is a different supply from industrial capital, which is lent as such, in commodity form, through commercial credit among the reproductive agents themselves.
But even so, the mass of this loanable money capital is different from the mass of circulating money, and independent of it.
Suppose £20 were lent out five times in a day. A money capital of £100 would then be lent — and that would also mean that this same £20 had acted at least four times as means of purchase or payment. For if it went without any purchase or payment in between, so that it had not stood for the transformed form of capital (commodities, labour-power among them) at least four times, it would not amount to a capital of £100, but only to five claims of £20 each.
In countries where credit is developed, we may assume that all money capital available for lending exists in the form of deposits with banks and money-lenders. That at least holds for business as a whole, on the large scale. Beyond that, in good times, before speculation proper is let loose, when credit is easy and confidence is growing, the greater part of the work of circulation is settled by a simple credit transfer, with no metal or paper money stepping in between.
The bare possibility of large deposit sums, while the quantity of means of circulation is relatively small, depends entirely on:
(1) how many purchases and payments the same piece of money carries out;
(2) how many times it comes back — how often it returns to the banks as a deposit — so that its repeated work as means of purchase and payment goes through its renewed transformation into a deposit. Take a retail trader who deposits £100 in money with his banker every week. The banker pays out part of a manufacturer's deposit with it; the manufacturer pays it out to the workers; the workers pay the retail trader with it; and he deposits it with the bank again. So the £100 the retail trader deposited has served: first, to pay out a deposit of the manufacturer's; second, to pay the workers; third, to pay the retail trader himself; and fourth, to deposit a further part of that same retail trader's money capital. For at the end of twenty weeks, if he had had nothing of his own to draw against this money, he would have deposited £2,000 in the bank with the same £100.
How far this money capital sits unused can be seen only from what flows in and out of the banks' reserve funds. That is why Mr Weguelin — Governor of the Bank of England in 1857 — concluded that the Bank of England's gold is the 'only' reserve capital:
1258. 'In my view, the rate of discount is in fact determined by the amount of unemployed capital that is present in the country. The amount of unemployed capital is represented by the reserve of the Bank of England, which is in fact a reserve of gold. So when the gold flows away, that reduces the amount of unemployed capital in the country, and therefore raises the value of the part that remains.' — 1364. [Newmarch:] 'The gold reserve of the Bank of England is in truth the central reserve, or the hoard of coin, on the basis of which the whole business of the country is carried on ... It is on this hoard, or this reservoir, that the effect of the foreign exchanges always falls.' (Report on Bank Acts, 1857.)
A measure of the accumulation of real capital, that is, of productive and commodity capital, is given by the statistics of exports and imports. And there it always shows that for the period over which English industry moved in ten-year cycles (1815–1870), the peak of the last prosperity before a crisis turns up again each time as the low point of the prosperity that follows next, and then rises to a far higher new peak.
In the prosperous year 1824, the real or declared value of the products exported by Great Britain and Ireland was £40,396,300. With the crisis of 1825, exports fall below that sum and swing between 35 and 39 million a year. With the returning prosperity of 1834 they rise above the earlier highest level, to £41,649,191, and in 1836 reach a new maximum of £53,368,571. In 1837 they fall again to 42 million, so that the new low already stands higher than the old peak, and then swing between 50 and 53 million.
The return of prosperity lifts the export figure in 1844 to 58 1/2 million, well past the maximum of 1836. In 1845 it reaches £60,111,082; falls again to a little over 57 million in 1846, almost 59 million in 1847, almost 53 million in 1848; rises in 1849 to 65 1/2 million, in 1853 to almost 99 million, 1854 to 97 million, 1855 to 94 1/2 million, 1856 to almost 116 million, and reaches its maximum in 1857 at 122 million. In 1858 it falls to 116 million, but is already up again in 1859 at 130 million, in 1860 at almost 136 million, in 1861 at only 125 million (here once more the new low is higher than the earlier peak), and in 1863 at 146 1/2 million.
The same could naturally be demonstrated for imports as well, since it is imports that show the market expanding. Here we are dealing only with the scale of production. (For England, of course, this applies only during the period of its actual industrial monopoly; but it applies in general to every country with modern large-scale industry, so long as the world market keeps expanding. — F. E.)
What we are looking at here is the accumulation of money capital — and only in so far as it does not express a stall in the flow of commercial credit, or a saving on the medium actually in circulation, or on the reserve capital held by those taking part in reproduction.
Besides these two cases, money capital can also pile up through an exceptional inflow of gold, as in 1852 and 1853, after the new gold mines in Australia and California. That gold was deposited in the Bank of England. The depositors took notes against it, and did not put those notes straight back on deposit with bankers. That swelled the circulating medium far beyond the usual. (Weguelin's evidence, B. A. 1857, no. 1329.) The Bank tried to put these deposits to work by cutting its discount rate to 2 per cent. Over six months of 1853 the pile of gold in the Bank rose to some £22-£23 million.
Money-lending capitalists plainly accumulate straight in the money form, whereas we have seen that the real accumulation of industrial capitalists as a rule takes place by adding to the elements of reproductive capital itself. So the growth of the credit system, and the huge concentration of the money-lending business in the hands of big banks, must by itself already speed up the accumulation of loanable capital — as a form that is different from real accumulation. This rapid growth of loan capital is therefore a result of real accumulation, since it follows from the development of the reproduction process; and the profit that is the source of accumulation for these money capitalists is only a deduction from the surplus-value that those engaged in reproduction extract (and at the same time an appropriation of part of the interest on other people's savings). The accumulation of loan capital comes at the cost of the industrial and the commercial capitalists alike.
We have seen how, in the bad phases of the industrial cycle, the rate of interest can climb so high that for particular branches — especially those badly placed — it temporarily swallows up the profit completely. At the same time, government paper and other securities fall in price. That is the moment when the money capitalists buy up these devalued securities in bulk, since in the later phases they soon rise back to their normal level and above it. They then sell them off, and in this way take over part of the public's money capital. The part they keep yields a higher interest, because it was bought below its price.
But all the profit the money capitalists make, and turn back into capital, they first turn into loanable money capital. So the accumulation of that loanable capital — distinct from real accumulation even though it is the offshoot of it — already follows if we look at the money capitalists, bankers and so on themselves: it is the accumulation of this particular class of capitalists. And it must grow with every extension of the credit system, as that extension accompanies the real expansion of the reproduction process.
When the rate of interest is low, this loss of value in money capital falls mainly on the depositors, not on the banks. Before joint-stock banking developed, three-quarters of all deposits in England lay in the banks earning no interest at all. Where interest is paid for them now, it is at least 1 per cent below the market rate.
As for the accumulation of money by the other classes of capitalists, we leave aside the part that is invested in interest-bearing paper and accumulates in that form. We look only at the part that is thrown on the market as loanable money capital.
Take first the part of the profit that is not spent as revenue but set aside for accumulation, and for which the industrial capitalists have no use yet in their own business. This profit exists to begin with in commodity capital, as part of its value, and is realized in money together with it. If it is not turned back into the elements of production of that commodity capital — we leave the merchant aside for now, since he gets a section of his own later — then it has to stay in the money form for a while. Its size grows with the size of the capital itself, even when the rate of profit is falling. The part to be spent as revenue is gradually consumed, but in the meantime it forms loan capital as a deposit with the banker. So even the growth of the part of profit that is spent as revenue finds expression in a gradual, constantly repeated accumulation of loan capital. And the same goes for the other part, the one meant for accumulation.
With the development of the credit system and its organization, the rise in revenue — that is, in the consumption of the industrial and commercial capitalists — likewise finds expression as an accumulation of loan capital. And this holds of every kind of revenue, in so far as it is consumed only gradually: ground-rent, the higher forms of salary, the incomes of the unproductive classes, and so on. All of them take the form of money revenue for a time, and can therefore be converted into deposits, and so into loan capital. It holds of all revenue, whether meant for consumption or meant for accumulation, that as soon as it exists in any money form at all it is a portion of value of the commodity capital that has been turned into money, and hence the expression and result of real accumulation — but not productive capital itself.
If a spinner has exchanged his yarn for cotton, except the part that forms his revenue, which he exchanged for money, then the real existence of his industrial capital is the yarn that has passed into the hands of the weaver, or perhaps of a private consumer; and that yarn, whether it serves for reproduction or for consumption, is the existence of both the capital value and the surplus-value contained in it. How large the surplus-value turned into money is depends on how large the surplus-value contained in the yarn is. But once it is turned into money, this money is only the value-existence of that surplus-value. And as such it becomes an element of loan capital. Nothing more is needed for that than its turning into a deposit, unless its owner has already lent it out. To be turned back into productive capital, on the other hand, it must first have grown to a certain minimum size.